second treatise of government-第38章
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nferior de superiori supplicium sumat。 Quod itaque populus malum； antequam factum sit； impedire potest； ne fiat； id postquam factum est； in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest： populus igitur hoc amplius quam privatus quispiam habet： quod
huic； vel ipsis adversariis judicibus； excepto Buchanano； nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest。 Cum ille si intolerabilis tyrannus est （modicum enim ferre omnino debet） resistere cum reverentia possit； Barclay contra Monarchom。 1。 iii。 c。 8。
In English thus：
Sec。 233。 But if any one should ask； Must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny？ Must they see their cities pillaged； and laid in ashes； their wives and children exposed to the tyrant's lust and fury； and themselves and families reduced by their king to ruin； and all the miseries of want and oppression； and yet sit still？ Must men alone be debarred the common privilege of opposing force with force； which nature allows so freely to all other creatures for their preservation from injury？ I answer： Self…defence is a part of the law of nature； nor can it be denied the community； even against the king himself： but to revenge themselves upon him； must by no means be allowed them； it being not agreeable to that law。 Wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred； not only to some particular persons； but sets himself against the body of the common…wealth； whereof he is the head； and shall； with intolerable ill usage； cruelly tyrannize over the u7hole； or a considerable part of the people； in this case the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury： but it must be with this caution； that they only defend themselves； but do not attack their prince： they may repair the damages received； but must not for any provocation exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect。 They may repulse the present attempt； but must not revenge past violences： for it is natural for us to defend life and limb； but that an inferior should punish a superior； is against nature。 The mischief which is designed them； the people may prevent before it be done； but when it is done； they must not revenge it on the king； though author of the villany。 This therefore is the privilege of the people in general； above what any private person hath； that particular men are allowed by our adversaries themselves （Buchanan only excepted） to have no other remedy but patience； but the body of the people may with respect resist intolerable tyranny； for when it is but moderate； they ought to endure it。 Sec。 234。 Thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance。 Sec。 235。 It is true； he has annexed two limitations to it； to no purpose： First； He says； it must be with reverence。 Secondly； It must be without retribution； or punishment； and the reason he gives is； because an inferior cannot punish a superior。 First； How to resist force without striking again； or how to strike with reverence； will need some skill to make intelligible。 He that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows； or in any more respectful posture； without a sword in his hand； to abate the confidence and force of the assailant； will quickly be at an end of his resistance； and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage。 This is as ridiculous a way of resisting； as juvenal thought it of fighting； ubi tu pulsas； ego vapulo tantum。 And the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same he there describes it：
… Libertas pauperis haec est： Pulsatus rogat； & pugnis concisus； adorat； Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti。
This will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance； where men may not strike again。 He therefore who may resist； must be allowed to strike。 And then let our author； or any body
else； join a knock on the head； or a cut on the face； with as much reverence and respect as he thinks fit。 He that can reconcile blows and reverence； may； for aught I know； desire for his pains； a civil； respectful cudgeling where…ever he can meet with it。 Secondly； As to his second； An inferior cannot punish a superior； that is true； generally speaking； whilst he is his superior。 But to resist force with force； being the state of war that levels the parties； cancels all former relation of reverence； respect； and superiority： and then the odds that remains； is； that he； who opposes the unjust agressor； has this superiority over him； that he has a right； when he prevails； to punish the offender； both for the breach of the peace； and all the evils that followed upon it。 Barclay therefore； in another place； more coherently to himself； denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case。 But he there assigns two cases； whereby a king may un…king himself。 His words are； Quid ergo； nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suaque authoritate liceat？ Nulli certe quamdiu rex manet。 Semper enim ex divinis id obstat； Regem honorificato； & qui potestati resistit； Dei ordinationi resisit： non alias igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat。 Tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber： hoc modo populus & superior efficitur； reverso ad eum sc。 jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit。 At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt。 At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem； duo tantum invenio； duos； inquam； casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit； quorum etiam meminit Winzerus。 Horum unus est； Si regnum disperdat； quemadmodum de Nerone fertur； quod is nempe senatum populumque Romanum； atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare； ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset。 Et de Caligula； quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore； inque animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque Alexandriam commigrare； ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret； unam ei cervicem optavit。 Talia cum rex aliquis meditator & molitur serio； omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit； ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit； ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti dominium。 Sec。 236。 Alter casus est； Si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit； ac regnum quod liberum a majoribus & populo traditum accepit； alienae ditioni mancipavit。 Nam tunc quamvis forte non ea mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet： tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amifit； ut summus scilicet in regno secundum Deum sit； & solo Deo inferior； atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum； cujus libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit； in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit； hac velut quadam regni ab alienatione effecit； ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit retineat； nec in eum cui collatum voluit； juris quicquam transferat； atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit； cujus rei exemplum unum annales Scotici suppeditant。 Barclay contra Monarchom。 1。 iii。 c。 16。
Which in English runs thus：
Sec。 237。 What then； can there no case happen wherein the people may of right； and by their own authority； help themselves； take arms； and set upon their king； imperiously domineering over them？ None at all； whilst he remains a king。 Honour the king； and he that resists the power； resists the ordinance of God； are divine oracles that will never permit it； The people therefore can never come by a power over him； unless he does something that
makes him cease to be a king： for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity； and returns to the state of a private man； and the people become free and superior； the power which they had in the interregnum； before they crowned him king； devolving to them again。 But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state。 After considering it well on all sides； I can find but two。
