second treatise of government-第26章
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te of war with the people； who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power： for having erected a legislative； with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws； either at certain set times； or when there is need of it； when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society； and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists； the people have a right to remove it by force。 In all states and conditions； the true remedy of force without authority； is to oppose force to it。 The use of force without authority； always puts him that uses it into a state of war； as the aggressor； and renders him liable to be treated accordingly。 Sec。 156。 The power of assembling and dismissing the legislative； placed in the executive； gives not the executive a superiority over it； but is a fiduciary trust placed in him； for the safety of the people； in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule： for it not being possible； that the first framers of the government should； by any foresight； be so much masters of future events； as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislative； in all times to come； that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the common… wealth； the best remedy could be found for this defect； was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present； and whose business it was to watch over the public good。 Constant frequent meetings of the legislative； and long continuations of their assemblies； without necessary occasion； could not but be burdensome to the people； and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies； and yet the quick
turn of affairs might be sometimes such as to need their present help： any delay of their convening might endanger the public； and sometimes too their business might be so great； that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work； and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation。 What then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed some time or other to eminent hazard； on one side or the other； by fixed intervals and periods； set to the meeting and acting of the legislative； but to intrust it to the prudence of some； who being present； and acquainted with the state of public affairs； might make use of this prerogative for the public good？ and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands； who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end？ Thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative； not settled by the original constitution； it naturally fell into the hands of the executive； not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure； but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public weal； as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require。 Whether settled periods of their convening； or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative； or perhaps a mixture of both； hath the least inconvenience attending it； it is not my business here to inquire； but only to shew； that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the legislative； yet it is not thereby superior to it。 Sec。 157。 Things of this world are in so constant a flux； that nothing remains long in the same state。 Thus people； riches； trade； power； change their stations； flourishing mighty cities come to ruin； and prove in times neglected desolate corners； whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous countries； filled with wealth and inhabitants。 But things not always changing equally； and private interest often keeping up customs and privileges； when the reasons of them are ceased； it often comes to pass； that in governments； where part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people； that in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first established upon。 To what gross absurdities the following of custom； when reason has left it； may lead； we may be satisfied； when we see the bare name of a town； of which there remains not so much as the ruins； where scarce so much housing as a sheepcote； or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found； sends as many representatives to the grand assembly of law…makers； as a whole county numerous in people； and powerful in riches。 This strangers stand amazed at； and every one must confess needs a remedy； tho' most think it hard to find one； because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supreme act of the society； antecedent to all positive laws in it； and depending wholly on the people； no inferior power can alter it。 And therefore the people； when the legislative is once constituted； having； in such a government as we have been speaking of； no power to act as long as the government stands； this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy。 Sec。 158。 Salus populi suprema lex； is certainly so just and fundamental a rule； that he； who sincerely follows it； cannot dangerously err。 If therefore the executive； who has the power of convoking the legislative； observing rather the true proportion； than fashion of representation； regulates； not by old custom； but true reason； the number of members； in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented； which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to； but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public； it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative； but to have restored the old and true one； and to have rectified the disorders which
succession of time had insensibly； as well as inevitably introduced： For it being the interest as well as intention of the people； to have a fair and equal representative； whoever brings it nearest to that； is an undoubted friend to； and establisher of the government； and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community； prerogative being nothing but a power； in the hands of the prince； to provide for the public good； in such cases； which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences； certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct； whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people； and the establishing the government upon its true foundations； is； and always will be； just prerogative； The power of erecting new corporations； and therewith new representatives； carries with it a supposition； that in time the measures of representation might vary； and those places have a just right to be represented which before had none； and by the same reason； those cease to have a right； and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege； which before had it。 'Tis not a change from the present state； which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced； that makes an inroad upon the government； but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people； and to set up one part or party； with a distinction from； and an unequal subjection of the rest。 Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society； and people in general； upon just and lasting measures； will always； when done； justify itself； and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures； suitable to the original frame of the government； it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society； whoever permitted or caused them so to do。
CHAP。 XIV。
Of PREROGATIVE。
Sec。 159。 WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands； （as they are in all moderated monarchies； and well…framed governments） there the good of the society requires； that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power： for the legislators not being able to foresee； and provide by laws； for all that may be useful to the community； the executor of the laws having the power in his h
