north america-2-第76章
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Amount of debt up to January； 1862 61；352；923 pounds。 Added by July 1st； 1862 68；647；077 〃 Again added by July 1st； 1803 110；000；000 〃 … 240；000；000 〃
The first of these items may no doubt be taken as accurate。 The second has probably been founded on facts which leave little doubt as to its substantial truth。 The third； which professes to give the proposed expense of the war for the forthcoming year； viz。； from July 1st； 1862； to June 30th； 1863； must necessarily have been obtained by a very loose estimate。 No one can say what may be the condition of the country during the next yearwhether the war may then be raging throughout the Southern States； or whether the war may not have ceased altogether。 The North knows little or nothing of the capacity of the South。 How little it knows may be surmised from the fact that the whole Southern army of Virginia retreated from their position at Manassas before the Northern generals knew that they were moving； and that when they were gone no word whatever was left of their numbers。 I do not believe that the Northern government is even yet able to make any probable conjecture as to the number of troops which the Southern Confederacy is maintaining； and if this be so； they can certainly make no trustworthy estimates as to their own expenses for the ensuing year。 Two hundred and forty millions is； however； the sum named by a gentleman presumed to be conversant with the matter； as the amount of debt which may be expected by midsummer； 1863； and if the war be continued till then； it will probably be found that he has not exceeded the mark。 It is right； however； to state that Mr。 Chase in his estimate does not rate the figures so high。 He has given it as his opinion that the debt will be about one hundred and four millions in July； 1862； and one hundred and eighty millions in July； 1863。 As to the first amount； with reference to which a tolerably accurate calculation may probably be made； I am inclined to prefer the estimate as given by the member of the committee； and as to the other； which hardly； as I think； admits of any calculation； his calculation is at any rate as good as that made in the Treasury。 But it is the immediate want of funds； and not the prospective debt of the country； which is now doing the damage。 In this opinion Mr。 Chase will probably agree with me； but readers on this side of the water will receive what I say with a smile。 Such a state of affairs is certainly one that has not uncommonly been reached by financiers； it has also often been experienced by gentlemen in the management of their private affairs。 It has been common in Ireland； and in London has created the wealth of the pawnbrokers。 In the States at the present time the government is very much in this condition。 The prospective wealth of the country is almost unbounded； but there is great difficulty in persuading any pawnbroker to advance money on the pledge。 In February last Mr。 Chase was driven to obtain the sanction of the legislature for paying the national creditors by bills drawn at twelve months' date； and bearing 6 per cent。 interest。 It is the old story of the tailor who calls with his little account； and draws on his insolvent debtor at ninety days。 If the insolvent debtor be not utterly gone as regards solvency he will take up the bill when due； even though he may not be able to pay a simple debt。 But； then； if he be utterly insolvent； he can do neither the one nor the other！ The Secretary of the Treasury； when he asked for permission to accept these billsor to issue these certificates； as he calls themacknowledged to pressing debts of over five millions sterling which he could not pay； and to further debts of eight millions which he could not pay； but which he termed floating； debts； if I understand him； which were not as yet quite pressing。 Now I imagine that to be a lamentable condition for any Chancellor of an Exchequerespecially as a confession is at the same time made that no advantageous borrowing is to be done under the existing circumstances。 When a Chancellor of the Exchequer confesses that he cannot borrow on advantageous terms； the terms within his reach must be very bad indeed。 This position is indeed a sad one； and at any rate justifies me in stating that the immediate want of funds is severely felt。 But the very arguments which have been used to prove that the country will be ultimately crushed by the debt； are those which I should use to prove that it will not be crushed。 A comparison has more than once been made between the manner in which our debt was made and that in which the debt of the United States is now being created； and the great point raised in our favor is； that while we were borrowing money we were also taxing ourselves； and that we raised as much by taxes as we did by loans。 But it is too early in the day to deny to the Americans the credit which we thus take to ourselves。 We were a tax…paying nation when we commenced those wars which made our great loans necessary； and only went on in that practice which was habitual to us。 I do not think that the Americans could have taxed themselves with greater alacrity than they have shown。 Let us wait； at any rate； till they shall have had time for the operation； before we blame them for not making it。 It is then argued that we in England did not borrow nearly so fast as they have borrowed in the States。 That is true。 But it must be remembered that the dimensions and proportions of wars now are infinitely greater than they were when we began to borrow。 Does any one imagine that we would not have borrowed faster； if by faster borrowing we could have closed the war more speedily？ Things go faster now than they did then。 Borrowing for the sake of a war may be a bad thing to do； as also it may be a good thing； but if it be done at all； it should be so done as to bring the war to the end with what greatest dispatch may be possible。 The only fair comparison； as it seems to me； which can be drawn between the two countries with reference to their debts； and the condition of each under its debt； should be made to depend on the amount of the debt and probable ability of the country to bear that burden。 The amount of the debt must be calculated by the interest payable on it rather than by the figures representing the actual sum due。 If we debit the United States government with seven per cent。 on all the money borrowed by them； and presume that amount to have reached in July； 1863； the sum named by Mr。 Spaulding； they will then have loaded themselves with an annual charge of 16；800；000 pounds sterling。 It will have been an immense achievement to have accomplished in so short a time； but it will by no means equal the annual sum with which we are charged。 And； moreover； the comparison will have been made in a manner that is hardly fair to the Americans。 We pay our creditors three per cent。 now that we have arranged our affairs； and have settled down into the respectable position of an old gentleman whose estates； though deeply mortgaged； are not over mortgaged。 But we did not get our money at three per cent。 while our wars were on hand and there yet existed some doubt as to the manner in which they might be terminated。 This attempt； however； at guessing what may be the probable amount of the debt at the close of the war is absolutely futile。 No one can as yet conjecture when the war may be over； or what collateral expenses may attend its close。 It may be the case that the government； in fixing some boundary between the future United States and the future Southern Confederacy； will be called on to advance a very large sum of money as compensation for slaves who shall have been liberated in the border States； or have been swept down South into the cotton regions with the retreating hordes of the Southern army。 The total of the bill cannot be reckoned up while the work is still unfinished。 But； after all； that question as to the amount of the bill is not to us the question of the greatest interest。 Whether the debt shall amount to two； or three； or ev
