on sophistical refutations-第14章

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accident　to　be　true　of　the　thing　as　well。　For　only　to　things　that



are　indistinguishable　and　one　in　essence　is　it　generally　agreed　that



all　the　same　attributes　belong；　whereas　in　the　case　of　a　good　thing；



to　be　good　is　not　the　same　as　to　be　going　to　be　the　subject　of　a



question；　nor　in　the　case　of　a　man　approaching；　or　wearing　a　mask；



is　'to　be　approaching'　the　same　thing　as　'to　be　Coriscus'；　so　that



suppose　I　know　Coriscus；　but　do　not　know　the　man　who　is　approaching；



it　still　isn't　the　case　that　I　both　know　and　do　not　know　the　same　man；



nor；　again；　if　this　is　mine　and　is　also　a　work　of　art；　is　it　therefore



my　work　of　art；　but　my　property　or　thing　or　something　else。　（The



solution　is　after　the　same　manner　in　the　other　cases　as　well。）



　　Some　solve　these　refutations　by　demolishing　the　original　proposition



asked：　for　they　say　that　it　is　possible　to　know　and　not　to　know　the



same　thing；　only　not　in　the　same　respect：　accordingly；　when　they　don't



know　the　man　who　is　coming　towards　them；　but　do　know　Corsicus；　they



assert　that　they　do　know　and　don't　know　the　same　object；　but　not　in



the　same　respect。　Yet；　as　we　have　already　remarked；　the　correction



of　arguments　that　depend　upon　the　same　point　ought　to　be　the　same；



whereas　this　one　will　not　stand　if　one　adopts　the　same　principle　in



regard　not　to　knowing　something；　but　to　being；　or　to　being　is　a　in　a



certain　state；　e。g。　suppose　that　X　is　father；　and　is　also　yours：　for



if　in　some　cases　this　is　true　and　it　is　possible　to　know　and　not　to



know　the　same　thing；　yet　with　that　case　the　solution　stated　has



nothing　to　do。　Certainly　there　is　nothing　to　prevent　the　same　argument



from　having　a　number　of　flaws；　but　it　is　not　the　exposition　of　any　and



every　fault　that　constitutes　a　solution：　for　it　is　possible　for　a



man　to　show　that　a　false　conclusion　has　been　proved；　but　not　to　show



on　what　it　depends；　e。g。　in　the　case　of　Zeno's　argument　to　prove



that　motion　is　impossible。　So　that　even　if　any　one　were　to　try　to



establish　that　this　doctrine　is　an　impossible　one；　he　still　is



mistaken；　and　even　if　he　proved　his　case　ten　thousand　times　over；



still　this　is　no　solution　of　Zeno's　argument：　for　the　solution　was　all



along　an　exposition　of　false　reasoning；　showing　on　what　its　falsity



depends。　If　then　he　has　not　proved　his　case；　or　is　trying　to　establish



even　a　true　proposition；　or　a　false　one；　in　a　false　manner；　to　point



this　out　is　a　true　solution。　Possibly；　indeed；　the　present



suggestion　may　very　well　apply　in　some　cases：　but　in　these　cases；　at



any　rate；　not　even　this　would　be　generally　agreed：　for　he　knows　both



that　Coriscus　is　Coriscus　and　that　the　approaching　figure　is



approaching。　To　know　and　not　to　know　the　same　thing　is　generally



thought　to　be　possible；　when　e。g。　one　knows　that　X　is　white；　but



does　not　realize　that　he　is　musical：　for　in　that　way　he　does　know



and　not　know　the　same　thing；　though　not　in　the　same　respect。　But　as　to



the　approaching　figure　and　Coriscus　he　knows　both　that　it　is



approaching　and　that　he　is　Coriscus。



　　A　like　mistake　to　that　of　those　whom　we　have　mentioned　is　that　of



those　who　solve　the　proof　that　every　number　is　a　small　number：　for　if；



when　the　conclusion　is　not　proved；　they　pass　this　over　and　say　that



a　conclusion　has　been　proved　and　is　true；　on　the　ground　that　every



number　is　both　great　and　small；　they　make　a　mistake。



　　Some　people　also　use　the　principle　of　ambiguity　to　solve　the



aforesaid　reasonings；　e。g。　the　proof　that　'X　is　your　father'；　or



'son'；　or　'slave'。　Yet　it　is　evident　that　if　the　appearance　a　proof



depends　upon　a　plurality　of　meanings；　the　term；　or　the　expression　in



question；　ought　to　bear　a　number　of　literal　senses；　whereas　no　one



speaks　of　A　as　being　'B's　child'　in　the　literal　sense；　if　B　is　the



child's　master；　but　the　combination　depends　upon　Accident。　'Is　A



yours？'　'Yes。'　'And　is　A　a　child？'　'Yes。'　'Then　the　child　A　is　yours；'



because　he　happens　to　be　both　yours　and　a　child；　but　he　is　not　'your



child'。



　　There　is　also　the　proof　that　'something　〃of　evils〃　is　good'；　for



wisdom　is　a　'knowledge　〃of　evils〃'。　But　the　expression　that　this　is



'of　so　and…so'　（='so…and…so's'）　has　not　a　number　of　meanings：　it　means



that　it　is　'so…and…so's　property'。　We　may　suppose　of　course；　on　the



other　hand；　that　it　has　a　number　of　meanings…for　we　also　say　that



man　is　'of　the　animals'；　though　not　their　property；　and　also　that



any　term　related　to　'evils'　in　a　way　expressed　by　a　genitive　case　is



on　that　account　a　so…and…so　'of　evils'；　though　it　is　not　one　of　the



evils…but　in　that　case　the　apparently　different　meanings　seem　to



depend　on　whether　the　term　is　used　relatively　or　absolutely。　'Yet　it



is　conceivably　possible　to　find　a　real　ambiguity　in　the　phrase



〃Something　of　evils　is　good〃。'　Perhaps；　but　not　with　regard　to　the



phrase　in　question。　It　would　occur　more　nearly；　suppose　that　'A



servant　is　good　of　the　wicked'；　though　perhaps　it　is　not　quite　found



even　there：　for　a　thing　may　be　'good'　and　be　'X's'　without　being　at



the　same　time　'X's　good'。　Nor　is　the　saying　that　'Man　is　of　the



animals'　a　phrase　with　a　number　of　meanings：　for　a　phrase　does　not



become　possessed　of　a　number　of　meanings　merely　suppose　we　express



it　elliptically：　for　we　express　'Give　me　the　Iliad'　by　quoting　half



a　line　of　it；　e。g。　'Give　me　〃Sing；　goddess；　of　the　wrath。。。〃'







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　　Those　arguments　which　depend　upon　an　expression　that　is　valid　of　a



particular　thing；　or　in　a　particular　respect；　or　place；　or　manner；



or　relation；　and　not　valid　absolutely；　should　be　solved　by　considering



the　conclusion　in　relation　to　its　contradictory；　to　see　if　any　of



these　things　can　possibly　have　happened　to　it。　For　it　is　impossible



for　contraries　and　opposites　and　an　affirmative　and　a　negative　to



belong　to　the　same　thing　absolutely；　there　is；　however；　nothing　to



prevent　each　from　belonging　in　a　particular　respect　or　relation　or



manner；　or　to　prevent　one　of　them　from　belonging　in　a　particular



respect　and　the　other　absolutely。　So　that　if　this　one　belongs



absolutely　and　that　one　in　a　particular　respect；　there　is　as　yet　no



refutation。　This　is　a　feature　one　has　to　find　in　the　conclusion　by



examining　it　in　comparison　with　its　contradictory。



　　All　arguments　of　the　following　kind　have　this　feature：　'Is　it



possible　for　what　is…not　to　be？　〃No。〃　But；　you　see；　it　is　something；



despite　its　not　being。'　Likewise　also；　Being　will　not　be；　for　it



will　not　he　some　particular　form　of　being。　Is　it　possible　for　the　same



man　at　the　same　time　to　be　a　keeper　and　a　breaker　of　his　oath？'　'Can



the　same　man　at　the　same　time　both　obey　and　disobey　the　same　man？'



Or　isn't　it　the　case　that　being　something　in　particular　and　Being



are　not　the　same？　On　the　other　hand；　Not…being；　even　if　it　be



something；　need　not　also　have　absolute　'being'　as　well。　Nor　if　a　man



keeps　his　oath　in　this　particular　instance　or　in　this　particular



respect；　is　he　bound　also　to　be　a　keeper　of　oaths　absolutely；　but　he



who　swears　that　he　will　break　his　oath；　and　then　breaks　it；　keeps　this



particular　oath　only；　he　is　not　a　keeper　of　his　oath：　nor　is　the



disobedient　man　'obedient'；　though　he　obeys　one　particular　command。



The　argument　is　similar；　also；　as　regards　the　problem　whether　the　same



man　can　at　the　same　time　say　what　is　both　false　and　true：　but　it



appears　to　be　a　troublesome　question　because　it　is　not　easy　to　see



in　which　of　the　two　connexions　the　word　'absolutely'　is　to　be



rendered…with　'true'　or　with　'false'。　There　is；　however；　nothing　to



prevent　it　from　being　false　absolutely；　though　true　in　some　particular



respect　or　relation；　i。e。　being　true　in　some　things；　though　not　'true'



absolutely。　Likewise　also　in　cases　of　some　particular　relation　and



place　and　time。　For　all　arguments　of　the　following　k