parmenides-第2章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！




hand；　he　wants　to　prove　that　I　am　one；　he　will　say；　that　we　who　are



here　assembled　are　seven；　and　that　I　am　one　and　partake　of　the　one。　In



both　instances　he　proves　his　case。　So　again；　if　a　person　shows　that



such　things　as　wood；　stones；　and　the　like；　being　many　are　also　one；　we



admit　that　he　shows　the　coexistence　the　one　and　many；　but　he　does



not　show　that　the　many　are　one　or　the　one　many；　he　is　uttering　not　a



paradox　but　a　truism。　If　however；　as　I　just　now　suggested；　some　one



were　to　abstract　simple　notions　of　like；　unlike；　one；　many；　rest；



motion；　and　similar　ideas；　and　then　to　show　that　these　admit　of



admixture　and　separation　in　themselves；　I　should　be　very　much



astonished。　This　part　of　the　argument　appears　to　be　treated　by　you；



Zeno；　in　a　very　spirited　manner；　but；　as　I　was　saying；　I　should　be　far



more　amazed　if　any　one　found　in　the　ideas　themselves　which　are



apprehended　by　reason；　the　same　puzzle　and　entanglement　which　you　have



shown　to　exist　in　visible　objects。



　　While　Socrates　was　speaking；　Pythodorus　thought　that　Parmenides



and　Zeno　were　not　altogether　pleased　at　the　successive　steps　of　the



argument；　but　still　they　gave　the　closest　attention　and　often　looked



at　one　another；　and　smiled　as　if　in　admiration　of　him。　When　he　had



finished；　Parmenides　expressed　their　feelings　in　the　following　words：…



　　Socrates；　he　said；　I　admire　the　bent　of　your　mind　towards



philosophy；　tell　me　now；　was　this　your　own　distinction　between　ideas



in　themselves　and　the　things　which　partake　of　them？　and　do　you　think



that　there　is　an　idea　of　likeness　apart　from　the　likeness　which　we



possess；　and　of　the　one　and　many；　and　of　the　other　things　which　Zeno



mentioned？



　　I　think　that　there　are　such　ideas；　said　Socrates。



　　Parmenides　proceeded：　And　would　you　also　make　absolute　ideas　of



the　just　and　the　beautiful　and　the　good；　and　of　all　that　class？



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　should。



　　And　would　you　make　an　idea　of　man　apart　from　us　and　from　all　other



human　creatures；　or　of　fire　and　water？



　　I　am　often　undecided；　Parmenides；　as　to　whether　I　ought　to　include



them　or　not。



　　And　would　you　feel　equally　undecided；　Socrates；　about　things　of



which　the　mention　may　provoke　a　smile？…I　mean　such　things　as　hair；



mud；　dirt；　or　anything　else　which　is　vile　and　paltry；　would　you



suppose　that　each　of　these　has　an　idea　distinct　from　the　actual



objects　with　which　we　come　into　contact；　or　not？



　　Certainly　not；　said　Socrates；　visible　things　like　these　are　such



as　they　appear　to　us；　and　I　am　afraid　that　there　would　be　an　absurdity



in　assuming　any　idea　of　them；　although　I　sometimes　get　disturbed；



and　begin　to　think　that　there　is　nothing　without　an　idea；　but　then



again；　when　I　have　taken　up　this　position；　I　run　away；　because　I　am



afraid　that　I　may　fall　into　a　bottomless　pit　of　nonsense；　and



perish；　and　so　I　return　to　the　ideas　of　which　I　was　just　now　speaking；



and　occupy　myself　with　them。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　said　Parmenides；　that　is　because　you　are　still　young；



the　time　will　come；　if　I　am　not　mistaken；　when　philosophy　will　have



a　firmer　grasp　of　you；　and　then　you　will　not　despise　even　the



meanest　things；　at　your　age；　you　are　too　much　disposed　to　regard



opinions　of　men。　But　I　should　like　to　know　whether　you　mean　that　there



are　certain　ideas　of　which　all　other　things　partake；　and　from　which



they　derive　their　names；　that　similars；　for　example；　become　similar；



because　they　partake　of　similarity；　and　great　things　become　great；



because　they　partake　of　greatness；　and　that　just　and　beautiful



things　become　just　and　beautiful；　because　they　partake　of　justice



and　beauty？



　　Yes；　certainly；　said　Socrates　that　is　my　meaning。



　　Then　each　individual　partakes　either　of　the　whole　of　the　idea　or



else　of　a　part　of　the　idea？　Can　there　be　any　other　mode　of



participation？



　　There　cannot　be；　he　said。



　　Then　do　you　think　that　the　whole　idea　is　one；　and　yet；　being　one；　is



in　each　one　of　the　many？



　　Why　not；　Parmenides？　said　Socrates。



　　Because　one　and　the　same　thing　will　exist　as　a　whole　at　the　same



time　in　many　separate　individuals；　and　will　therefore　be　in　a　state　of



separation　from　itself。



　　Nay；　but　the　idea　may　be　like　the　day　which　is　one　and　the　same　in



many　places　at　once；　and　yet　continuous　with　itself；　in　this　way



each　idea　may　be　one；　and　the　same　in　all　at　the　same　time。



　　I　like　your　way；　Socrates；　of　making　one　in　many　places　at　once。　You



mean　to　say；　that　if　I　were　to　spread　out　a　sail　and　cover　a　number　of



men；　there　would　be　one　whole　including　many…is　not　that　your　meaning？



　　I　think　so。



　　And　would　you　say　that　the　whole　sail　includes　each　man；　or　a　part



of　it　only；　and　different　parts　different　men？



　　The　latter。



　　Then；　Socrates；　the　ideas　themselves　will　be　divisible；　and　things



which　participate　in　them　will　have　a　part　of　them　only　and　not　the



whole　idea　existing　in　each　of　them？



　　That　seems　to　follow。



　　Then　would　you　like　to　say；　Socrates；　that　the　one　idea　is　really



divisible　and　yet　remains　one？



　　Certainly　not；　he　said。



　　Suppose　that　you　divide　absolute　greatness；　and　that　of　the　many



great　things；　each　one　is　great　in　virtue　of　a　portion　of　greatness



less　than　absolute　greatness…is　that　conceivable？



　　No。



　　Or　will　each　equal　thing；　if　possessing　some　small　portion　of



equality　less　than　absolute　equality；　be　equal　to　some　other　thing



by　virtue　of　that　portion　only？



　　Impossible。



　　Or　suppose　one　of　us　to　have　a　portion　of　smallness；　this　is　but　a



part　of　the　small；　and　therefore　the　absolutely　small　is　greater；　if



the　absolutely　small　be　greater；　that　to　which　the　part　of　the　small



is　added　will　be　smaller　and　not　greater　than　before。



　　How　absurd！



　　Then　in　what　way；　Socrates；　will　all　things　participate　in　the



ideas；　if　they　are　unable　to　participate　in　them　either　as　parts　or



wholes？



　　Indeed；　he　said；　you　have　asked　a　question　which　is　not　easily



answered。



　　Well；　said　Parmenides；　and　what　do　you　say　of　another　question？



　　What　question？



　　I　imagine　that　the　way　in　which　you　are　led　to　assume　one　idea　of



each　kind　is　as　follows：　…You　see　a　number　of　great　objects；　and



when　you　look　at　them　there　seems　to　you　to　be　one　and　the　same　idea



（or　nature）　in　them　all；　hence　you　conceive　of　greatness　as　one。



　　Very　true；　said　Socrates。



　　And　if　you　go　on　and　allow　your　mind　in　like　manner　to　embrace　in



one　view　the　idea　of　greatness　and　of　great　things　which　are　not　the



idea；　and　…to　compare　them；　will　not　another　greatness　arise；　which



will　appear　to　be　the　source　of　all　these？



　　It　would　seem　so。



　　Then　another　idea　of　greatness　now　comes　into　view　over　and　above



absolute　greatness；　and　the　individuals　which　partake　of　it；　and



then　another；　over　and　above　all　these；　by　virtue　of　which　they　will



all　be　great；　and　so　each　idea　instead　of　being　one　will　be　infinitely



multiplied。



　　But　may　not　the　ideas；　asked　Socrates；　be　thoughts　only；　and　have　no



proper　existence　except　in　our　minds；　Parmenides？　For　in　that　case



each　idea　may　still　be　one；　and　not　experience　this　infinite



multiplication。



　　And　can　there　be　individual　thoughts　which　are　thoughts　of　nothing？



　　Impossible；　he　said。



　　The　thought　must　be　of　something？



　　Yes。



　　Of　something　which　is　or　which　is　not？



　　Of　something　which　is。



　　Must　it　not　be　of　a　single　something；　which　the　thought　recognizes



as　attaching　to　all；　being　a　single　form　or　nature？



　　Yes。



　　And　will　not　the　something　which　is　apprehended　as　one　and　the



same　in　all；　be　an　idea？



　　From　that；　again；　there　is　no　escape。



　　Then；　said　Parmenides；　if　you　say　that　everything　else



participates　in　the　ideas；　must　you　not　say　either　that　everything



is　made　up　of　thoughts；　and　that　all　things　think；　or　th