second treatise of government-第28章
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w the actions of those good rulers into precedent； and make them the standard of their prerogative； as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right in them to do； for the harm of the people； if they so pleased； it has often occasioned contest； and sometimes public disorders； before the people could recover their original right； and get that to be declared not to be prerogative； which truly was never so； since it is impossible that any body in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm； though it be very possible； and reasonable； that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings； or rulers； who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good： for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule。 Sec。 167。 The power of calling parliaments in England； as to precise time； place； and duration； is certainly a prerogative of the king； but still with this trust； that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation； as the exigencies of the times； and variety of occasions； shall require： for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in； and what the best season； the choice of these was left with the executive power； as might be most subservient to the public good； and best suit the ends of parliaments。 Sec。 168。 The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative； But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of ？ 1 answer： between an executive power in being；
with such a prerogative； and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening； there can be no judge on earth； as there can be none between the legislative and the people； should either the executive； or the legislative； when they have got the power in their hands； design； or go about to enslave or destroy them。 The people have no other remedy in this； as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth； but to appeal to heaven： for the rulers； in such attempts； exercising a power the people never put into their hands； （who can never be supposed to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm） do that which they have not a right to do。 And where the body of the people； or any single man； is deprived of their right； or is under the exercise of a power without right； and have no appeal on earth； then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven； whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment。 And therefore； though the people cannot be judge； so as to have； by the constitution of that society； any superior power； to determine and give effective sentence in the case； yet they have； by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men； reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind； where there lies no appeal on earth； viz。 to judge； whether they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven。 And this judgment they cannot part with； it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another； as to give him a liberty to destroy him； God and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself； as to neglect his own preservation： and since he cannot take away his own life； neither can he give another power to take it。 Nor let any one think； this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder； for this operates not； till the inconveniency is so great； that the majority feel it； and are weary of it； and find a necessity to have it amended。 But this the executive power； or wise princes； never need come in the danger of： and it is the thing； of all others； they have most need to avoid； as of all others the most perilous。
CHAP。 XV。
Of Paternal； Political； and Despotical Power； considered together。
Sec。 169。 THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before； yet the great mistakes of late about government； having； as I suppose； arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another； it may not； perhaps； be amiss to consider them here together。 Sec。 170。 First； then； Paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children； to govern them for the children's good； till they come to the use of reason； or a state of knowledge； wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule； whether it be the law of nature； or the municipal law of their country； they are to govern themselves by： capable； I say； to know it； as well as several others； who live as freemen under that law。 The affection and tenderness which God hath planted in the breast of parents towards their children； makes it evident； that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government； but only for the help； instruction； and preservation of their offspring。 But happen it as it will； there is； as I have proved； no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death； at any time； over their children； more than over any body else； neither can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the child； when grown to a man； in subjection to the will of his parents； any farther than having received life and education from
his parents； obliges him to respect； honour； gratitude； assistance and support； all his life； to both father and mother。 And thus； 'tis true； the paternal is a natural government； but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political。 The power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child； which is only in his own disposing。 Sec。 171。 Secondly； Political power is that power； which every man having in the state of nature； has given up into the hands of the society； and therein to the governors； whom the society hath set over itself； with this express or tacit trust； that it shall be employed for their good； and the preservation of their property： now this power； which every man has in the state of nature； and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him； is to use such means； for the preserving of his own property； as he thinks good； and nature allows him； and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others； so as （according to the best of his reason） may most conduce to the preservation of himself； and the rest of mankind。 So that the end and measure of this power； when in every man's hands in the state of nature； being the preservation of all of his society； that is； all mankind in general； it can have no other end or measure； when in the hands of the magistrate； but to preserve the members of that society in their lives； liberties； and possessions； and so cannot be an absolute； arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes； which are as much as possible to be preserved； but a power to make laws； and annex such penalties to them； as may tend to the preservation of the whole； by cutting off those parts； and those only； which are so corrupt； that they threaten the sound and healthy； without which no severity is lawful。 And this power has its original only from compact and agreement； and the mutual consent of those who make up the community。 Sec。 172。 Thirdly； Despotical power is an absolute； arbitrary power one man has over another； to take away his life； whenever he pleases。 This is a power； which neither nature gives； for it has made no such distinction between one man and another； nor compact can convey： for man not having such an arbitrary power over his own life； cannot give another man such a power over it； but it is the effect only of forfeiture； which the aggressor makes of his own life； when he puts himself into the state of war with another： for having quitted reason； which God hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man； and the common bond whereby human kind is united into one fellowship and society； and having renounced the way of peace which that teaches； and made use of the force of war； to compass his unjust ends upon another； where he has no right； and so revolting from his own kind to that of beasts； by making force； which is their's； to be
