second treatise of government-第36章

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and　violence。　　Whensoever　therefore　the　　legislative　shall　transgress　this　fundamental　rule　of　society；　

and　either　by　ambition；　fear；　folly　or　corruption；　endeavour　to　　grasp　themselves；　or　put　into　the　hands　of　any　other；　an　absolute　　power　over　the　lives；　liberties；　and　estates　of　the　people；　by　　this　breach　of　trust　they　forfeit　the　power　the　people　had　put　　into　their　hands　for　quite　contrary　ends；　and　it　devolves　to　the　　people；　who。　　have　a　right　to　resume　their　original　liberty；　and；　　by　the　establishment　of　a　new　legislative；　（such　as　they　shall　　think　fit）　provide　for　their　own　safety　and　security；　which　is　　the　end　for　which　they　are　in　society。　　What　I　have　said　here；　　concerning　the　legislative　in　general；　holds　true　also　concerning　　the　supreme　executor；　who　having　a　double　trust　put　in　him；　both　　to　have　a　part　in　the　legislative；　and　the　supreme　execution　of　　the　law；　acts　against　both；　when　he　goes　about　to　set　up　his　own　　arbitrary　will　as　the　law　of　the　society。　　He　acts　also　contrary　　to　his　trust；　when　he　either　employs　the　force；　treasure；　and　　offices　of　the　society；　to　corrupt　the　representatives；　and　gain　　them　to　his　purposes；　or　openly　preengages　the　electors；　and　　prescribes　to　their　choice；　such；　whom　he　has；　by　sollicitations；　　threats；　promises；　or　otherwise；　won　to　his　designs；　and　employs　　them　to　bring　in　such；　who　have　promised　before…hand　what　to　　vote；　and　what　to　enact。　　Thus　to　regulate　candidates　and　　electors；　and　new…model　the　ways　of　election；　what　is　it　but　to　　cut　up　the　government　by　the　roots；　and　poison　the　very　fountain　　of　public　security？　for　the　people　having　reserved　to　themselves　　the　choice　of　their　representatives；　as　the　fence　to　their　　properties；　could　do　it　for　no　other　end；　but　that　they　might　　always　be　freely　chosen；　and　so　chosen；　freely　act；　and　advise；　　as　the　necessity　of　the　common…wealth；　and　the　public　good　　should；　upon　examination；　and　mature　debate；　be　judged　to　　require。　　This；　those　who　give　their　votes　before　they　hear　the　　debate；　and　have　weighed　the　reasons　on　all　sides；　are　not　　capable　of　doing。　　To　prepare　such　an　assembly　as　this；　and　　endeavour　to　set　up　the　declared　abettors　of　his　own　will；　for　　the　true　representatives　of　the　people；　and　the　law…makers　of　the　　society；　is　certainly　as　great　a　breach　of　trust；　and　as　perfect　　a　declaration　of　a　design　to　subvert　the　government；　as　is　　possible　to　be　met　with。　　To　which；　if　one　shall　add　rewards　and　　punishments　visibly　employed　to　the　same　end；　and　all　the　arts　of　　perverted　law　made　use　of；　to　take　off　and　destroy　all　that　stand　　in　the　way　of　such　a　design；　and　will　not　comply　and　consent　to　　betray　the　liberties　of　their　country；　it　will　be　past　doubt　what　　is　doing。　　What　power　they　ought　to　have　in　the　society；　who　thus　　employ　it　contrary　to　the　trust　went　along　with　it　in　its　first　　institution；　is　easy　to　determine；　and　one　cannot　but　see；　that　　he；　who　has　once　attempted　any　such　thing　as　this；　cannot　any　　longer　be　trusted。　　　　　　Sec。　223。　　To　this　perhaps　it　will　be　said；　that　the　people　　being　ignorant；　and　always　discontented；　to　lay　the　foundation　of　　government　in　the　unsteady　opinion　and　uncertain　humour　of　the　　people；　is　to　expose　it　to　certain　ruin；　and　no　government　will　　be　able　long　to　subsist；　if　the　people　may　set　up　a　new　　legislative；　whenever　they　take　offence　at　the　old　one。　　To　this　　I　answer；　Quite　the　contrary。　　　People　are　not　so　easily　got　out　　of　their　old　forms；　as　some　are　apt　to　suggest。　　They　are　hardly　　to　be　prevailed　with　to　amend　the　acknowledged　faults　in　the　　frame　they　have　been　accustomed　to。　　　And　if　there　be　any　　original　defects；　or　adventitious　ones　introduced　by　time；　or　　corruption；　it　is　not　an　easy　thing　to　get　them　changed；　even　　when　all　the　world　sees　there　is　an　opportunity　for　it。　　This　　slowness　and　aversion　in　the　people　to　quit　their　old　　constitutions；　has；　in　the　many　revolutions　which　have　been　seen　　in　this　kingdom；　in　this　and　former　ages；　still　kept　us　to；　or；　　after　some　interval　of　fruitless　attempts；　still　brought　us　back　　again　to　our　old　legislative　of　king；　lords　and　commons：　and　　whatever　provocations　have　made　the　crown　be　taken　from　some　of　　our　princes　heads；　they　never　carried　the　people　so　far　as　to　

place　it　in　another　line。　　　　　　Sec。　224。　　But　it　will　be　said；　this　hypothesis　lays　a　　ferment　for　frequent　rebellion。　　To　which　I　answer；　　　　　　First；　No　more　than　any　other　hypothesis：　for　when　the　　people　are　made　miserable；　and　find　themselves　exposed　to　the　ill　　usage　of　arbitrary　power；　cry　up　their　governors；　as　much　as　you　　will；　for　sons　of　Jupiter；　let　them　be　sacred　and　divine；　　descended；　or　authorized　from　heaven；　give　them　out　for　whom　or　　what　you　please；　the　same　will　happen。　　The　people　generally　ill　　treated；　and　contrary　to　right；　will　be　ready　upon　any　occasion　　to　ease　themselves　of　a　burden　that　sits　heavy　upon　them。　　They　　will　wish；　and　seek　for　the　opportunity；　which　in　the　change；　　weakness　and　accidents　of　human　affairs；　seldom　delays　long　to　　offer　itself。　　He　must　have　lived　but　a　little　while　in　the　　world；　who　has　not　seen　examples　of　this　in　his　time；　and　he　must　　have　read　very　little；　who　cannot　produce　examples　of　it　in　all　　sorts　of　governments　in　the　world。　　　　　　Sec。　225。　　Secondly；　I　answer；　such　revolutions　happen　not　　upon　every　little　mismanagement　in　public　affairs。　　Great　　mistakes　in　the　ruling　part；　many　wrong　and　inconvenient　laws；　　and　all　the　slips　of　human　frailty；　will　be　born　by　the　people　　without　mutiny　or　murmur。　　But　if　a　long　train　of　abuses；　　prevarications　and　artifices；　all　tending　the　same　way；　make　the　　design　visible　to　the　people；　and　they　cannot　but　feel　what　they　　lie　under；　and　see　whither　they　are　going；　it　is　not　to　be　　wondered；　that　they　should　then　rouze　themselves；　and　endeavour　　to　put　the　rule　into　such　hands　which　may　secure　to　them　the　ends　　for　which　government　was　at　first　erected；　and　without　which；　　ancient　names；　and　specious　forms；　are　so　far　from　being　better；　　that　they　are　much　worse；　than　the　state　of　nature；　or　pure　　anarchy；　the　inconveniencies　being　all　as　great　and　as　near；　but　　the　remedy　farther　off　and　more　difficult。　　　　　　Sec。　226。　　Thirdly；　I　answer；　that　this　doctrine　of　a　power　　in　the　people　of　providing　for　their　safety　a…new；　by　a　new　　legislative；　when　their　legislators　have　acted　contrary　to　their　　trust；　by　invading　their　property；　is　the　best　fence　against　　rebellion；　and　the　probablest　means　to　hinder　it：　for　rebellion　　being　an　opposition；　not　to　persons；　but　authority；　which　is　　founded　only　in　the　constitutions　and　laws　of　the　government；　　those；　whoever　they　be；　who　by　force　break　through；　and　by　force　　justify　their　violation　of　them；　are　truly　and　properly　rebels：　　for　when　men；　by　entering　into　society　and　civil…government；　have　　excluded　force；　and　introduced　laws　for　the　preservation　of　　property；　peace；　and　unity　amongst　themselves；　those　who　set　up　　force　again　in　opposition　to　the　laws；　do　rebellare；　that　is；　　bring　back　again　the　state　of　war；　and　are　properly　rebels：　which　　they　who　are　in　power；　（by　the　pretence　they　have　to　authority；　　the　temptation　of　force　they　have　in　their　hands；　and　the　　flattery　of　those　about　them）　being　likeliest　to　do；　the　　properest　way　to　prevent　the　evil；　is　to　shew　them　the　danger　and　　injustice　of　it；　who　are　under　the　greatest　temptation　to　run　　into　it。　　　　　　Sec。　227。　　In　both　the　fore…mentioned　cases；　when　either　the　　legislative　is　changed；　or　the　legislators　act　contrary　to　the　　end　for　which　they　were　constituted；　those　who　are　guilty　are　　guilty　of　rebellion：　for　if　any　one　by　force　takes　away　the　　established　legislative　of　any　society；　and　the　laws　by　them　　made；　pursuant　to　their　trust；　he　thereby　takes　away　the　　umpirage；　which　every　one　had　consented　to；　for　a　peaceable　　decision　of　all　their　controversies；　and　a　bar　to　the　state　of　　war　amongst　them。　　They；　who　remove；　or　change　the　legislative；　　take　away　this　decisive　power；　which　no　body　can　have；　but　by　the　　appointment　and　consent　of　the　people；　and　so　destroying　the　　authority　which　the　people　did；　and　no　body　else　can　set　up；　and　　introducing　a　power　which　the　people　hath　not　authorized；　they　　actually