the origins of contemporary france-5-第35章

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mayor　to　the　state…senator　and　state…councilor；　had　borne　a　part　in

the　Revolution；　either　in　effecting　it　or　under　subjection　to　it　…

Monarchists；　Feuillantists；　Girondists；　Montagnards；　Thermidorians；

moderate　Jacobins　or　desperate　Jacobins；　all　oppressed　in　turn　and

disappointed　in　their　calculations。　Their　passions；　under　this　régime；

had　become　embittered；　each　brought　personal　bias　and　resentment　into

the　performance　of　his　duties；　to　prevent　him　from　being　unjust　and

mischievous　demanded　a　tightened　curb。＇3＇　All　sense　of　conviction；

under　this　régime；　had　died　out；　no　body　would　serve　gratis　as　in

1789；＇4＇　nobody　would　work　without　pay；　disinterestedness　had　lost　all

charm；　ostentatious　zeal　seemed　hypocrisy；　genuine　zeal　seemed　self…

dupery；　each　looked　out　for　himself　and　not　for　the　community；　public

spirit　had　yielded　to　indifference；　to　egotism；　and　to　the　need　of

security；　of　enjoyment；　and　of　self…advancement。　Human　materials；

deteriorated　by　the　Revolution；　were　less　than　ever　suited　to

providing　citizens　…　they　simply　furnished　functionaries。　With　such

wheels　combined　together　according　to　formula　current　between　1791　and

1795；　the　requisite　work　could　not　possibly　be　done。　As　a　consequence；

definitely　and　for　a　long　time；　any　use　of　the　two　great　liberal

mechanisms　were　doomed。　So　long　as　the　wheels　remained　of　such　poor

quality　and　the　task　so　hard；　both　the　election　of　local　powers　and

the　division　of　the　central　power　had　to　be　abandoned。





IV。



Motives　for　suppressing　the　election　of　local　powers。　…　The　Electors。

…　Their　egoism　and　partiality。　…　The　Elected。　…　Their　inertia；

corruption；　and　disobedience。



All　were　agreed　on　the　first　point。　If　any　still　doubted；　they　had

only　to　open　their　eyes；　fix　them　on　the　local　authorities；　watch　them

as　soon　as　born；　and　follow　them　throughout　the　exercise　of　their

functions。　…　Naturally；　in　filling　each　office；　the　electors　had

chosen　a　man　of　their　own　species　and　caliber；　their　fixed　and

dominant　disposition　was　accordingly　well　known；　they　were　indifferent

to　public　matters　and　therefore　their　candidate　was　as　indifferent　as

themselves。　Had　they　shown　too　great　a　concern　for　the　nation　this

would　have　prevented　their　election；　the　State　to　them　was　a

troublesome　moralist　and　remote　creditor。　Their　candidate　must　choose

between　them　and　this　intruder；　side　with　them　against　it；　and　not　act

as　a　pedagogue　in　its　name　or　as　bailiff　on　its　behalf。　When　power　is

born　on　the　spot　and　conferred　to…day　by　constituents　who　are　to

submit　to　it　to…morrow　as　subordinates；　they　do　not　put　the　whip　in

the　hands　of　one　who　will　flog　them；　they　demand　sentiments　of　him　in

conformity　with　their　inclinations；　in　any　event　they　will　not

tolerate　in　him　the　opposite　ones。　From　the　beginning；　this

resemblance　between　them　and　him　is　great；　and　it　goes　on　increasing

from　day　to　day　because　the　creature　is　always　in　the　hands　of　his

creators；　subject　to　their　daily　pressure；　he　at　last　becomes　as　they

are；　after　a　certain　period　they　have　shaped　him　in　their　image。　…

Thus　the　candidate…elect；　from　the　start　or　very　soon　after；　became　a

confederate　with　his　electors。　At　one　time；　and　this　occurred

frequently；　especially　in　the　towns；　he　had　been　elected　by　a　violent

sectarian　minority；　he　then　subordinated　general　interests　to　the

interests　of　a　clique。　At　another；　and　especially　in　the　rural

districts；　he　had　been　elected　by　an　ignorant　and　brutal　majority；

when　he　accordingly　subordinated　general　interests　to　those　of　a

village。　…　If　he　chanced　to　be　conscientious　and　somewhat　intelligent

and　was　anxious　to　do　his　duty；　he　could　not；　he　felt　himself　weak　and

was　felt　to　be　weak；＇5＇　both　authority　and　the　means　for　exercising　it

were　wanting　in　him。　He　had　not　the　force　which　a　power　above

communicates　to　its　delegates　below；　nobody　saw　behind　him　the

government　and　the　army；　his　only　resource　was　a　national…guard；　which

either　shirked　or　refused　to　do　its　duty；　and　which　often　did　not

exist　at　all。　…　On　the　contrary；　he　could　prevaricate；　pillage；　and

persecute　for　his　own　advantage　and　that　of　his　clique　with　impunity；

for　there　was　no　restraint　on　him　from　above；　the　Paris　Jacobins　would

not　be　disposed　to　alienate　the　Jacobins　of　the　province；　they　were

partisans　and　allies；　and　the　government　had　few　others；　it　was　bound

to　retain　them；　to　let　them　intrigue　and　embezzle　at　will。



Suppose　an　extensive　domain　of　which　the　steward　is　appointed；　not　by

the　absent　owner；　but　by　his　tenants；　debtors；　farmers；　and

dependents：　the　reader　may　imagine　whether　rents　will　be　paid　and

debts　collected；　whether　road…taxes　will　be　worked　out；　what　care　will

be　taken　of　the　property；　what　its　annual　income　will　be　to　the　owner；

how　abuses　of　commission　and　omission　will　be　multiplied　indefinitely；

how　great　the　disorder　will　be；　the　neglect；　the　waste；　the　fraud；　the

injustice；　and　the　license。　…　The　same　in　France；＇6＇　and　for　the　same

reason：



*　every　public　service　disorganized；　destroyed；　or　perverted；

*　no　justice；　no　police；

*　authorities　abstaining　from　prosecution；　magistrates　not　daring　to

　　condemn；　a　gendarmerie　which　receives　no　orders　or　which　stands　still；

*　rural　marauding　become　a　habit；

*　roving　bands　of　brigands　in　forty…five　departments；

*　mail　wagons　and　coaches　stopped　and　pillaged　even　up　to　the　environs

　　of　Paris；

*　highways　broken　up　and　rendered　impassable；

*　open　smuggling；　customs　yielding　nothing；　national　forests

　　devastated；　the　public　treasury　empty；＇7＇　its　revenues　intercepted

　　and　expended　before　being　deposited；　taxes　decreed　and　not　collected；

*　everywhere　arbitrary　assessments　of　real　and　personal　estate；　no

　　less　wicked　exemptions　than　overcharges；

*　in　many　places　no　list　prepared　for　tax　assessments；

*　communes　which　here　and　there；　under　pretext　of　defending　the

　　republic　against　neighboring　consumers；　exempt　themselves　from　both

　　tax　and　conscription；

*　conscripts　to　whom　their　mayor　gives　false　certificates　of　infirmity

　　and　marriage；　who　do　not　turn　out　when　ordered　out；　who　desert　by

　　hundreds　on　the　way　to　headquarters；　who　form　mobs　and　use　guns　in

　　defending　themselves　against　the　troops；…



such　were　the　fruits　of　the　system。



The　government　could　not　constrain　rural　majorities　with　the　officials

chosen　by　the　selfish　and　inept　rural　majorities。　Neither　could　it

repress　the　urban　minorities　with　agents　elected　by　the　same　partial

and　corrupt　urban　minorities。　Hands　are　necessary；　and　hands　as　firm

as　tenacious；　to　seize　conscripts　by　the　collar；　to　rummage　the

pockets　of　taxpayers；　and　the　State　did　not　have　such　hands。　They　were

required　right　away；　if　only　to　prepare　and　provide　for　urgent　needs。

If　the　western　departments　had　to　be　subdued　and　tranquilized；　relief

furnished　to　Massena　besieged　in　Genoa；　Mélas　prevented　from　invading

Provence；　Moreau's　army　transported　over　the　Rhine；　the　first　thing

was　to　restore　to　the　central　government　the　appointment　of　local

authorities。



V。　Reasons　for　centralization。



Reasons　for　placing　the　executive　central　power　in　one　hand。　…　Sieyès'

chimerical　combinations。　…　Bonaparte's　objections。



On　this　second　point；　the　evidence　was　scarcely　less。　…　And　clearly；

the　moment　the　local　powers　owed　their　appointment　to　the　central

powers；　it　is　plain　that　the　central　executive　power；　on　which　they

depend；　should　be　unique。　For；　this　great　team　of　functionaries；

driven　from　aloft；　could　not　have　aloft　several　distinct　drivers；

being　several　and　distinct；　the　drivers　would　each　pull　his　own　way；

while　the　horses；　pulling　in　opposite　directions；　would　do　nothing　but

prance。　In　this　respect　the　combinations　of　Sieyès　do　not　bear

examination。　A　mere　theorist　and　charged　with　preparing　the　plan　of　a

new　constitution；　he　had　reasoned　as　if　the　drivers　on　the　box　were

not　men；　but　robots：　perched　above　all；　a　grand…elec