second treatise of government-第23章
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authority； cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees； but is bound to dispense justice； and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws； and known authorized judges： for the law of nature being unwritten； and so no where to be found but in the minds of men； they who through passion or interest shall miscite； or misapply it； cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge： and so it serves not； as it ought； to determine the rights； and fence the properties of those that live under it； especially where every one is judge； interpreter； and executioner of it too； and that in his own case： and he that has right on his side； having ordinarily but his own single strength； hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries； or to punish delinquents。 To avoid these inconveniences； which disorder men's propperties in the state of nature； men unite into societies； that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties； and may have standing rules to bound it； by which every one may know what is his。 To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society which they enter into； and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit； with this trust； that they shall be governed by declared laws； or else their peace； quiet； and property will still be at the same uncertainty； as it was in the state of nature。 （*Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct； howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by； which rules are two； the law of God； and the law of nature； so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of nature； and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture； otherwise they are ill made。 Hooker's Eccl。 Pol。 l。 iii。 sect。 9。 To constrain men to any thing inconvenient cloth seem unreasonable。 Ibid。 l。 i。 sect。 10。） Sec。 137。 Absolute arbitrary power； or governing without settled standing laws； can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government； which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for； and tie themselves up under； were it not to preserve their lives； liberties and fortunes； and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet。 It cannot be supposed that they should intend； had they a
power so to do； to give to any one； or more； an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates； and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them。 This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature； wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others； and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it； whether invaded by a single man； or many in combination。 Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator； they have disarmed themselves； and armed him； to make a prey of them when he pleases； he being in a much worse condition； who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man； who has the command of 100；000； than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100；000 single men； no body being secure； that his will； who has such a command； is better than that of other men； though his force be 100；000 times stronger。 And therefore； whatever form the common…wealth is under； the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws； and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions： for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature； if they shall have armed one； or a few men with the joint power of a multitude； to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts； or unrestrained； and till that moment unknown wills； without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions： for all the power the government has； being only for the good of the society； as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure； so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws； that both the people may know their duty； and be safe and secure within the limits of the law； and the rulers too kept within their bounds； and not be tempted； by the power they have in their hands； to employ it to such purposes； and by such measures； as they would not have known； and own not willingly。 Sec。 138。 Thirdly； The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent： for the preservation of property being the end of government； and that for which men enter into society； it necessarily supposes and requires； that the people should have property； without which they must be supposed to lose that； by entering into society； which was the end for which they entered into it； too gross an absurdity for any man to own。 Men therefore in society having property； they have such a right to the goods； which by the law of the community are their's； that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them； without their own consent： without this they have no property at all； for I have truly no property in that； which another can by right take from me； when he pleases； against my consent。 Hence it is a mistake to think； that the supreme or legislative power of any common… wealth； can do what it will； and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily； or take any part of them at pleasure。 This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists； wholly or in part； in assemblies which are variable； whose members； upon the dissolution of the assembly； are subjects under the common laws of their country； equally with the rest。 But in governments； where the legislative is in one lasting assembly always in being； or in one man； as in absolute monarchies； there is danger still； that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community； and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power； by taking what they think fit from the people： for a man's property is not at all secure； tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects； if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man； what part he pleases of his property； and use and dispose of it as he thinks good。 Sec。 139。 But government； into whatsoever hands it is put；
being； as I have before shewed； intrusted with this condition； and for this end； that men might have and secure their properties； the prince； or senate； however it may have power to make laws； for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another； yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole； or any part of the subjects property； without their own consent： for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all。 And to let us see； that even absolute power； where it is necessary； is not arbitrary by being absolute； but is still limited by that reason； and confined to those ends； which required it in some cases to be absolute； we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline： for the preservation of the army； and in it of the whole common…wealth； requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer； and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them； but yet we see； that neither the serjeant； that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon； or stand in a breach； where he is almost sure to perish； can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money； nor the general； that can condemn him to death for deserting his post； or for not obeying the most desperate orders； can yet； with all his absolute power of life and death； dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate； or seize one jot of his goods； whom yet he can command any thing； and hang for the least disobedience； because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end； for which t
