north america-2-第57章
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hibits servants of the State from going into Parliament is； like many of our constitutional rules； hard to be defined； and yet perfectly understood。 It may perhaps be said； with the nearest approach to a correct definition； that permanent servants of the State may not go into Parliament； and that those may do so whose services are political； depending for the duration of their term on the duration of the existing ministry。 But even this would not be exact； seeing that the Master of the Rolls and the officers of the army and navy can sit in Parliament。 The absence of the President's ministers from Congress certainly occasions much confusion； or rather prohibits a more thorough political understanding between the executive and the legislature than now exists。 In speaking of the government of the United States in the next chapter； I shall be constrained to allude again to this subject。*
* It will be alleged by Americans that the introduction into Congress of the President's ministers would alter all the existing relations of the President and of Congress； and would at once produce that parliamentary form of government which England possesses； and which the States have chosen to avoid。 Such a change would elevate Congress and depress the President。 No doubt this is true。 Such elevation； however； and such depression seemed to me to be the two things needed。
The duties of the House of Representatives are solely legislative。 Those of the Senate are legislative and executive； as with us those of the Upper House are legislative and judicial。 The House of Representatives is always open to the public。 The Senate is so open when it is engaged on legislative work； but it is closed to the public when engaged in executive session。 No treaties can be made by the President； and no appointments to high offices confirmed； without the consent of the Senate； and this consent must be given as regards the confirmation of treatiesby two…thirds of the members present。 This law gives to the Senate the power of debating with closed doors upon the nature of all treaties； and upon the conduct of the government as evinced in the nomination of the officers of State。 It also gives to the Senate a considerable control over the foreign relations of the government。 I believe that this power is often used； and that by it the influence of the Senate is raised much above that of the Lower House。 This influence is increased again by the advantage of that superior statecraft and political knowledge which the six years of the Senator gives him over the two years of the Representative。 The tried Representative； moreover； very frequently blossoms into a Senator but a Senator does not frequently fade into a Representative。 Such occasionally is the case； and it is not even unconstitutional for an ex…President to reappear in either House。 Mr。 Benton； after thirty years' service in the Senate； sat in the House of Representatives。 Mr。 Crittenden； who was returned as Senator by Kentucky； I think seven times； now sits in the Lower House； and John Quincy Adams appeared as a Representative from Massachusetts after he had filled the presidential chair。 And； moreover； the Senate of the United States is not debarred from an interference with money bills； as the House of Lords is debarred with us。 〃All bills for raising revenue；〃 says the seventh section of the first article of the Constitution； 〃shall originate with the House of Representatives； but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills。〃 By this the Senate is enabled to have an authority in the money matters of the nation almost equal to that held by the Lower Housean authority quite sufficient to preserve to it the full influence of its other powers。 With us the House of Commons is altogether in the ascendant； because it holds and jealously keeps to itself the exclusive command of the public purse。 Congress can levy custom duties in the United States； and always has done so； hitherto the national revenue has been exclusively raised from custom duties。 It cannot levy duties on exports。 It can levy excise duties； and is now doing so； hitherto it has not done so。 It can levy direct taxes； such as an income tax and a property tax； it hitherto has not done so； but now must do so。 It must do so； I think I am justified in saying； but its power of doing this is so hampered by constitutional enactment； that it would seem that the Constitution as regards this heading must be altered before any scheme can be arranged by which a moderately just income tax can be levied and collected。 This difficulty I have already mentioned； but perhaps it will be well that I should endeavor to make the subject more plain。 It is specially declared： 〃That all duties； imposts； and excises shall be uniform throughout the united States。〃 And again： 〃That no capitation or other direct tax shall be laid； unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken。〃 And again； in the words before quoted： 〃Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which shall be included in this Union； according to their respective numbers。〃 By these repeated rules it has been intended to decree that the separate States shall bear direct taxation according to their population and the consequent number of their Representatives； and this intention has been made so clear that no direct taxation can be levied in opposition to it without an evident breach of the Constitution。 To explain the way in which this will work； I will name the two States of Rhode Island and Iowa as opposed to each other； and the two States of Massachusetts and Indiana as opposed to each other。 Rhode Island and Massachusetts are wealthy Atlantic States； containing； as regards enterprise and commercial success； the cream of the population of the United States。 Comparing them in the ratio of population； I believe that they are richer than any other States。 They return between them thirteen Representatives； Rhode Island sending two and Massachusetts eleven。 Iowa and Indiana also send thirteen Representatives； Iowa sending two； and being thus equal to Rhode Island； Indiana sending eleven； and being thus equal to Massachusetts。 Iowa and Indiana are Western States； and though I am not prepared to say that they are the poorest States of the Union； I can assert that they are exactly opposite in their circumstances to Rhode Island and Massachusetts。 The two Atlantic States of New England are old established； rich； and commercial。 The two Western States I have named are full of new immigrants； are comparatively poor； and are agricultural。 Nevertheless any direct taxation levied on those in the East and on those in the West must be equal in its weight。 Iowa must pay as much as Rhode Island； Indiana must pay as much as Massachusetts。 But Rhode Island and Massachusetts could pay； without the sacrifice of any comfort to its people； without any sensible suffering； an amount of direct taxation which would crush the States of Iowa and Indianawhich indeed no tax gatherer could collect out of those States。 Rhode Island and Massachusetts could with their ready money buy Iowa and Indiana； and yet the income tax to be collected from the poor States is to be the same in amount as that collected from the rich States。 Within each individual State the total amount of income tax or of other direct taxation to be levied from that State may be apportioned as the State may think fit； but an income tax of two per cent。 on Rhode Island would probably produce more than an income tax of ten per cent。 in Iowa； whereas Rhode Island could pay an income tax of ten per cent。 easier than could Iowa one of two per cent。 It would in fact appear that the Constitution as at present framed is fatal to all direct taxation。 Any law for the collection of direct taxation levied under the Constitution would produce internecine quarrel between the Western States and those which border on the Atlantic。 The Western States would not submit to the taxation。 The difficulty which one here feels is that which always attends an attempt at finality in political arrangements。 One would be inclined to say at once that the law should be altere
