the common law-第9章

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tment；　and　the　same　rules　for　both。　The　ever…growing　value　set　upon　peace　and　the　social　relations　tends　to　give　the　law　of　social　being　the　appearance　of　the　law　of　all　being。　But　it　seems　to　me　clear　that　the　ultima　ratio；　not　only　regum；　but　of　private　persons；　is　force；　and　that　at　the　bottom　of　all　private　relations；　however　tempered　by　sympathy　and　all　the　social　feelings；　is　a　justifiable　self…preference。　If　a　man　is　on　a　plank　in　the　deep　sea　which　will　only　float　one；　and　a　stranger　lays　hold　of　it；　he　will　thrust　him　off　if　he　can。　When　the　state　finds　itself　in　a　similar　position；　it　does　the　same　thing。

The　considerations　which　answer　the　argument　of　equal　rights　also　answer　the　objections　to　treating　man　as　a　thing；　and　the　like。　If　a　man　lives　in　society；　he　is　liable　to　find　himself　so　treated。　The　degree　of　civilization　which　a　people　has　reached；　no　doubt；　is　marked　by　their　anxiety　to　do　as　they　would　be　done　by。　It　may　be　the　destiny　of　man　that　the　social　instincts　shall　grow　to　control　his　actions　absolutely；　even　in　anti…social　situations。　But　they　have　not　yet　done　so；　and　as　the　rules　of　law　are　or　should　be　based　upon　a　morality　which　is　generally　accepted；　no　rule　founded　on　a　theory　of　absolute　unselfishness　can　be　laid　down　without　a　breach　between　law　and　working　beliefs。

If　it　be　true；　as　I　shall　presently　try　to　show；　that　the　general　principles　of　criminal　and　civil　liability　are　the　same；　it　will　follow　from　that　alone　that　theory　and　fact　agree　in　frequently　punishing　those　who　have　been　guilty　＇45＇　of　no　moral　wrong；　and　who　could　not　be　condemned　by　any　standard　that　did　not　avowedly　disregard　the　personal　peculiarities　of　the　individuals　concerned。　If　punishment　stood　on　the　moral　grounds　which　are　proposed　for　it；　the　first　thing　to　be　considered　would　be　those　limitations　in　the　capacity　for　choosing　rightly　which　arise　from　abnormal　instincts；　want　of　education；　lack　of　intelligence；　and　all　the　other　defects　which　are　most　marked　in　the　criminal　classes。　I　do　not　say　that　they　should　not　be；　or　at　least　I　do　not　need　to　for　my　argument。　I　do　not　say　that　the　criminal　law　does　more　good　than　harm。　I　only　say　that　it　is　not　enacted　or　administered　on　that　theory。

There　remains　to　be　mentioned　the　affirmative　argument　in　favor　of　the　theory　of　retribution；　to　the　effect　that　the　fitness　of　punishment　following　wrong…doing　is　axiomatic；　and　is　instinctively　recognized　by　unperverted　minds。　I　think　that　it　will　be　seen；　on　self…inspection；　that　this　feeling　of　fitness　is　absolute　and　unconditional　only　in　the　case　of　our　neighbors。　It　docs　not　seem　to　me　that　any　one　who　has　satisfied　himself　that　an　act　of　his　was　wrong；　and　that　he　will　never　do　it　again；　would　feel　the　least　need　or　propriety；　as　between　himself　and　an　earthly　punishing　power　alone；　of　his　being　made　to　suffer　for　what　he　had　done；　although；　when　third　persons　were　introduced；　he　might；　as　a　philosopher；　admit　the　necessity　of　hurting　him　to　frighten　others。　But　when　our　neighbors　do　wrong；　we　sometimes　feel　the　fitness　of　making　them　smart　for　it；　whether　they　have　repented　or　not。　The　feeling　of　fitness　seems　to　me　to　be　only　vengeance　in　disguise；　and　I　have　already　admitted　that　vengeance　was　an　element；　though　not　the　chief　element；　of　punishment。

＇46＇　But；　again；　the　supposed　intuition　of　fitness　does　not　seem　to　me　to　be　coextensive　with　the　thing　to　be　accounted　for。　The　lesser　punishments　are　just　as　fit　for　the　lesser　crimes　as　the　greater　for　the　greater。　The　demand　that　crime　should　be　followed　by　its　punishment　should　therefore　be　equal　and　absolute　in　both。　Again；　a　malum　prohibitum　is　just　as　much　a　crime　as　a　malum　in　se。　If　there　is　any　general　ground　for　punishment；　it　must　apply　to　one　case　as　much　as　to　the　other。　But　it　will　hardly　be　said　that；　if　the　wrong　in　the　case　just　supposed　consisted　of　a　breach　of　the　revenue　laws；　and　the　government　had　been　indemnified　for　the　loss；　we　should　feel　any　internal　necessity　that　a　man　who　had　thoroughly　repented　of　his　wrong　should　be　punished　for　it；　except　on　the　ground　that　his　act　was　known　to　others。　If　it　was　known；　the　law　would　have　to　verify　its　threats　in　order　that　others　might　believe　and　tremble。　But　if　the　fact　was　a　secret　between　the　sovereign　and　the　subject；　the　sovereign；　if　wholly　free　from　passion；　would　undoubtedly　see　that　punishment　in　such　a　case　was　wholly　without　justification。

On　the　other　hand；　there　can　be　no　case　in　which　the　law…maker　makes　certain　conduct　criminal　without　his　thereby　showing　a　wish　and　purpose　to　prevent　that　conduct。　Prevention　would　accordingly　seem　to　be　the　chief　and　only　universal　purpose　of　punishment。　The　law　threatens　certain　pains　if　you　do　certain　things；　intending　thereby　to　give　you　a　new　motive　for　not　doing　them。　If　you　persist　in　doing　them；　it　has　to　inflict　the　pains　in　order　that　its　threats　may　continue　to　be　believed。

If　this　is　a　true　account　of　the　law　as　it　stands；　the　law　does　undoubtedly　treat　the　individual　as　a　means　to　an　＇47＇　end；　and　uses　him　as　a　tool　to　increase　the　general　welfare　at　his　own　expense。　It　has　been　suggested　above；　that　this　course　is　perfectly　proper；　but　even　if　it　is　wrong；　our　criminal　law　follows　it；　and　the　theory　of　our　criminal　law　must　be　shaped　accordingly。

Further　evidence　that　our　law　exceeds　the　limits　of　retribution；　and　subordinates　consideration　of　the　individual　to　that　of　the　public　well…being；　will　be　found　in　some　doctrines　which　cannot　be　satisfactorily　explained　on　any　other　ground。

The　first　of　these　is；　that　even　the　deliberate　taking　of　life　will　not　be　punished　when　it　is　the　only　way　of　saving　one's　own。　This　principle　is　not　so　clearly　established　as　that　next　to　be　mentioned；　but　it　has　the　support　of　very　great　authority。　/1/　If　that　is　the　law；　it　must　go　on　one　of　two　grounds；　either　that　self…preference　is　proper　in　the　case　supposed；　or　that；　even　if　it　is　improper；　the　law　cannot　prevent　it　by　punishment；　because　a　threat　of　death　at　some　future　time　can　never　be　a　sufficiently　powerful　motive　to　make　a　man　choose　death　now　in　order　to　avoid　the　threat。　If　the　former　ground　is　adopted；　it　admits　that　a　single　person　may　sacrifice　another　to　himself；　and　a　fortiori　that　a　people　may。　If　the　latter　view　is　taken；　by　abandoning　punishment　when　it　can　no　longer　be　expected　to　prevent　an　act；　the　law　abandons　the　retributive　and　adopts　the　preventive　theory。

The　next　doctrine　leads　to　still　clearer　conclusions。　Ignorance　of　the　law　is　no　excuse　for　breaking　it。　This　substantive　principle　is　sometimes　put　in　the　form　of　a　rule　of　evidence；　that　every　one　is　presumed　to　know　the　＇48＇　law。　It　has　accordingly　been　defended　by　Austin　and　others；　on　the　ground　of　difficulty　of　proof。　If　justice　requires　the　fact　to　be　ascertained；　the　difficulty　of　doing　so　is　no　ground　for　refusing　to　try。　But　every　one　must　feel　that　ignorance　of　the　law　could　never　be　admitted　as　an　excuse；　even　if　the　fact　could　be　proved　by　sight　and　hearing　in　every　case。　Furthermore；　now　that　parties　can　testify；　it　may　be　doubted　whether　a　man's　knowledge　of　the　law　is　any　harder　to　investigate　than　many　questions　which　are　gone　into。　The　difficulty；　such　as　it　is；　would　be　met　by　throwing　the　burden　of　proving　ignorance　on　the　lawbreaker。

The　principle　cannot　be　explained　by　saying　that　we　are　not　only　commanded　to　abstain　from　certain　acts；　but　also　to　find　out　that　we　are　commanded。　For　if　there　were　such　a　second　command；　it　is　very　clear　that　the　guilt　of　failing　to　obey　it　would　bear　no　proportion　to　that　of　disobeying　the　principal　command　if　known；　yet　the　failure　to　know　would　receive　the　same　punishment　as　the　failure　to　obey　the　principal　law。

The　true　explanation　of　the　rule　is　the　same　as　that　which　accounts　for　the　law's　indifference　to　a　man's　particular　temperament；　faculties；　and　so　forth。　Public　policy　sacrifices　the　individual　to　the　general　good。　It　is　desirable　that　the　burden　of　all　should　be　equal；　but　it　is　still　more　desirable　to　put　an　end　to　robbery　and　murder。　It　is　no　doubt　true　that　there　are　many　cases　in　which　the　criminal　could　not　have　known　that　he　was　breaking　the　law；　but　to　admit　the　excuse　at　all　would