the common law-第65章

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1＇　as　that　anything；　however　important；　shall　not　be；　and　if　that　essential　is　part　of　the　contract　description　of　a　specific　thing　which　is　also　identified　by　reference　to　the　senses；　how　can　there　be　a　contract　in　its　absence　any　more　than　if　the　thing　is　in　popular　speech　different　in　kind　from　its　description？　The　qualities　that　make　sameness　or　difference　of　kind　for　the　purposes　of　a　contract　are　not　determined　by　Agassiz　or　Darwin；　or　by　the　public　at　large；　but　by　the　will　of　the　parties；　which　decides　that　for　their　purposes　the　characteristics　insisted　on　are　such　and　such。　/1/1　Now；　if　this　be　true；　what　evidence　can　there　be　that　a　certain　requirement　is　essential；　that　without　it　the　subject…matter　will　be　different　in　kind　from　the　description；　better　than　that　one　party　has　required　and　the　other　given　a　warranty　of　its　presence？　Yet　the　contract　description　of　the　specific　vessel　as　now　in　the　port　of　Amsterdam；　although　held　to　be　an　implied　warranty；　does　not　seem　to　have　been　regarded　as　making　the　contract　repugnant　and　void；　but　only　as　giving　the　defendant　the　option　of　avoiding　it。　/2/　Even　an　express　warranty　of　quality　in　sales　does　not　have　this　effect；　and　in　England；　indeed；　it　does　not　allow　the　purchaser　to　rescind　in　case　of　breach。　On　this　last　point　the　law　of　Massachusetts　is　different。

The　explanation　has　been　offered　of　the　English　doctrine　with　regard　to　sales；　that；　when　the　title　has　passed；　the　purchaser　has　already　had　some　benefit　from　the　contract；　and　therefore　cannot　wholly　replace　the　seller　in　statu　quo；　as　must　be　done　when　a　contract　is　rescinded。　/3/　This　reasoning　＇332＇　seems　doubtful；　even　to　show　that　the　contract　is　not　voidable；　but　has　no　bearing　on　the　argument　that　it　is　void。　For　if　the　contract

is　void；　the　title　does　not　pass。

It　might　be　said　that　there　is　no　repugnancy　in　the　charterer's　promise；　because　he　only　promises　to　load　a　certain　ship；　and　that　the　words　〃now　in　the　port　of　Amsterdam〃　are　merely　matter　of　history　when　the　time　for　loading　comes；　and　no　part　of　the　description　of　the　vessel　which　he　promised　to　load。　But　the　moment　those　words　are　decided　to　be　essential　they　become　part　of　the　description；　and　the　promise　is　to　load　a　certain　vessel　which　is　named　the　Martaban；　and　which　was　in　the　port　of　Amsterdam　at　the　date　of　the　contract。　So　interpreted；　it　is　repugnant。

Probably　the　true　solution　is　to　be　found　in　practical　considerations。　At　any　rate；　the　fact　is　that　the　law　has　established　three　degrees　in　the　effect　of　repugnancy。　If　one　of　the　repugnant　terms　is　wholly　insignificant；　it　is　simply　disregarded；　or　at　most　will　only　found　a　claim　for　damages。　The　law　would　be　loath　to　hold　a　contract　void　for　repugnancy　in　present　terms；　when　if　the　same　terms　were　only　promised　a　failure　of　one　of　them　would　not　warrant　a　refusal　to　perform　on　the　other　side。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　both　are　of　the　extremest　importance；　so　that　to　enforce　the　rest　of　the　promise　or　bargain　without　one　of　them　would　not　merely　deprive　one　party　of　a　stipulated　incident；　but　would　force　a　substantially　different　bargain　on　him；　the　promise　will　be　void。　There　is　an　intermediate　class　of　cases　where　it　is　left　to　the　disappointed　party　to　decide。　But　as　the　lines　between　the　three　are　of　this　vague　kind；　it　is　not　surprising　that　they　have　been　differently　drawn　in　different　jurisdictions。

＇333＇　The　examples　which　have　been　given　of　undertakings　for　a　present　state　of　facts　have　been　confined　to　those　touching　the　present　condition　of　the　subject…　matter　of　the　contract。　Of　course　there　is　no　such　limit　to　the　scope　of　their　employment。　A　contract　may　warrant　the　existence　of　other　facts　as　well；　and　examples　of　this　kind　probably　might　be　found　or　imagined　where　it　would　be　clear　that　the　only　effect　of　the　warranty　was　to　attach　a　condition　to　the　contract；　in　favor　of　the　other　side；　and　where　the　question　would　be　avoided　whether　there　was　not　something　more　than　a　condition；a　repugnancy　which　prevented　the　formation　of　any　contract　at　all。　But　the　preceding　illustrations　are　enough　for　the　present　purpose。

We　may　now　pass　from　undertakings　that　certain　facts　are　true　at　the　time　of　making　the　contract；　to　undertakings　that　certain　facts　shall　be　true　at　some　later　time；that　is；　to　promises　properly　so　called。　The　question　is　when　performance　of　the　promise　on　one　side　is　a　condition　to　the　obligation　of　the　contract　on　the　other。　In　practice；　this　question　is　apt　to　be　treated　as　identical　with　another；　which；　as　has　been　shown　earlier；　is　a　distinct　point；　namely；　when　performance　on　one　side　is　a　condition　of　the　right　to　call　for　performance　on　the　other。　It　is　of　course　conceivable　that　a　promise　should　be　limited　to　the　case　of　performance　of　the　things　promised　on　the　other　side；　and　yet　that　a　failure　of　the　latter　should　not　warrant　a　rescission　of　the　contract。　Wherever　one　party　has　already　received　a　substantial　benefit　under　a　contract　of　a　kind　which　cannot　be　restored；　it　is　too　late　to　rescind；　however　important　a　breach　may　be　committed　later　by　the　other　side。　Yet　he　may　be　＇334＇　excused　from　going　farther。　Suppose　a　contract　is　made　for　a　month's　labor；　ten　dollars　to　be　paid　down；　not　to　be　recovered　except　in　case　of　rescission　for　the　laborer's　fault；　and　thirty　dollars　at　the　end　of　the　month。　If　the　laborer　should　wrongfully　stop　work　at　the　end　of　a　fortnight；　I　do　not　suppose　that　the　contract　could　be　rescinded；　and　that　the　ten　dollars　could　be　recovered　as　money　had　and　received；　/1/　but；　on　the　other　hand；　the　employer　would　not　be　bound　to　pay　the　thirty　dollars；　and　of　course　he　could　sue　for　damages　on　the　contract。　/2/

But；　for　the　most　part；　a　breach　of　promise　which　discharges　the　promisee　from　further　performance　on　his　side　will　also　warrant　rescission；　so　that　no　great　harm　is　done　by　the　popular　confusion　of　the　two　questions。　Where　the　promise　to　perform　on　one　side　is　limited　to　the　case　of　performance　on　the　other；　the　contract　is　generally　conditioned　on　it　also。　In　what　follows；　I　shall　take　up　the　cases　which　I　wish　to　notice　without　stopping　to　consider　whether　the　contract　was　in　a　strict　sense　conditioned　on　performance　of　the　promise　on　one　side；　or　whether　the　true　construction　was　merely　that　the　promise　on　the　other　side　was　limited　to　that　event。

Now；　how　do　we　settle　whether　such　a　condition　exists？　It　is　easy　to　err　by　seeking　too　eagerly　for　simplicity；　and　by　striving　too　hard　to　reduce　all　cases　to　artificial　presumptions；　which　are　less　obvious　than　the　decisions　which　they　are　supposed　to　explain。　The　foundation　of　the　whole　matter　is；　after　all；　good　sense；　as　the　courts　have　often　said。　The　law　means　to　carry　out　the　intention　of　the　parties；　and；　so　far　as　they　have　not　provided　＇335＇　for　the　event　which　has　happened；　it　has　to　say　what　they　naturally　would　have　intended　if　their　minds　had　been　turned　to　the　point。　It　will　be　found　that　decisions　based　on　the　direct　implications　of　the　language　used；　and　others　based　upon　a　remoter　inference　of　what　the　parties　must　have　meant；　or　would　have　said　if　they　had　spoken；　shade　into　each　other　by　imperceptible　degrees。

Mr。　Langdell　has　called　attention　to　a　very　important　principle；　and　one　which；　no　doubt；　throws　light　on　many　decisions。　/1/　This　is；　that；　where　you　have　a　bilateral　contract；　while　the　consideration　of　each　promise　is　the　counter　promise；　yet　prima　facie　the　payment　for　performance　of　one　is　performance　of　the　other。　The　performance　of　the　other　party　is　what　each　means　to　have　in　return　for　his　own。　If　A　promises　a　barrel　of　flour　to　B；　and　B　promises　him　ten　dollars　for　it；　A　means　to　have　the　ten　dollars　for　his　flour；　and　B　means　to　have　the　flour　for　his　ten　dollars。　If　no　time　is　set　for　either　act；　neither　can　call　on　the　other　to　perform　without　being　ready　at　the　same　time　himself。

But　this　principle　of　equivalency　is　not　the　only　principle　to　be　drawn　even　from　the　form　of　contracts；　without　considering　their　subject…matter；　and　of　course　it　is　not　offered　as　such　in　Mr。　Langdell's　work。

Another　very　clear　one　is　found　in　contracts　for　the　sale　or　lease　of　a　thing；　and　the　like。　Here　the　qualities　or　cha