the common law-第61章

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a　machine…shop；　but　an　organ　factory；　which　is　a　greater　risk。　The　contract　is　void；　not　because　of　any　misrepresentation；　but；　as　before；　because　two　of　its　essential　terms　are　repugnant；　and　their　union　is　insensible。　/1/

Of　course　the　principle　of　repugnancy　last　explained　might　be　stretched　to　apply　to　any　inconsistency　between　the　different　terms　of　a　contract。　It　might　be　said；　for　instance；　that　if　a　piece　of　gold　is　sold　as　eighteen…carat　gold；　and　it　is　in　fact　not　so　pure；　or　if　a　cow　is　sold　as　yielding　an　average　of　twelve　quarts　of　milk　a　day；　and　in　fact　she　yields　only　six　quarts；　there　is　no　logical　difference；　＇312＇　according　to　the　explanation　which　has　just　been　offered；　between　those　cases　and　that　of　the　barrel　of　salt　sold　for　mackerel。　Yet　those　bargains　would　not　be　void。　At　the　most；　they　would　only　be　voidable；　if　the　buyer　chose　to　throw　them　up。

The　distinctions　of　the　law　are　founded　on　experience；　not　on　logic。　It　therefore　does　not　make　the　dealings　of　men　dependent　on　a　mathematical　accuracy。　Whatever　is　promised；　a　man　has　a　right　to　be　paid　for；　if　it　is　not　given；　but　it　does　not　follow　that　the　absence　of　some　insignificant　detail　will　authorize　him　to　throw　up　the　contract；　still　less　that　it　will　prevent　the　formation　of　a　contract；　which　is　the　matter　now　under　consideration。　The　repugnant　terms　must　both　be　very　important；so　important　that　the　court　thinks　that；　if　either　is　omitted；　the　contract　would　be　different　in　substance　from　that　which　the　words　of　the　parties　seemed　to　express。

A　term　which　refers　directly　to　an　identification　by　the　senses　has　always　this　degree　of　importance。　If　a　promise　is　made　to　sell　this　cow；　or　this　mackerel；　to　this　man；　whatever　else　may　be　stricken　from　the　contract；　it　can　never　be　enforced　except　touching　this　object　and　by　this　man。　If　this　barrel　of　salt　is　fraudulently　sold　for　a　barrel　of　mackerel；　the　buyer　may　perhaps　elect　to　take　this　barrel　of　salt　if　he　chooses；　but　he　cannot　elect　to　take　another　barrel　of　mackerel。　If　the　seller　is　introduced　by　the　name　B；　and　the　buyer　supposes　him　to　be　another　person　of　the　same　name；　and　under　that　impression　delivers　his　written　promise　to　buy　of　B；　the　B　to　whom　the　writing　is　delivered　is　the　contractee；　if　any　one　is；　and；　notwithstanding　what　has　been　said　of　the　use　of　proper　names；　I　should　suppose　＇313＇　a　contract　would　be　made。　/1/　For　it　is　further　to　be　said　that；　so　far　as　by　one　of　the　terms　of　a　contract　the　thing　promised　or　the　promisee　is　identified　by　sight　and　hearing；　that　term　so　far　preponderates　over　all　others　that　it　is　very　rare　for　the　failure　of　any　other　element　of　description　to　prevent　the　making　of　a　contract。　/2/　The　most　obvious　of　seeming　exceptions　is　where　the　object　not　in　fact　so　identified；　but　only　its　covering　or　wrapper。

Of　course　the　performance　of　a　promise　may　be　made　conditional　on　all　the　terms　stipulated　from　the　other　side　being　complied　with；　but　conditions　attaching　to　performance　can　never　come　into　consideration　until　a　contract　has　been　made；　and　so　far　the　question　has　been　touching　the　existence　of　a　contract　in　the　first　instance。

A　different　case　may　be　suggested　from　any　yet　considered。　Instead　of　a　repugnancy　between　offer　and　assent　which　prevents　an　agreement；　or　between　the　terms　of　an　agreement　which　makes　it　insensible　on　its　fact；　there　may　be　a　like　repugnancy　between　a　term　of　the　contract　and　a　previous　representation　of　fact　which　is　not　expressly　made　a　part　of　the　contract。　The　representation　may　have　been　the　chief　inducement　and　very　foundation　of　the　bargain。　It　may　be　more　important　than　any　of　the　expressed　terms；　and　yet　the　contract　may　have　＇314＇　been　reduced　to　writing　in　words　which　cannot　fairly　be　construed　to　include　it。　A　vendor　may　have　stated　that　barrels　filled　with　salt　contain　mackerel；　but　the　contract　may　be　only　for　the　barrels　and　their　contents。　An　applicant　for　insurance　may　have　misstated　facts　essential　to　the　risk；　yet　the　policy　may　simply　insure　a　certain　building　or　a　certain　life。　It　may　be　asked　whether　these　contracts　are　not　void　also。

There　might　conceivably　be　cases　in　which；　taking　into　account　the　nature　of　the　contract；　the　words　used　could　be　said　to　embody　the　representation　as　a　term　by　construction。　For　instance；　it　might　be　said　that　the　true　and　well…understood　purport　of　a　contract　of　insurance　is　not；　as　the　words　seem　to　say；　to　take　the　risk　of　any　loss　by　fire　or　perils　of　the　sea；　however　great　the　risk　may　be；　but　to　take　a　risk　of　a　certain　magnitude；　and　no　other；　which　risk　has　been　calculated　mathematically　from　the　statements　of　the　party　insured。　The　extent　of　the　risk　taken　is　not　specified　in　the　policy；　because　the　old　forms　and　established　usage　are　otherwise；　but　the　meaning　is　perfectly　understood。

If　this　reasoning　were　adopted；　there　would　be　an　equal　repugnancy　in　the　terms　of　the　contract；　whether　the　nature　of　the　risk　were　written　in　the　policy　or　fixed　by　previous　description。　But；　subject　to　possible　exceptions　of　this　kind；　it　would　seem　that　a　contract　would　be　made；　and　that　the　most　that　could　be　claimed　would　be　a　right　to　rescind。　Where　parties　having　power　to　bind　themselves　do　acts　and　use　words　which　are　fit　to　create　an　obligation；　I　take　it　that　an　obligation　arises。　If　there　is　a　mistake　as　to　a　fact　not　mentioned　in　the　contract；　it　goes　only　to　the　motives　for　making　the　contract。　But　a　＇315＇　contract　is　not　prevented　from　being　made　by　the　mere　fact　that　one　party　would　not　have　made　it　if　he　had　known　the　truth。　In　what　cases　a　mistake　affecting　motives　is　a　ground　for　avoidance；　does　not　concern　this　discussion；　because　the　subject　now　under　consideration　is　when　a　contract　is　made；　and　the　question　of　avoiding　or　rescinding　it　presupposes　that　it　has　been　made。

I　think　that　it　may　now　be　assumed　that；　when　fraud；　misrepresentation；　or　mistake　is　said　to　make　a　contract　void；　there　is　no　new　principle　which　comes　in　to　set　aside　an　otherwise　perfect　obligation；　but　that　in　every　such　case　there　is　wanting　one　or　more　of　the　first　elements　which　were　explained　in　the　foregoing　Lecture。　Either　there　is　no　second　party；　or　the　two　parties　say　different　things；　or　essential　terms　seemingly　consistent　are　really　inconsistent　as　used。

When　a　contract　is　said　to　be　voidable；　it　is　assumed　that　a　contract　has　been　made；　but　that　it　is　subject　to　being　unmade　at　the　election　of　one　party。　This　must　be　because　of　the　breach　of　some　condition　attached　to　its　existence　either　expressly　or　by　implication。

If　a　condition　is　attached　to　the　contract's　coming　into　being；　there　is　as　yet　no　contract。　Either　party　may　withdraw；　at　will；　until　the　condition　is　determined。　There　is　no　obligation；　although　there　may　be　an　offer　or　a　promise；　and　hence　there　is　no　relation　between　the　parties　which　requires　discussion　here。　But　some　conditions　seemingly　arising　out　of　a　contract　already　made　are　conditions　of　this　sort。　Such　is　always　the　case　if　the　condition　of　a　promise　lies　within　the　control　of　the　promisor's　own　will。　For　instance；　a　promise　to　pay　for　clothes　if　made　to　the　customer's　satisfaction；　has　been　held　in　Massachusetts　to　＇316＇　make　the　promisor　his　own　final　judge。　/1/　So　interpreted；　it　appears　to　me　to　be　no　contract　at　all；　until　the　promisor's　satisfaction　is　expressed。　His　promise　is　only　to　pay　if　he　sees　fit；　and　such　a　promise　cannot　be　made　a　contract　because　it　cannot　impose　any　obligation。　/2/　If　the　promise　were　construed　to　mean　that　the　clothes　should　be　paid　for　provided　they　were　such　as　ought　to　satisfy　the　promisor；　/3/　and　thus　to　make　the　jury　the　arbiter；　there　would　be　a　contract；　because　the　promisor　gives　up　control　over　the　event；　but　it　would　be　subject　to　a　condition　in　the　sense　of　the　present　analysis。

The　conditions　which　a　contract　may　contain　have　been　divided　by　theorists　into　conditions　precedent　and　conditions　subsequent。　The　distinction　has　even　been　pronounced　of　great　importance。　It　must　be　admitted　that；　if　the　course　of　pleading　be　taken　as　a　test；　it　is　so。　In　some　cases；　the　plaintiff　has　to　state　that　a　condition　has　been　performed　in　order　to　put　the　defendant　to　his　answer；