on sophistical refutations-第12章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




as　e。g。　that　'speaking　of　the　silent'　is　in　one　sense　possible　but



in　another　not　possible：　also　that　in　one　sense　'one　should　do　what



must　needs　be　done'；　but　not　in　another：　for　'what　must　needs　be'



bears　a　number　of　senses。　If；　however；　the　ambiguity　escapes　one；



one　should　correct　it　at　the　end　by　making　an　addition　to　the



question：　'Is　speaking　of　the　silent　possible？'　'No；　but　to　speak　of



while　he　is　silent　is　possible。'　Also；　in　cases　which　contain　the



ambiguity　in　their　premisses；　one　should　reply　in　like　manner：　'Do



people…then　not　understand　what　they　know？　〃Yes；　but　not　those　who



know　it　in　the　manner　described'：　for　it　is　not　the　same　thing　to



say　that　'those　who　know　cannot　understand　what　they　know'；　and　to　say



that　'those　who　know　something　in　this　particular　manner　cannot　do



so'。　In　general；　too；　even　though　he　draws　his　conclusion　in　a　quite



unambiguous　manner；　one　should　contend　that　what　he　has　negated　is　not



the　fact　which　one　has　asserted　but　only　its　name；　and　that



therefore　there　is　no　refutation。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　20







　　It　is　evident　also　how　one　should　solve　those　refutations　that



depend　upon　the　division　and　combination　of　words：　for　if　the



expression　means　something　different　when　divided　and　when　combined；



as　soon　as　one's　opponent　draws　his　conclusion　one　should　take　the



expression　in　the　contrary　way。　All　such　expressions　as　the



following　depend　upon　the　combination　or　division　of　the　words：　'Was　X



being　beaten　with　that　with　which　you　saw　him　being　beaten？'　and



'Did　you　see　him　being　beaten　with　that　with　which　he　was　being



beaten？'　This　fallacy　has　also　in　it　an　element　of　amphiboly　in　the



questions；　but　it　really　depends　upon　combination。　For　the　meaning



that　depends　upon　the　division　of　the　words　is　not　really　a　double



meaning　（for　the　expression　when　divided　is　not　the　same）；　unless　also



the　word　that　is　pronounced；　according　to　its　breathing；　as　eros　and



eros　is　a　case　of　double　meaning。　（In　writing；　indeed；　a　word　is　the



same　whenever　it　is　written　of　the　same　letters　and　in　the　same



manner…　and　even　there　people　nowadays　put　marks　at　the　side　to



show　the　pronunciation…　but　the　spoken　words　are　not　the　same。）



Accordingly　an　expression　that　depends　upon　division　is　not　an



ambiguous　one。　It　is　evident　also　that　not　all　refutations　depend　upon



ambiguity　as　some　people　say　they　do。



　　The　answerer；　then；　must　divide　the　expression：　for



'I…saw…a…man…being…beaten　with　my　eyes'　is　not　the　same　as　to　say　'I



saw　a　man　being…beaten…with…my…eyes'。　Also　there　is　the　argument　of



Euthydemus　proving　'Then　you　know　now　in　Sicily　that　there　are



triremes　in　Piraeus'：　and　again；　'Can　a　good　man　who　is　a　cobbler　be



bad？'　'No。'　'But　a　good　man　may　be　a　bad　cobbler：　therefore　a　good



cobbler　will　be　bad。'　Again；　'Things　the　knowledge　of　which　is　good；



are　good　things　to　learn；　aren't　they？'　'Yes。'　'The　knowledge；



however；　of　evil　is　good：　therefore　evil　is　a　good　thing　to　know。'



'Yes。　But；　you　see；　evil　is　both　evil　and　a　thing…to…learn；　so　that



evil　is　an　evil…thing…to…learn；　although　the　knowledge　of　evils　is



good。'　Again；　'Is　it　true　to　say　in　the　present　moment　that　you　are



born？'　'Yes。'　'Then　you　are　born　in　the　present　moment。'　'No；　the



expression　as　divided　has　a　different　meaning：　for　it　is　true　to



say…in…the…present…moment　that　〃you　are　born〃；　but　not　〃You　are



born…in…the…present…moment〃。'　Again；　'Could　you　do　what　you　can；　and



as　you　can？'　'Yes。'　'But　when　not　harping；　you　have　the　power　to　harp：



and　therefore　you　could　harp　when　not　harping。'　'No：　he　has　not　the



power　to　harp…while…not…harping；　merely；　when　he　is　not　doing　it；　he



has　the　power　to　do　it。'　Some　people　solve　this　last　refutation　in



another　way　as　well。　For；　they　say；　if　he　has　granted　that　he　can　do



anything　in　the　way　he　can；　still　it　does　not　follow　that　he　can



harp　when　not　harping：　for　it　has　not　been　granted　that　he　will　do



anything　in　every　way　in　which　he　can；　and　it　is　not　the　same　thing'



to　do　a　thing　in　the　way　he　can'　and　'to　do　it　in　every　way　in　which



he　can'。　But　evidently　they　do　not　solve　it　properly：　for　of　arguments



that　depend　upon　the　same　point　the　solution　is　the　same；　whereas　this



will　not　fit　all　cases　of　the　kind　nor　yet　all　ways　of　putting　the



questions：　it　is　valid　against　the　questioner；　but　not　against　his



argument。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　21







　　Accentuation　gives　rise　to　no　fallacious　arguments；　either　as



written　or　as　spoken；　except　perhaps　some　few　that　might　be　made　up；



e。g。　the　following　argument。　'Is　ou　katalueis　a　house？'　'Yes。'　'Is



then　ou　katalueis　the　negation　of　katalueis？'　'Yes。'　'But　you



said　that　ou　katalueis　is　a　house：　therefore　the　house　is　a



negation。'　How　one　should　solve　this；　is　clear：　for　the　word　does



not　mean　the　same　when　spoken　with　an　acuter　and　when　spoken　with　a



graver　accent。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　22







　　It　is　clear　also　how　one　must　meet　those　fallacies　that　depend　on



the　identical　expressions　of　things　that　are　not　identical；　seeing



that　we　are　in　possession　of　the　kinds　of　predications。　For　the　one



man；　say；　has　granted；　when　asked；　that　a　term　denoting　a　substance



does　not　belong　as　an　attribute；　while　the　other　has　shown　that　some



attribute　belongs　which　is　in　the　Category　of　Relation　or　of　Quantity；



but　is　usually　thought　to　denote　a　substance　because　of　its



expression；　e。g。　in　the　following　argument：　'Is　it　possible　to　be



doing　and　to　have　done　the　same　thing　at　the　same　time？'　'No。'　'But；



you　see；　it　is　surely　possible　to　be　seeing　and　to　have　seen　the



same　thing　at　the　same　time；　and　in　the　same　aspect。'　Again；　'Is　any



mode　of　passivity　a　mode　of　activity？'　'No。'　'Then　〃he　is　cut〃；　〃he　is



burnt〃；　〃he　is　struck　by　some　sensible　object〃　are　alike　in　expression



and　all　denote　some　form　of　passivity；　while　again　〃to　say〃；　〃to　run〃；



〃to　see〃　are　like　one　like　one　another　in　expression：　but；　you　see；



〃to　see〃　is　surely　a　form　of　being　struck　by　a　sensible　object；



therefore　it　is　at　the　same　time　a　form　of　passivity　and　of　activity。'



Suppose；　however；　that　in　that　case　any　one；　after　granting　that　it　is



not　possible　to　do　and　to　have　done　the　same　thing　in　the　same　time；



were　to　say　that　it　is　possible　to　see　and　to　have　seen　it；　still　he



has　not　yet　been　refuted；　suppose　him　to　say　that　'to　see'　is　not　a



form　of　'doing'　（activity）　but　of　'passivity'：　for　this　question　is



required　as　well；　though　he　is　supposed　by　the　listener　to　have



already　granted　it；　when　he　granted　that　'to　cut'　is　a　form　of



present；　and　'to　have　cut'　a　form　of　past；　activity；　and　so　on　with



the　other　things　that　have　a　like　expression。　For　the　listener　adds



the　rest　by　himself；　thinking　the　meaning　to　be　alike：　whereas



really　the　meaning　is　not　alike；　though　it　appears　to　be　so　because　of



the　expression。　The　same　thing　happens　here　as　happens　in　cases　of



ambiguity：　for　in　dealing　with　ambiguous　expressions　the　tyro　in



argument　supposes　the　sophist　to　have　negated　the　fact　which　he　（the



tyro）　affirmed；　and　not　merely　the　name：　whereas　there　still　wants　the



question　whether　in　using　the　ambiguous　term　he　had　a　single　meaning



in　view：　for　if　he　grants　that　that　was　so；　the　refutation　will　be



effected。



　　Like　the　above　are　also　the　following　arguments。　It　is　asked　if　a



man　has　lost　what　he　once　had　and　afterwards　has　not：　for　a　man　will



no　longer　have　ten　dice　even　though　he　has　only　lost　one　die。　No：



rather　it　is　that　he　has　lost　what　he　had　before　and　has　not　now；



but　there　is　no　necessity　for　him　to　have　lost　as　much　or　as　many



things　as　he　has　not　now。　So　then；　he　asks　the　questions　as　to　what　he



has；　and　draws　the　conclusion　as　to　the　whole　number　that　he　has：



for