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第24章

second treatise of government-第24章

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g for the least  disobedience; because such a blind obedience is necessary to that  end; for which the commander has his power; viz。  the  preservation of the rest; but the disposing of his goods has  nothing to do with it。      Sec。 140。  It is true; governments cannot be supported  without great charge; and it is fit every one who enjoys his  share of the protection; should pay out of his estate his  proportion for the maintenance of it。   But still it must be with  his own consent; i。e。  the consent of the majority; giving it  either by themselves; or their representatives chosen by them:  for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the  people; by his own authority; and without such consent of the  people; he thereby invades the fundamental law of property; and  subverts the end of government: for what property have I in that;  which another may by right take; when he pleases; to himself?      Sec。 141。  Fourthly; The legislative cannot transfer the  power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a  delegated power from the people; they who have it cannot pass it  over to others。  The people alone can appoint the form of the  common…wealth; which is by constituting the legislative; and  appointing in whose hands that shall be。  And when the people  have said; We will submit to rules; and be governed by laws made  by such men; and in such forms; no body else can say other men  shall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any  laws; but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen; and  authorized to make laws for them。   The power of the legislative;  being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and  institution; can be no other than what that positive grant  conveyed; which being only to make laws; and not to make  legislators; the legislative can have no power to transfer their  authority of making laws; and place it in other hands。      Sec。 142。  These are the bounds which the trust; that is put  in them by the society; and the law of God and nature; have set  to the legislative power of every common…wealth; in all forms of  government。      First; They are to govern by promulgated established laws;  not to be varied in particular cases; but to have one rule for  rich and poor; for the favourite at court; and the country man at  plough。      Secondly; These laws also ought to be designed for no other  end ultimately; but the good of the people。      Thirdly; They must not raise taxes on the property of the 

people; without the consent of the people; given by themselves;  or their deputies。  And this properly concerns only such  governments where the legislative is always in being; or at least  where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to  deputies; to be from time to time chosen by themselves。      Fourthly; The legislative neither must nor can transfer the  power of making laws to any body else; or place it any where; but  where the people have。



                       CHAP。  XII。

       Of the Legislative; Executive; and Federative                Power of the Common…wealth。

     Sec。 143。  THE legislative power is that; which has a right  to direct how the force of the common…wealth shall be employed  for preserving the community and the members of it。  But because  those laws which are constantly to be executed; and whose force  is always to continue; may be made in a little time; therefore  there is no need; that the legislative should be always in being;  not having always business to do。  And because it may be too  great a temptation to human frailty; apt to grasp at power; for  the same persons; who have the power of making laws; to have also  in their hands the power to execute them; whereby they may exempt  themselves from obedience to the laws they make; and suit the  law; both in its making; and execution; to their own private  advantage; and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the  rest of the community; contrary to the end of society and  government: therefore in well ordered commonwealths; where the good of the whole is so con sidered; as it ought; the legislative power is put into the hands  of divers persons; who duly assembled; have by themselves; or  jointly with others; a power to make laws; which when they have  done; being separated again; they are themselves subject to the  laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them; to  take care; that they make them for the public good。      Sec。 144。  But because the laws; that are at once; and in a  short time made; have a constant and lasting force; and need a  perpetual execution; or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is  necessary there should be a power always in being; which should  see to the execution of the laws that are made; and remain in  force。  And thus the legislative and executive power come often  to be separated。      Sec。 145。  There is another power in every common…wealth;  which one may call natural; because it is that which answers to  the power every man naturally had before he entered into society:  for though in a common…wealth the members of it are distinct  persons still in reference to one another; and as such as  governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest  of mankind; they make one body; which is; as every member of it  before was; still in the state of nature with the rest of  mankind。  Hence it is; that the controversies that happen between  any man of the society with those that are out of it; are managed  by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body;  engages the whole in the reparation of it。  So that under this  consideration; the whole community is one body in the state of  nature; in respect of all other states or persons out of its  community。      Sec。 146。  This therefore contains the power of war and  peace; leagues and alliances; and all the transactions; with all  persons and communities without the common…wealth; and may be  called federative; if any one pleases。  So the thing be  understood; I am indifferent as to the name。      Sec。 147。  These two powers; executive and federative; 

though they be really distinct in themselves; yet one  comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society  within its self; upon all that are parts of it; the other the  management of the security and interest of the public without;  with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from; yet  they are always almost united。  And though this federative power  in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the  common…wealth; yet it is much less capable to be directed by  antecedent; standing; positive laws; than the executive; and so  must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those;  whose hands it is in; to be managed for the public good: for the  laws that concern subjects one amongst another; being to direct  their actions; may well enough precede them。  But what is to be  done in reference to foreigners; depending much upon their  actions; and the variation of designs and interests; must be left  in great part to the prudence of those; who have this power  committed to them; to be managed by the best of their skill; for  the advantage of the common…wealth。      Sec。 148。  Though; as I said; the executive and federative  power of every community be really distinct in themselves; yet  they are hardly to be separated; and placed at the same time; in  the hands of distinct persons: for both of them requiring the  force of the society for their exercise; it is almost  impracticable to place the force of the common…wealth in  distinct; and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and  federative power should be placed in persons; that might act  separately; whereby the force of the public would be under  different commands: which would be apt some time or other to  cause disorder and ruin。



                    C H A P。  X I I I。

         Of the Subordination of the Powers of the                       Common…wealth。

     Sec。 149。  THOUGH in a constituted common…wealth; standing  upon its own basis; and acting according to its own nature; that  is; acting for the preservation of the community; there can be  but one supreme power; w

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