parmenides-第3章
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participates in the ideas； must you not say either that everything
is made up of thoughts； and that all things think； or that they are
thoughts but have no thought？
The latter view； Parmenides； is no more rational than the previous
one。 In my opinion； the ideas are； as it were； patterns fixed in
nature； and other things are like them； and resemblances of
them…what is meant by the participation of other things in the
ideas； is really assimilation to them。
But if； said he； the individual is like the idea； must not the
idea also be like the individual； in so far as the individual is a
resemblance of the idea？ That which is like； cannot be conceived of as
other than the like of like。
Impossible。
And when two things are alike； must they not partake of the same
idea？
They must。
And will not that of which the two partake； and which makes them
alike； be the idea itself？
Certainly。
Then the idea cannot be like the individual； or the individual
like the idea； for if they are alike； some further idea of likeness
will always be coming to light； and if that be like anything else；
another； and new ideas will be always arising； if the idea resembles
that which partakes of it？
Quite true。
The theory； then that other things participate in the ideas by
resemblance； has to be given up； and some other mode of
participation devised？
It would seem so。
Do you see then； Socrates； how great is the difficulty of
affirming the ideas to be absolute？
Yes； indeed。
And； further； let me say that as yet you only understand a small
part of the difficulty which is involved if you make of each thing a
single idea； parting it off from other things。
What difficulty？ he said。
There are many； but the greatest of all is this：…If an opponent
argues that these ideas； being such as we say they ought to be； must
remain unknown； no one can prove to him that he is wrong； unless he
who denies their existence be a man of great ability and knowledge；
and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration； he will
remain unconvinced； and still insist that they cannot be known。
What do you mean； Parmenides？ said Socrates。
In the first place； I think； Socrates； that you； or any one who
maintains the existence of absolute essences； will admit that they
cannot exist in us。
No； said Socrates； for then they would be no longer absolute。
True； he said； and therefore when ideas are what they are in
relation to one another； their essence is determined by a relation
among themselves； and has nothing to do with the resemblances； or
whatever they are to be termed； which are in our sphere； and from
which we receive this or that name when we partake of them。 And the
things which are within our sphere and have the same names with
them； are likewise only relative to one another； and not to the
ideas which have the same names with them； but belong to themselves
and not to them。
What do you mean？ said Socrates。
I may illustrate my meaning in this way； said Parmenides：…A master
has a slave； now there is nothing absolute in the relation between
them； which is simply a relation of one man to another。 But there is
also an idea of mastership in the abstract； which is relative to the
idea of slavery in the abstract。 These natures have nothing to do with
us； nor we with them； they are concerned with themselves only； and
we with ourselves。 Do you see my meaning？
Yes； said Socrates； I quite see your meaning。
And will not knowledge…I mean absolute knowledge…answer to
absolute truth？
Certainly。
And each kind of absolute knowledge will answer to each kind of
absolute being？
Yes。
But the knowledge which we have； will answer to the truth which we
have； and again； each kind of knowledge which we have； will be a
knowledge of each kind of being which we have？
Certainly。
But the ideas themselves； as you admit； we have not； and cannot
have？
No； we cannot。
And the absolute natures or kinds are known severally by the
absolute idea of knowledge？
Yes。
And we have not got the idea of knowledge？
No。
Then none of the ideas are known to us； because we have no share
in absolute knowledge？
I suppose not。
Then the nature of the beautiful in itself； and of the good in
itself； and all other ideas which we suppose to exist absolutely；
are unknown to us？
It would seem so。
I think that there is a stranger consequence still。
What is it？
Would you； or would you not say； that absolute knowledge； if there
is such a thing； must be a far more exact knowledge than our
knowledge； and the same of beauty and of the rest？
Yes。
And if there be such a thing as participation in absolute knowledge；
no one is more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge？
Certainly。
But then； will God； having absolute knowledge； have a knowledge of
human things？
Why not？
Because； Socrates； said Parmenides； we have admitted that the
ideas are not valid in relation to human things； nor human things in
relation to them； the relations of either are limited to their
respective spheres。
Yes； that has been admitted。
And if God has this perfect authority； and perfect knowledge； his
authority cannot rule us； nor his knowledge know us； or any human
thing； just as our authority does not extend to the gods； nor our
knowledge know anything which is divine； so by parity of reason
they； being gods； are not our masters； neither do they know the things
of men。
Yet； surely； said Socrates； to deprive God of knowledge is
monstrous。
These； Socrates； said Parmenides； are a few； and only a few of the
difficulties in which we are involved if ideas really are and we
determine each one of them to be an absolute unity。 He who hears
what may be said against them will deny the very existence of them…and
even if they do exist； he will say that they must of necessity be
unknown to man； and he will seem to have reason on his side； and as we
were remarking just now； will be very difficult to convince； a man
must be gifted with very considerable ability before he can learn that
everything has a class and an absolute essence； and still more
remarkable will he be who discovers all these things for himself；
and having thoroughly investigated them is able to teach them to
others。
I agree with you； Parmenides； said Socrates； and what you say is
very much to my mind。
And yet； Socrates； said Parmenides； if a man； fixing his attention
on these and the like difficulties； does away with ideas of things and
will not admit that every individual thing has its own determinate
idea which is always one and the same； he will have nothing on which
his mind can rest； and so he will utterly destroy the power of
reasoning； as you seem to me to have particularly noted。
Very true； he said。
But； then； what is to become of philosophy？ Whither shall we turn；
if the ideas are unknown？
I certainly do not see my way at present。
Yes； said Parmenides； and I think that this arises； Socrates； out of
your attempting to define the beautiful； the just； the good； and the
ideas generally； without sufficient previous training。 I noticed
your deficiency； when I heard you talking here with your friend
Aristoteles； the day before yesterday。 The impulse that carries you
towards philosophy is assuredly noble and divine； but there is an
art which is called by the vulgar idle talking； and which is of
imagined to be useless； in that you must train and exercise
yourself； now that you are young； or truth will elude your grasp。
And what is the nature of this exercise； Parmenides； which you woul
