list1-第12章

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account；　up　to　the　year　1603　the　English　had　been　almost　entirely



shut　out　by　the　Dutch。



　　　　2。　An　immense　extension　of　the　contraband　trade　with　Spain　and



Portugal；　and　their　West　Indian　colonies。



　　　　3。　A　great　increase　of　England's　herring　and　whale　fisheries；



which　the　Dutch　had　previously　almost　entirely　monopolised。



　　　　4。　The　conquest　of　the　most　important　English　colony　in　the



West　Indies　　Jamaica　　in　1655；　and　with　that；　the　command　of



the　West　Indian　sugar　trade。



　　　　5。　The　conclusion　of　the　Methuen　Treaty　（1703）　with　Portugal；



of　which　we　have　fully　treated　in　the　chapters　devoted　to　Spain　and



Portugal　in　this　work。　By　the　operation　of　this　treaty　the　Dutch



and　the　Germans　were　entirely　excluded　from　the　important　trade



with　Portugal　and　her　colonies：　Portugal　sank　into　complete



political　dependence　upon　England；　while　England　acquired　the



means；　through　the　gold　and　silver　earned　in　her　trade　with



Portugal；　of　extending　enormously　her　own　commercial　intercourse



with　China　and　the　East　Indies；　and　thereby　subsequently　of　laying



the　foundation　for　her　great　Indian　empire；　and　dispossessing　the



Dutch　from　their　most　important　trading　stations。



　　　　The　two　results　last　enumerated　stand　in　intimate　connection



one　with　the　other。　And　the　skill　is　especially　noteworthy　with



which　England　contrived　to　make　these　two　countries　　Portugal　and



India　　the　instruments　of　her　own　future　greatness。　Spain　and



Portugal　had　in　the　main　little　to　dispose　of　besides　the　precious



metals；　while　the　requirements　of　the　East；　with　the　exception　of



cloths；　consisted　chiefly　of　the　precious　metals。　So　far　everything



suited　most　admirably。　But　the　East　had　principally　only　cotton　and



silk　manufactures　to　offer　in　exchange；　and　that　did　not　fit　in



with　the　principle　of　the　English　Ministry　before　referred　to；



namely；　to　export　manufactured　articles　and　import　raw　materials。



How；　then；　did　they　act　under　the　circumstances？　Did　they　rest



content　with　the　profits　accruing　from　the　trade　in　cloths　with



Portugal　and　in　cotton　and　silk　manufactures　with　India？　By　no



means。　The　English　Ministers　saw　farther　than　that。



　　　　Had　they　sanctioned　the　free　importation　into　England　of　Indian



cotton　and　silk　goods；　the　English　cotton　and　silk　manufactories



must　of　necessity　soon　come　to　a　stand。　India　had　not　only　the



advantage　of　cheaper　labour　and　raw　material；　but　also　the



experience；　the　skill；　and　the　practice　of　centuries。　The　effect　of



these　advantages　could　not　fail　to　tell　under　a　system　of　free



competition。



　　　　But　England　was　unwilling　to　found　settlements　in　Asia　in　order



to　become　subservient　to　Asia　in　manufacturing　industry。　She　strove



for　commercial　supremacy；　and　felt　that　of　two　countries



maintaining　free　trade　between　one　another；　that　one　would　be



supreme　which　sold　manufactured　goods；　while　that　one　would　be



subservient　which　could　only　sell　agricultural　produce。　In　her



North　American　colonies　England　had　already　acted　on　those



principles　in　disallowing　the　manufacture　in　those　colonies　of　even



a　single　horseshoe　nail；　and；　still　more；　that　no　horseshoe　nails



made　there　should　be　imported　into　England。　How　could　it　be



expected　of　her　that　she　would　give　up　her　own　market　for



manufactures；　the　basis　of　her　future　greatness；　to　a　people　so



numerous；　so　thrifty；　so　experienced　and　perfect　in　the　old　systems



of　manufacture　as　the　Hindoos？



　　　　Accordingly；　England　prohibited　the　import　of　the　goods　dealt



in　by　her　own　factories；　the　Indian　cotton　and　silk　fabrics。（6*）



The　prohibition　was　complete　and　peremptory。　Not　so　much　as　a



thread　of　them　would　England　permit　to　be　used。　She　would　have　none



of　these　beautiful　and　cheap　fabrics；　but　preferred　to　consume　her



own　inferior　and　more　costly　stuffs。　She　was；　however；　quite



willing　to　supply　the　Continental　nations　with　the　far　finer



fabrics　of　India　at　lower　prices；　and　willingly　yielded　to　them　all



the　benefit　of　that　cheapness；　she　herself　would　have　none　of　it。



　　　　Was　England　a　fool　in　so　acting？　Most　assuredly；　according　to



the　theories　of　Adam　Smith　and　J。　B。　Say　the　Theory　of　Values。　For；



according　to　them；　England　should　have　bought　what　she　required



where　she　could　buy　them　cheapest　and　best：　it　was　an　act　of　folly



to　manufacture　for　herself　goods　at　a　greater　cost　than　she　could



buy　them　at　elsewhere；　and　at　the　same　time　give　away　that



advantage　to　the　Continent。



　　　　The　case　is　quite　the　contrary；　according　to　our　theory；　which



we　term　the　Theory　of　the　Powers　of　Production；　and　which　the



English　Ministry；　without　having　examined　the　foundation　on　which



it　rests；　yet　practically　adopted　when　enforcing　their　maxim　of



importing　produce　and　exporting　fabrics。



　　　　The　English　Ministers　cared　not　for　the　acquisition　of



low…priced　and　perishable　articles　of　manufacture；　but　for　that　of



a　more　costly　but　enduring　manufacturing　power。



　　　　They　have　attained　their　object　in　a　brilliant　degree。　At　this



day　England　produces　seventy　million　pounds'　worth　of　cotton　and



silk　goods；　and　supplies　all　Europe；　the　entire　world；　India　itself



included；　with　British　manufactures。　Her　home　production　exceeds　by



fifty　or　a　hundred　times　the　value　of　her　former　trade　in　Indian



manufactured　goods。



　　　　What　would　it　have　profited　her　had　she　been　buying　for　a



century　the　cheap　goods　of　Indian　manufacture？



　　　　And　what　have　they　gained　who　purchased　those　goods　so　cheaply



of　her？　The　English　have　gained　power；　incalculable　power；　while



the　others　have　gained　the　reverse　of　power。



　　　　That　in　the　face　of　results　like　these；　historically　attested



upon　unimpeachable　evidence；　Adam　Smith　should　have　expressed　so



warped　a　judgment　upon　the　Navigation　Laws；　can　only　be　accounted



for　upon　the　same　principle　on　which　we　shall　in　another　chapter



explain　this　celebrated　author's　fallacious　conclusions　respecting



commercial　restrictions。　These　facts　stood　in　the　way　of　his　pet



notion　of　unrestricted　free　trade。　It　was　therefore　necessary　for



him　to　obviate　the　objection　that　could　be　adduced　against　his



principle　from　the　effects　of　the　Navigation　Laws；　by　drawing　a



distinction　between　their　political　objects　and　their　economical



objects。　He　maintained　that；　although　the　Navigation　Laws　had　been



politically　necessary　and　beneficial；　yet　that　they　were



economically　prejudicial　and　injurious。　How　little　this　distinction



can　be　justified　by　the　nature　of　things　or　by　experience；　we　trust



to　make　apparent　in　the　course　of　this　treatise。



　　　　J。　B。　Say；　though　he　might　have　known　better　from　the



experience　of　North　America；　here　too；　as　in　every　instance　where



the　principles　of　free　trade　and　protection　clash；　goes　still



farther　than　his　predecessor。　Say　reckons　up　what　the　cost　of　a



sailor　to　the　French　nation　is；　owing　to　the　fishery　bounties；　in



order　to　show　how　wasteful　and　unremunerative　these　bounties　are。



　　　　The　subject　of　restrictions　upon　navigation　constitutes　a



formidable　stumbling…block　in　the　path　of　the　advocates　of



unrestricted　free　trade；　which　they　are　only　too　glad　to　pass　over



in　silence；　especially　if　they　are　members　of　the　mercantile



community　in　seaport　towns。



　　　　The　truth　of　the　matter　is　this。　Restrictions　on　navigation　are



governed　by　the　same　law　as　restrictions　upon　any　other　kind　of



trade。　Freedom　of　navigation　and　the　carrying　trade　conducted　by



foreigners　are　serviceable　and　welcome　to　communities　in　the　early



stages　of　their　civilisation；　so　long　as　their　agricul