the common law-第60章

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as　in　the　case　supposed；　the　consideration　for　the　return　promise　has　been　put　into　the　power　of　the　offeree　and　the　return　promise　has　been　accepted　in　advance；　there　is　not　an　instant；　either　in　time　or　logic；　when　the　return　promise　is　an　offer。　It　is　a　promise　and　a　term　of　a　binding　contract　as　soon　as　it　is　anything。　An　offer　is　a　revocable　and　unaccepted

communication　of　willingness　to　promise。　＇306＇　When　an　offer　of　a　certain　bilateral　contract　has　been　made；　the　same　contract　cannot　be　offered　by　the　other　side。　The　so…called　offer　would　neither　be　revocable　nor　unaccepted。　It　would　complete　the　contract　as　soon　as　made。

If　it　be　said　that　it　is　of　the　essence　of　a　promise　to　be　communicated；　whether　it　goes　through　the　stage　of　offer　or　not；　meaning　by　communicated　brought　to　the　actual　knowledge　of　the　promisee；　the　law　is　believed　to　be　otherwise。　A　covenant　is　binding　when　it　is　delivered　and　accepted；　whether　it　is　read　or　not。　On　the　same　principle；　it　is　believed　that；　whenever　the　obligation　is　to　be　entered　into　by　a　tangible　sign；　as；　in　the　case　supposed；　by　letter　containing　the　return　promise；　and　the　consideration　for　and　assent　to　the　promise　are　already　given；　the　only　question　is　when　the　tangible　sign　is　sufficiently　put　into　the　power　of　the　promisee。　I　cannot　believe　that；　if　the　letter　had　been　delivered　to　the　promisee　and　was　then　snatched　from　his　hands　before　he　had　read　it；　there　would　be　no　contract。　/l　/　If　I　am　right；　it　appears　of　little　importance　whether　the　post…office　be　regarded　as　agent　or　bailee　for　the　offerer；　or　as　a　mere　box　to　which　he　has　access。　The　offeree；　when　he　drops　the　letter　containing　the　counter…promise　into　the　letter…box；　does　an　overt　act；　which　by　general　understanding　renounces　control　over　the　letter；　and　puts　it　into　a　third　hand　for　the　benefit　of　the　offerer；　with　liberty　to　the　latter　at　any　moment　thereafter　to　take　it。

The　principles　governing　revocation　are　wholly　different。　One　to　whom　an　offer　is　made　has　a　right　to　assume　that　it　remains　open　according　to　its　terms　until　he　has　actual　＇307＇　notice　to　the　contrary。　The　effect　of　the　communication　must　be　destroyed　by　a　counter　communication。　But　the　making　of　a　contract　does　not　depend　on　the　state　of　the　parties'　minds；　it　depends　on　their　overt　acts。　When　the　sign　of　the　counter　promise　is　a　tangible　object；　the　contract　is　completed　when　the　dominion　over　that　object　changes。

＇308＇　LECTURE　IX。

CONTRACT。…　III。　VOID　AND　VOIDABLE。

THE　elements　of　fact　necessary　to　call　a　contract　into　existence；　and　the　legal　consequences　of　a　contract　when　formed；　have　been　discussed。　It　remains　to　consider　successively　the　cases　in　which　a　contract　is　said　to　be　void；　and　those　in　which　it　is　said　to　be　voidable；in　which；　that　is；　a　contract　fails　to　be　made　when　it　seems　to　have　been；　or；　having　been　made；　can　be　rescinded　by　one　side　or　the　other；　and　treated　as　if　it　had　never　been。　I　take　up　the　former　class　of　cases　first。

When　a　contract　fails　to　be　made；　although　the　usual　forms　have　been　gone　through　with；　the　ground　of　failure　is　commonly　said　to　be　mistake；　misrepresentation；　or　fraud。　But　I　shall　try　to　show　that　these　are　merely　dramatic　circumstances；　and　that　the　true　ground　is　the　absence　of　one　or　more　of　the　primary　elements；　which　have　been　shown；　or　are　seen　at　once；　to　be　necessary　to　the　existence　of　a　contract。

If　a　man　goes　through　the　form　of　making　a　contract　with　A　through　B　as　A's　agent；　and　B　is　not　in　fact　the　agent　of　A；　there　is　no　contract；　because　there　is　only　one　party。　The　promise　offered　to　A　has　not　been　accepted　by　him；　and　no　consideration　has　moved　from　him。　In　such　a　case；　although　there　is　generally　mistake　on　one　side　and　fraud　on　the　other；　it　is　very　clear　that　no　special　＇309＇　doctrine　need　be　resorted　to；　because　the　primary　elements　of　a　contract　explained　in　the　last　Lecture　are　not　yet　present。

Take　next　a　different　case。　The　defendant　agreed　to　buy；　and　the　plaintiff　agreed　to　sell；　a　cargo　of　cotton；　〃to　arrive　ex　Peerless　from　Bombay。〃　There　were　two　such　vessels　sailing　from　Bombay；　one　in　October；　the　other　in　December。　The　plaintiff　meant　the　latter；　the　defendant　the　former。　It　was　held　that　the　defendant　was　not　bound　to　accept　the　cotton。　/1/　It　is　commonly　said　that　such　a　contract　is　void；　because　of　mutual　mistake　as　to　the　subject…　matter；　and　because　therefore　the　parties　did　not　consent　to　the　same　thing。　But　this　way　of　putting　it　seems　to　me　misleading。　The　law　has　nothing　to　do　with　the　actual　state　of　the　parties'　minds。　In　contract；　as　elsewhere；　it　must　go　by　externals；　and　judge　parties　by　their　conduct。　If　there　had　been　but　one　〃Peerless；〃　and　the　defendant　had　said　〃Peerless〃　by　mistake；　meaning　〃Peri；〃　he　would　have　been　bound。　The　true　ground　of　the　decision　was　not　that　each　party　meant　a　different　thing　from　the　other；　as　is　implied　by　the　explanation　which　has　been　mentioned；　but　that　each　said　a　different　thing。　The　plaintiff　offered　one　thing；　the　defendant　expressed　his　assent　to　another。

A　proper　name；　when　used　in　business　or　in　pleading；　/2/　means　one　individual　thing；　and　no　other；　as　every　one　knows；　and　therefore　one　to　whom　such　a　name　is　used　must　find　out　at　his　peril　what　the　object　designated　is。　If　there　are　no　circumstances　which　make　the　use　deceptive　on　either　side；　each　is　entitled　to　insist　on　the　＇310＇　meaning　favorable　to　him　for　the　word　as　used　by　him；　and　neither　is　entitled　to　insist　on　that　meaning　for　the　word　as　used　by　the　other。　So　far　from　mistake　having　been　the　ground　of　decision；　as　mistake；　its　only　bearing；　as　it　seems　to　me；　was　to　establish　that　neither　party　knew　that　he　was　understood　by　the　other　to　use　the　word　〃Peerless　〃in　the　sense　which　the　latter　gave　to　it。　In　that　event　there　would　perhaps　have　been　a　binding　contract；　because；　if　a　man　uses　a　word　to　which　he　knows　the　other　party　attaches；　and　understands　him　to　attach；　a　certain　meaning；　he　may　be　held　to　that　meaning；　and　not　be　allowed　to　give　it　any　other。　/1/

Next；　suppose　a　case　in　which　the　offer　and　acceptance　do　not　differ；　and　in　which　both　parties　have　used　the　same　words　in　the　same　sense。　Suppose　that　A　agreed　to　buy；　and　B　agreed　to　sell；　〃these　barrels　of　mackerel；〃　and　that　the　barrels　in　question　turn　out　to　contain　salt。　There　is　mutual　mistake　as　to　the　contents　of　the　barrels；　and　no　fraud　on　either　side。　I　suppose　the　contract　would　be　void。　/2/

It　is　commonly　said　that　the　failure　of　the　contract　in　such　a　case　is　due　to　the　fact　of　a　difference　in　kind　between　the　actual　subject…matter　and　that　to　which　the　intention　of　the　parties　was　directed。　It　is　perhaps　more　instructive　to　say　that　the　terms　of　the　supposed　contract；　although　seemingly　consistent；　were　contradictory；　in　matters　that　went　to　the　root　of　the　bargain。　For；　by　one　of　the　essential　terms；　the　subject…matter　of　the　agreement　was　the　contents　of　certain　barrels；　and　nothing　else；　and；　by　another　equally　important；　it　was　mackerel；　and　nothing　else；　＇311＇　while；　as　a　matter　of　fact；　it　could　not　be　both；　because　the　contents　of　the　barrels　were　salt。　As　neither　term　could　be　left　out　without　forcing　on　the　parties　a　contract　which　they　did　not　make；　it　follows　that　A　cannot　be　required　to　accept；　nor　B　to　deliver　either　these　barrels　of　salt；　or　other　barrels　of　mackerel；　and　without　omitting　one　term；　the　promise　is　meaningless。

If　there　had　been　fraud　on　the　seller's　part；　or　if　he　had　known　what　the　barrels　really　contained；　the　buyer　might　have　had　a　right　to　insist　on　delivery　of　the　inferior　article。　Fraud　would　perhaps　have　made　the　contract　valid　at　his　option。　Because；　when　a　man　qualifies　sensible　words　with　others　which　he　knows；　on　secret　grounds；　are　insensible　when　so　applied；　he　may　fairly　be　taken　to　authorize　his　promisee　to　insist　on　the　possible　part　of　his　promise　being　performed；　if　the　promisee　is　willing　to　forego　the　rest。

Take　one　more　illustration　like　the　last　case。　A　policy　of　insurance　is　issued　on　a　certain　building　described　in　the　policy　as　a　machine…shop。　In　fact　the　building　is　not　a　machine…shop；　but　an　organ　factory；　which　is　a　greater　risk。　The　contract　is　void；　not　because　of