north america-2-第67章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
ly so at present。 The career of one of the President's ministers is not a very high career as things now stand； nor is the man supposed to have achieved much who has achieved that position。 I think it would be otherwise if the ministers were the leaders of the legislative houses。 To Congress itself would be given the power of questioning and ultimately of controlling these ministers。 The power of the President would no doubt be diminished as that of Congress would be increased。 But an alteration in that direction is in itself desirable。 It is the fault of the present system of government in the United States that the President has too much of power and weight； while the Congress of the nation lacks power and weight。 As matters now stand； Congress has not that dignity of position which it should hold； and it is without it because it is not endowed with that control over the officers of the government which our Parliament is enabled to exercise。 The want of this close connection with Congress and the President's ministers has been so much felt that it has been found necessary to create a medium of communication。 This has been done by a system which has now become a recognized part of the machinery of the government； but which is； I believe； founded on no regularly organized authority； at any rate； no provision is made for it in the Constitution； nor； as far as I am aware； has it been established by any special enactment or written rule。 Nevertheless； I believe I am justified in saying that it has become a recognized link in the system of government adopted by the United States。 In each House standing committees are named； to which are delegated the special consideration of certain affairs of State。 There are； for instance； Committees of Foreign Affairs； of Finance； the Judiciary Committee； and others of a similar nature。 To these committees are referred all questions which come before the House bearing on the special subject to which each is devoted。 Questions of taxation are referred to the Finance Committee before they are discussed in the House； and the House； when it goes into such discussion； has before it the report of the committee。 In this way very much of the work of the legislature is done by branches of each House； and by selected men whose time and intellects are devoted to special subjects。 It is easy to see that much time and useless debate may be thus saved； and I am disposed to believe that this system of committees has worked efficiently and beneficially。 The mode of selection of the members has been so contrived as to give to each political party that amount of preponderance in each committee which such party holds in the House。 If the Democrats have in the Senate a majority； it would be within their power to vote none but Democrats into the Committee on Finance； but this would be manifestly unjust to the Republican party； and the injustice would itself frustrate the object of the party in power； therefore the Democrats simply vote to themselves a majority in each committee； keeping to themselves as great a preponderance in the committee as they have in the whole House； and arranging also that the chairman of the committee shall belong to their own party。 By these committees the chief legislative measures of the country are originated and inaugurated； as they are with us by the ministers of the Crown； and the chairman of each committee is supposed to have a certain amicable relation with that minister who presides over the office with which his committee is connected。 Mr。 Sumner is at present chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs； and he is presumed to be in connection with Mr。 Seward； who； as Secretary of State； has the management of the foreign relations of the government。 But it seems to me that this supposed connection between the committees and the ministers is only a makeshift； showing by its existence the absolute necessity of close communication between the executive and the legislative； but showing also by its imperfections the great want of some better method of communication。 In the first place； the chairman of the committee is in no way bound to hold any communication with the minister。 He is simply a Senator； and as such has no ministerial duties and can have none。 He holds no appointment under the President； and has no palpable connection with the executive。 And then； it is quite as likely that he may be opposed in politics to the minister as that he may agree with him。 If the two be opposed to each other on general politics； it may be presumed that they cannot act together in union on one special subject； nor； whether they act in union or do not so act； can either have any authority over the other。 The minister is not responsible to Congress； nor is the chairman of the committee in any way bound to support the minister。 It is presumed that the chairman must know the minister's secrets； but the chairman may be bound by party considerations to use those secrets against the minister。 The system of committees appears to me to be good as regards the work of legislation。 It seems well adapted to effect economy of time and the application of special men to special services。 But I am driven to think that that connection between the chairmen of the committees and the ministers which I have attempted to describe is an arrangement very imperfect in itself； but plainly indicating the necessity of some such close relation between the executive and the legislature of the United States as does exist in the political system of Great Britain。 With us the Queen's minister has a greater weight in Parliament than the President's minister could hold in Congress； because the Queen is bound to employ a minister in whom the Parliament has confidence。 As soon as such confidence ceases； the minister ceases to be minister。 As the Crown has no politics of its own； it is simply necessary that the minister of the day should hold the politics of the people as testified by their representatives。 The machinery of the President's government cannot be made to work after this fashion。 The President himself is a political officer； and the country is bound to bear with his politics for four years； whatever those politics may be。 The ministry which he selects； on coming to his seat； will probably represent a majority in Congress； seeing that the same suffrages which have elected the President will also have elected the Congress。 But there exists no necessity on the part of the President to employ ministers who shall carry with them the support of Congress。 If； however； the minister sat in Congressif it were required of each minister that he should have a seat either in one House or in the otherthe President would； I think； find himself constrained to change a ministry in which Congress should decline to confide。 It might not be so at first； but there would be a tendency in that direction。 The governing powers do not rest exclusively with the President or with the President and his ministers； they are shared in a certain degree with the Senate； which sits from time to time in executive session； laying aside at such periods its legislative character。 It is this executive authority which lends so great a dignity to the Senate； gives it the privilege of preponderating over the other House； and makes it the political safeguard of the nation。 The questions of government as to which the Senate is empowered to interfere are soon told。 All treaties made by the President must be sanctioned by the Senate； and all appointments made by the President must be confirmed by the Senate。 The list is short； and one is disposed to think； when first hearing it； that the thing itself does not amount to much。 But it does amount to very much； it enables the Senate to fetter the President； if the Senate should be so inclined； both as regards foreign politics and home politics。 A Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Washington may write what dispatches he pleases without reference to the Senate； but the Senate interferes before those dispatches can have resulted in any fact which may be detrimental to the nation。 It is not only that the Senate is responsible for such treaties as are made； but that the President is deterred
