parmenides-第4章
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And what is the nature of this exercise； Parmenides； which you would
recommend？
That which you heard Zeno practising； at the same time； I give you
credit for saying to him that you did not care to examine the
perplexity in reference to visible things； or to consider the question
that way； but only in reference to objects of thought； and to what may
be called ideas。
Why； yes； he said； there appears to me to be no difficulty in
showing by this method that visible things are like and unlike and may
experience anything。
Quite true； said Parmenides； but I think that you should go a step
further； and consider not only the consequences which flow from a
given hypothesis； but also the consequences which flow from denying
the hypothesis； and that will be still better training for you。
What do you mean？ he said。
I mean； for example； that in the case of this very hypothesis of
Zeno's about the many； you should inquire not only what will be the
consequences to the many in relation to themselves and to the one； and
to the one in relation to itself and the many； on the hypothesis of
the being of the many； but also what will be the consequences to the
one and the many in their relation to themselves and to each other； on
the opposite hypothesis。 Or； again； if likeness is or is not； what
will be the consequences in either of these cases to the subjects of
the hypothesis； and to other things； in relation both to themselves
and to one another； and so of unlikeness； and the same holds good of
motion and rest； of generation and destruction； and even of being
and not…being。 In a word； when you suppose anything to be or not to
be； or to be in any way affected； you must look at the consequences in
relation to the thing itself； and to any other things which you
choose…to each of them singly； to more than one； and to all； and so of
other things； you must look at them in relation to themselves and to
anything else which you suppose either to be or not to be； if you
would train yourself perfectly and see the real truth。
That； Parmenides； is a tremendous business of which you speak； and I
do not quite understand you； will you take some hypothesis and go
through the steps？…then I shall apprehend you better。
That； Socrates； is a serious task to impose on a man of my years。
Then will you； Zeno？ said Socrates。
Zeno answered with a smile：…Let us make our petition to Parmenides
himself； who is quite right in saying that you are hardly aware of the
extent of the task which you are imposing on him； and if there were
more of us I should not ask him； for these are not subjects which
any one； especially at his age； can well speak of before a large
audience； most people are not aware that this round…about progress
through all things is the only way in which the mind can attain
truth and wisdom。 And therefore； Parmenides； I join in the request
of Socrates； that I may hear the process again which I have not
heard for a long time。
When Zeno had thus spoken； Pythodorus； according to Antiphon's
report of him； said； that he himself and Aristoteles and the whole
company entreated Parmenides to give an example of the process。 I
cannot refuse； said Parmenides； and yet I feel rather like Ibycus；
who； when in his old age； against his will； he fell in love；
compared himself to an old racehorse； who was about to run in a
chariot race； shaking with fear at the course he knew so well…this was
his simile of himself。 And I also experience a trembling when I
remember through what an ocean of words I have to wade at my time of
life。 But I must indulge you； as Zeno says that I ought； and we are
alone。 Where shall I begin？ And what shall be our first hypothesis； if
I am to attempt this laborious pastime？ Shall I begin with myself； and
take my own hypothesis the one？ and consider the consequences which
follow on the supposition either of the being or of the not being of
one？
By all means； said Zeno。
And who will answer me？ he said。 Shall I propose the youngest？ He
will not make difficulties and will be the most likely to say what
he thinks； and his answers will give me time to breathe。
I am the one whom you mean； Parmenides； said Aristoteles； for I am
the youngest and at your service。 Ask； and I will answer。
Parmenides proceeded： If one is； he said； the one cannot be many？
Impossible。
Then the one cannot have parts； and cannot be a whole？
Why not？
Because every part is part of a whole； is it not？
Yes。
And what is a whole？ would not that of which no part is wanting be a
whole？
Certainly。
Then； in either case； the one would be made up of parts； both as
being a whole； and also as having parts？
To be sure。
And in either case； the one would be many； and not one？
True。
But； surely； it ought to be one and not many？
It ought。
Then； if the one is to remain one； it will not be a whole； and
will not have parts？
No。
But if it has no parts； it will have neither beginning； middle；
nor end； for these would of course be parts of it。
Right。
But then； again； a beginning and an end are the limits of
everything？
Certainly。
Then the one； having neither beginning nor end； is unlimited？
Yes； unlimited。
And therefore formless； for it cannot partake either of round or
straight。
But why？
Why； because the round is that of which all the extreme points are
equidistant from the centre？
Yes。
And the straight is that of which the centre intercepts the view
of the extremes？
True。
Then the one would have parts and would be many； if it partook
either of a straight or of a circular form？
Assuredly。
But having no parts； it will be neither straight nor round？
Right。
And； being of such a nature； it cannot be in any place； for it
cannot be either in another or in itself。
How so？
Because if it were in another； it would be encircled by that in
which it was； and would touch it at many places and with many parts；
but that which is one and indivisible； and does not partake of a
circular nature； cannot be touched all round in many places。
Certainly not。
But if； on the other hand； one were in itself； it would also be
contained by nothing else but itself； that is to say； if it were
really in itself； for nothing can be in anything which does not
contain it。
Impossible。
But then； that which contains must be other than that which is
contained？ for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once； and
if so； one will be no longer one； but two？
True。
Then one cannot be anywhere； either in itself or in another？
No。
Further consider； whether that which is of such a nature can have
either rest or motion。
Why not？
Why； because the one； if it were moved； would be either moved in
place or changed in nature； for these are the only kinds of motion。
Yes。
And the one； when it changes and ceases to be itself； cannot be
any longer one。
It cannot。
It cannot therefore experience the sort of motion which is change of
nature？
Clearly not。
Then can the motion of the one be in place？
Perhaps。
But if the one moved in place； must it not either move round and
round in the same place； or from one place to another？
It must。
And that which moves in a circle must rest upon a centre； and that
which goes round upon a centre must have parts which are different
from the centre； but that which has no centre and no parts cannot
possibly be carried round upon a centre？
Impossible。
But perhaps the motion of the one consists in change of place？
Perhaps so； if it moves at all。
And have
