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第35章

second treatise of government-第35章

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of the society; the declaring of the public will; are  excluded from it; and others usurp the place; who have no such  authority or delegation。

     Sec。 213。  This being usually brought about by such in the  commonwealth who misuse the power they have; it is hard to  consider it aright; and know at whose door to lay it; without  knowing the form of government in which it happens。  Let us  suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three  distinct persons。      1。  A single hereditary person; having the constant;  supreme; executive power; and with it the power of convoking and  dissolving the other two within certain periods of time。      2。  An assembly of hereditary nobility。      3。  An assembly of representatives chosen; pro tempore; by  the people。  Such a form of government supposed; it is evident;      Sec。 214。  First; That when such a single person; or prince;  sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws; which are  the will of the society; declarad by the legislative; then the  legislative is changed: for that being in effect the legislative;  whose rules and laws are put in execution; and required to be  obeyed; when other laws are set up; and other rules pretended;  and inforced; than what the legislative; constituted by the  society; have enacted; it is plain that the legislative is  changed。  Whoever introduces new laws; not being thereunto  authorized by the fundamental appointment of the society; or  subverts the old; disowns and overturns the power by which they  were made; and so sets up a new legislative。      Sec。 215。  Secondly; When the prince hinders the legislative  from assembling in its due time; or from acting freely; pursuant  to those ends for which it was constituted; the legislative is  altered: for it is not a certain number of men; no; nor their  meeting; unless they have also freedom of debating; and leisure  of perfecting; what is for the good of the society; wherein the  legislative consists: when these are taken away or altered; so as  to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power; the  legislative is truly altered; for it is not names that constitute  governments; but the use and exercise of those powers that were  intended to accompany them; so that he; who takes away the  freedom; or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due  seasons; in effect takes away the legislative; and puts an end to  the government;      Sec。 216。  Thirdly; When; by the arbitrary power of the  prince; the electors; or ways of election; are altered; without  the consent; and contrary to the common interest of the people;  there also the legislative is altered: for; if others than those  whom the society hath authorized thereunto; do chuse; or in  another way than what the society hath prescribed; those chosen  are not the legislative appointed by the people。      Sec。 217。  Fourthly; The delivery also of the people into  the subjection of a foreign power; either by the prince; or by  the legislative; is certainly a change of the legislative; and so  a dissolution of the government: for the end why people entered  into society being to be preserved one intire; free; independent  society; to be governed by its own laws; this is lost; whenever  they are given up into the power of another。      Sec。 218。  Why; in such a constitution as this; the  dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to  the prince; is evident; because he; having the force; treasure  and offices of the state to employ; and often persuading himself;  or being flattered by others; that as supreme magistrate he is  uncapable of controul; he alone is in a condition to make great  advances toward such changes; under pretence of lawful authority;  and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers; as  factious; seditious; and enemies to the government: whereas no  other part of the legislative; or people; is capable by  themselves to attempt any alteration of the legislative; without  open and visible rebellion; apt enough to be taken notice of;  which; when it prevails; produces effects very little different  from foreign conquest。  Besides; the prince in such a form of 

government; having the power of dissolving the other parts of the  legislative; and thereby rendering them private persons; they can  never in opposition to him; or without his concurrence; alter the  legislative by a law; his conse power; neglects and abandons that charge; so that the  laws already made can no longer be put in execution。  This is  demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy; and so effectually to  dissolve the government: for laws not being made for themselves;  but to be; by their execution; the bonds of the society; to keep  every part of the body politic in its due place and function;  when that totally ceases; the government visibly ceases; and the  people become a confused multitude; without order or connexion。   Where there is no longer the administration of justice; for the  securing of men's rights; nor any remaining power within the  community to direct the force; or provide for the necessities of  the public; there certainly is no government left。  Where the  laws cannot be executed; it is all one as if there were no laws;  and a government without laws is; I suppose; a mystery in  politics; unconceivable to human capacity; and inconsistent with  human society。      Sec。 220。  In these and the like cases; when the government  is dissolved; the people are at liberty to provide for  themselves; by erecting a new legislative; differing from the  other; by the change of persons; or form; or both; as they shall  find it most for their safety and good: for the society can  never; by the fault of another; lose the native and original  right it has to preserve itself; which can only be done by a  settled legislative; and a fair and impartial execution of the  laws made by it。  But the state of mankind is not so miserable  that they are not capable of using this remedy; till it be too  late to look for any。  To tell people they may provide for  themselves; by erecting a new legislative; when by oppression;  artifice; or being delivered over to a foreign power; their old  one is gone; is only to tell them; they may expect relief when it  is too late; and the evil is past cure。  This is in effect no  more than to bid them first be slaves; and then to take care of  their liberty; and when their chains are on; tell them; they may  act like freemen。  This; if barely so; is rather mockery than  relief; and men can never be secure from tyranny; if there be no  means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and  therefore it is; that they have not only a right to get out of  it; but to prevent it。      Sec。 221。  There is therefore; secondly; another way whereby  governments are dissolved; and that is; when the legislative; or  the prince; either of them; act contrary to their trust。     First; The legislative acts against the trust reposed in them;  when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject; and to  make themselves; or any part of the community; masters; or  arbitrary disposers of the lives; liberties; or fortunes of the  people。      Sec。 222。  The reason why men enter into society; is the  preservation of their property; and the end why they chuse and  authorize a legislative; is; that there may be laws made; and  rules set; as guards and fences to the properties of all the  members of the society; to limit the power; and moderate the  dominion; of every part and member of the society: for since it  can never be supposed to be the will of the society; that the  legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one  designs to secure; by entering into society; and for which the  people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making;  whenever the legislators endeavour to take away; and destroy the  property of the people; or to reduce them to slavery under  arbitrary power; they put themselves into a state of war with the  people; who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience;  and are left to the common refuge; which God hath provided for  all men; against force and violence。  Whensoever therefore the  legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of socie

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