north america-2-第68章

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ly　that　the　Senate　is　responsible　for　such　treaties　as　are　made；　but　that　the　President　is　deterred　from　the　making　of　treaties　for　which　the　Senate　would　decline　to　make　itself　responsible。　　Even　though　no　treaty　should　ever　be　refused　its　sanction　by　the　Senate；　the　protecting　power　of　the　Senate　in　that　matter　would　not　on　that　account　have　been　less　necessary　or　less　efficacious。　　Though　the　bars　with　which　we　protect　our　house　may　never　have　been　tried　by　a　thief；　we　do　not　therefore　believe　that　our　house　would　have　been　safe　if　such　bars　had　been　known　to　be　wanting。　　And　then；　as　to　that　matter　of　State　appointments；　is　it　not　the　fact　that　all　governing　power　consists　in　the　selection　of　the　agents　by　whom　the　action　of　government　shall　be　carried　on？　　It　must　come　to　this；　I　imagine；　when　the　argument　is　pushed　home。　　The　power　of　the　most　powerful　man　depends　only　on　the　extent　of　his　authority　over　his　agents。　　According　to　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States；　the　President　can　select　no　agent　either　at　home　or　abroad；　for　purposes　either　of　peace　or　war；　or　to　the　employment　of　whom　the　Senate　does　not　agree　with　him。　Such　a　rule　as　this　should　save　the　nation　from　the　use　of　disreputable　agents　as　public　servants。　　It　might　perhaps　have　done　much　more　toward　such　salvation　than　it　has　as　yet　effected；　and　it　may　well　be　hoped　that　it　will　in　future　do　more。　Such　are　the　executive　powers　of　the　Senate；　and　it　is；　I　think；　remarkable　that　the　Senate　has　always　used　these　powers　with　extreme　moderation。　　It　has　never　shown　a　factious　inclination　to　hinder　government　by　unnecessary　interference；　or　a　disposition　to　clip　the　President's　wings　by　putting　itself　altogether　at　variance　with　him。　I　am　not　quite　sure　whether　some　fault　may　not　have　lain　on　the　other　side；　whether　the　Senate　may　not　have　been　somewhat　slack　in　exercising　the　protective　privileges　given　to　it　by　the　Constitution。　　And　here　I　cannot　but　remark　how　great　is　the　deference　paid　to　all　governors　and　edicts　of　government　throughout　the　United　States。　　One　would　have　been　disposed　to　think　that　such　a　feeling　would　be　stronger　in　an　old　country　such　as　Great　Britain　than　in　a　young　country　such　as　the　States。　　But　I　think　that　it　is　not　so。　　There　is　less　disposition　to　question　the　action　of　government　either　at　Washington　or　at　New　York；　than　there　is　in　London。　　Men　in　America　seem　to　be　content　when　they　have　voted　in　their　governors；　and　to　feel　that　for　them　all　political　action　is　over　until　the　time　shall　come　for　voting　for　others。　　And　this　feeling；　which　seems　to　prevail　among　the　people；　prevails　also　in　both　Houses　of　Congress。　　Bitter　denunciations　against　the　President's　policy　or　the　President's　ministers　are　seldom　heard。　Speeches　are　not　often　made　with　the　object　of　impeding　the　action　of　government。　　That　so　small　and　so　grave　a　body　as　the　Senate　should　abstain　from　factious　opposition　to　the　government　when　employed　on　executive　functions；　was　perhaps　to　be　expected。　　It　is　of　course　well　that　it　should　be　so。　　I　confess；　however；　that　it　has　appeared　to　me　that　the　Senate　has　not　used　the　power　placed　in　its　hands　as　freely　as　the　Constitution　has　intended；　But　I　look　at　the　matter　as　an　Englishman；　and　as　an　Englishman　I　can　endure　no　government　action　which　is　not　immediately　subject　to　parliamentary　control。　Such　are　the　governing　powers　of　the　United　States。　　I　think　it　will　be　seen　that　they　are　much　more　limited　in　their　scope　of　action　than　with　us；　but　within　that　scope　of　action　much　more　independent　and　self…sufficient。　　And；　in　addition　to　this；　those　who　exercise　power　in　the　United　States　are　not　only　free　from　immediate　responsibility；　but　are　not　made　subject　to　the　hope　or　fear　of　future　judgment。　　Success　will　bring　no　award；　and　failure　no　punishment。　　I　am　not　aware　that　any　political　delinquency　has　ever　yet　brought　down　retribution　on　the　head　of　the　offender　in　the　United　States；　or　that　any　great　deed　has　been　held　as　entitling　the　doer　of　it　to　his　country's　gratitude。　　Titles　of　nobility　they　have　none；　pensions　they　never　give；　and　political　disgrace　is　unknown。　The　line　of　politics　would　seem　to　be　cold　and　unalluring。　　It　is　cold；　and　would　be　unalluring；　were　it　not　that　as　a　profession　it　is　profitable。　　In　much　of　this　I　expect　that　a　change　will　gradually　take　place。　　The　theory　has　been　that　public　affairs　should　be　in　the　hands　of　little　men。　　The　theory　was　intelligible　while　the　public　affairs　were　small；　but　they　are　small　no　longer；　and　that　theory；　I　fancy；　will　have　to　alter　itself。　　Great　men　are　needed　for　the　government；　and　in　order　to　produce　great　men　a　career　of　greatness　must　be　opened　to　them。　　I　can　see　no　reason　why　the　career　and　the　men　should　not　be　forthcoming。

CHAPTER　XI。　THE　LAW　COURTS　AND　LAWYERS　OF　THE　UNITED　STATES。

I　do　not　propose　to　make　any　attempt　to　explain　in　detail　the　practices　and　rules　of　the　American　courts　of　law。　　No　one　but　a　lawyer　should　trust　himself　with　such　a　task；　and　no　lawyer　would　be　enabled　to　do　so　in　the　few　pages　which　I　shall　here　devote　to　the　subject。　　My　present　object　is　to　explain；　as　far　as　I　may　be　able　to　do　so；　the　existing　political　position　of　the　country。　　As　this　must　depend　more　or　less　upon　the　power　vested　in　the　hands　of　the　judges；　and　upon　the　tenure　by　which　those　judges　hold　their　offices；　I　shall　endeavor　to　describe　the　circumstances　of　the　position　in　which　the　American　judges　are　placed；　the　mode　in　which　they　are　appointed；　the　difference　which　exists　between　the　National　judges　and　the　State　judges；　and　the　extent　to　which　they　are　or　are　not　held　in　high　esteem　by　the　general　public　whom　they　serve。　It　will；　I　think；　be　acknowledged　that　this　last　matter　is　one　of　almost　paramount　importance　to　the　welfare　of　a　country。　　At　home　in　England　we　do　not　realize　the　importance　to　us　in　a　political　as　well　as　social　view　of　the　dignity　and　purity　of　our　judges；　because　we　take　from　them　all　that　dignity　and　purity　can　give　as　a　matter　of　course。　　The　honesty　of　our　bench　is　to　us　almost　as　the　honesty　of　heaven。　　No　one　dreams　that　it　can　be　questioned　or　become　questionable；　and　therefore　there　are　but　few　who　are　thankful　for　its　blessings。　　Few　Englishmen　care　to　know　much　about　their　own　courts　of　law；　or　are　even　aware　that　the　judges　are　the　protectors　of　their　liberties　and　property。　　There　are　the　men；　honored　on　all　sides；　trusted　by　every　one；　removed　above　temptation；　holding　positions　which　are　coveted　by　all　lawyers。　　That　it　is　so　is　enough　for　us；　and　as　the　good　thence　derived　comes　to　us　so　easily；　we　forget　to　remember　that　we　might　possibly　be　without　it。　　The　law　courts　of　the　States　have　much　in　their　simplicity　and　the　general　intelligence　of　their　arrangements　to　recommend　them。　　In　all　ordinary　causes　justice　is　done　with　economy；　with　expedition；　and　I　believe　with　precision。　　But　they　strike　an　Englishman　at　once　as　being　deficient　in　splendor　and　dignity；　as　wanting　that　reverence　which　we　think　should　be　paid　to　words　falling　from　the　bench；　and　as　being　in　danger　as　to　that　purity　without　which　a　judge　becomes　a　curse　among　a　people；　a　chief　of　thieves；　and　an　arch…minister　of　the　Evil　One。　　I　say　as　being　in　danger；　not　that　I　mean　to　hint　that　such　want　of　purity　has　been　shown；　or　that　I　wish　it　to　be　believed　that　judges　with　itching　palms　do　sit　upon　the　American　bench；　but　because　the　present　political　tendency　of　the　State　arrangements　threatens　to　produce　such　danger。　　We　in　England　trust　implicitly　in　our　judgesnot　because　they　are　Englishmen；　but　because　they　are　Englishmen　carefully　selected　for　their　high　positions。　　We　should　soon　distrust　them　if　they　were　elected　by　universal　suffrage　from　all　the　barristers　and　attorneys　practicing　in　the　different　courts；　and　so　elected　only　for　a　period　of　years；　as　is　the　case　with　reference　to　many　of　the　State　judges　in　America。　　Such　a　mode　of　appointment　would；　in　our　estimation；　at　once　rob　them　of　their　prestige。　　And　our　distrust　would　not　be　diminished　if　the　pay　accorded　to　the　work　were　so　small　that　no　lawyer　in　good　practice　could　afford　to　accept　the　situation。　　When　we　look　at　a　judge　in　court；　venerable　beneath　his　wig　a