second treatise of government-第25章
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ture； that is； acting for the preservation of the community； there can be but one supreme power； which is the legislative； to which all the rest are and must be subordinate； yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends； there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative； when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them： for all power given with trust for the attaining an end； being limited by that end； whenever that end is manifestly neglected； or opposed； the trust must necessarily be forfeited； and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it； who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security。 And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body； even of their legislators； whenever they shall be so foolish； or so wicked； as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject： for no man or society of men； having a power to deliver up their preservation； or consequently the means of it； to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another； when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition； they will always have a right to preserve； what they have not a power to part with； and to rid themselves of those； who invade this fundamental； sacred； and unalterable law of self…preservation； for which they entered into society。 And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power； but not as considered under any form of government； because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved。
Sec。 150。 In all cases； whilst the government subsists； the legislative is the supreme power： for what can give laws to another； must needs be superior to him； and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society； but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts； and for every member of the society； prescribing rules to their actions； and giving power of execution； where they are transgressed； the legislative must needs be the supreme； and all other powers； in any members or parts of the society； derived from and subordinate to it。 Sec。 151。 In some commonwealths； where the legislative is not always in being； and the executive is vested in a single person； who has also a share in the legislative； there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme： not that he has in himself all the supreme power； which is that of law…making； but because he has in him the supreme execution； from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers； or at least the greatest part of them： having also no legislative superior to him； there being no law to be made without his consent； which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative； he is properly enough in this sense supreme。 But yet it is to be observed； that tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him； it is not to him as supreme legislator； but as supreme executor of the law； made by a joint power of him with others； allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law； which when he violates； he has no right to obedience； nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law； and so is to be considered as the image； phantom； or representative of the common…wealth； acted by the will of the society； declared in its laws； and thus he has no will； no power； but that of the law。 But when he quits this representation； this public will； and acts by his own private will； he degrades himself； and is but a single private person without power； and without will； that has any right to obedience； the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society。 Sec。 152。 The executive power； placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative； is visibly subordinate and accountable to it； and may be at pleasure changed and displaced； so that it is not the supreme executive power； that is exempt from subordination； but the supreme executive power vested in one； who having a share in the legislative； has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to； farther than he himself shall join and consent； so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit； which one may certainly conclude will be but very little。 Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth； we need not speak； they being so multiplied with infinite variety； in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths； that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all。 Only thus much； which is necessary to our present purpose； we may take notice of concerning them； that they have no manner of authority； any of them； beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them； and are all of them accountable to some other power in the common…wealth。 Sec。 153。 It is not necessary； no； nor so much as convenient； that the legislative should be always in being； but absolutely necessary that the executive power should； because there is not always need of new laws to be made； but always need of execution of the laws that are made。 When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws； they make； into other hands； they have a power still to resume it out of those hands； when they find cause； and to punish for any maladministration against the laws。 The same holds also in regard of the federative power； that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative； which； as has been shewed； in a constituted common…wealth is the supreme。 The legislative also in this case
being supposed to consist of several persons； （for if it be a single person； it cannot but be always in being； and so will； as supreme； naturally have the supreme executive power； together with the legislative） may assemble； and exercise their legislature； at the times that either their original constitution； or their own adjournment； appoints； or when they please； if neither of these hath appointed any time； or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them： for the supreme power being placed in them by the people； it is always in them； and they may exercise it when they please； unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons； or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time； and when that time comes； they have a right to assemble and act again。 Sec。 154。 If the legislative； or any part of it； be made up of representatives chosen for that time by the people； which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects； and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice； this power of chusing must also be exercised by the people； either at certain appointed seasons； or else when they are summoned to it； and in this latter case ' the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive； and has one of these two limitations in respect of time： that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals； and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling； according to due forms； or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections； when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old； or making of new laws； or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies； that lie on； or threaten the people。 Sec。 155。 It may be demanded here； What if the executive power； being possessed of the force of the common…wealth； shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative； when the original constitution； or the public exigencies require it？ I say； using force upon the people without authority； and contrary to the trust put in him that does so； is a state of war with the people； who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their
