the common law-第52章

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waged　his　law；　it　was　long　before　the　inquest　got　much　foothold。

To　establish　a　debt　which　arose　merely　by　way　of　promise　or　acknowledgment；　and　for　which　there　had　formerly　＇264＇　been　no　mode　of　trial　provided；　you　must　have　a　writing；　the　new　form　of　proof　which　introduced　it　into　the　law。　The　rule　was　laid　down；　〃by　parol　the　party　is　not　obliged。〃　/1/　But　the　old　debts　were　not　conceived　of　as　raised　by　a　promise。　/2/　They　were　a　〃duty〃　springing　from　the　plaintiff's　receipt　of　property；　a　fact　which　could　be　seen　and　sworn　to。　In　these　cases　the　old　law　maintained　and　even　extended　itself　a　little　by　strict　analogy。

But　the　undertaking　of　a　surety；　in　whatever　form　it　was　clothed；　did　not　really　arise　out　of　any　such　fact。　It　had　become　of　the　same　nature　as　other　promises；　and　it　was　soon　doubted　whether　it　should　not　be　proved　by　the　same　evidence。　/3/　By　the　reign　of　Edward　III。；　it　was　settled　that　a　deed　was　necessary；　/4/　except　where　the　customs　of　particular　cities　had　kept　the　old　law　in　force。　/5/

This　reign　may　be　taken　as　representing　the　time　when　the　divisions　and　rules　of　procedure　were　established　which　have　lasted　until　the　present　day。　It　is　therefore　worth　while　to　repeat　and　sum　up　the　condition　of　the　law　at　that　time。

It　was　still　necessary　that　the　secta　should　be　tendered　in　every　action　of　debt　for　which　no　writing　was　produced。　For　this；　as　well　as　for　the　other　reasons　which　have　been　mentioned；　the　sphere　of　such　actions　was　not　materially　enlarged　beyond　those　cases　which　had　formerly　been　established　by　the　witness…　oath。　As　suretyship　was　no　＇265＇　longer　one　of　these；　they　became　strictly　limited　to　cases　in　which　the　debt　arose　from　the　receipt　of　a　quid　pro　quo。　Moreover　there　was　no　other　action　of　contract　which　could　be　maintained　without　a　writing。　New　species　of　contracts　were　now　enforced　by　an　action　of　covenant；　but　there　a　deed　was　always　necessary。　At　the　same　time　the　secta　had　shrunk　to　a　form；　although　it　was　still　argued　that　its　function　was　more　important　in　contract　than　elsewhere。　It　could　no　longer　be　examined　before　the　court。　/1/　It　was　a　mere　survival；　and　the　transaction　witness　had　ceased　to　be　an　institution。　Hence；　the　necessity　of　tendering　the　witness　oath　did　not　fix　the　limit　of　debt　upon　simple　contract　except　by　tradition；　and　it　is　not　surprising　to　find　that　the　action　was　slightly　extended　by　analogy　from　its　scope　in　Glanvill's　time。

But　debt　remained　substantially　at　the　point　which　I　have　indicated；　and　no　new　action　available　for　simple　contracts　was　introduced　for　a　century。　In　the　mean　time　the　inversion　which　I　have　explained　took　place；　and　what　was　an　accident　of　procedure　had　become　a　doctrine　of　substantive　law。　The　change　was　easy　when　the　debts　which　could　be　enforced　without　deed　all　sprung　from　a　benefit　to　the　debtor。

The　influence　of　the　Roman　law；　no　doubt；　aided　in　bringing　about　this　result。　It　will　be　remembered　that　in　the　reign　of　Henry　II。　most　simple　contracts　and　debts　for　which　there　was　not　the　evidence　of　deed　or　witness　were　left　to　be　enforced　by　the　ecclesiastical　courts；　so　far　as　their　jurisdiction　extended。　/2/　Perhaps　it　was　this　circumstance　＇266＇　which　led　Glanvill　and　his　successors　to　apply　the　terminology　of　the　civilians　to　common…law　debts。　But　whether　he　borrowed　it　from　the　ecclesiastical　courts；　or　went　directly　to　the　fountain…　head；　certain　it　is　that　Glanvill　makes　use　of　the　classification　and　technical　language　of　the　Corpus　Juris　throughout　his　tenth　book。

There　were　certain　special　contracts　in　the　Roman　system　called　real；　which　bound　the　contractor　either　to　return　a　certain　thing　put　into　his　hands　by　the　contractee；　as　in　a　case　of　lease　or　loan；　or　to　deliver　other　articles　of　the　same　kind；　as　when　grain；　oil；　or　money　was　lent。　This　class　did　not　correspond；　except　in　the　most　superficial　way；　with　the　common…law　debts。　But　Glanvill　adopted　the　nomenclature；　and　later　writers　began　to　draw　conclusions　from　it。　The　author　of　Fleta；　a　writer　by　no　means　always　intelligent　in　following　and　adopting　his　predecessors'　use　of　the　Roman　law；　/1/　says　that　to　raise　a　debt　there　must　be　not　only　a　certain　thing　promised；　but　a　certain　thing　promised　in　return。　/2/

If　Fleta　had　confined　his　statement　to　debts　by　simple　contract；　it　might　well　have　been　suggested　by　the　existing　state　of　the　law。　But　as　he　also　required　a　writing　and　a　seal；　in　addition　to　the　matter　given　or　promised　in　return；　the　doctrine　laid　down　by　him　can　hardly　have　prevailed　at　any　time。　It　was　probably　nothing　more　than　a　slight　vagary　of　reasoning　based　upon　the　Roman　elements　which　he　borrowed　from　Bracton。

＇267＇　It　only　remains　to　trace　the　gradual　appearance　of　consideration　in　the　decisions。　A　case　of　the　reign　of　Edward　III。　/1/　seems　to　distinguish　between　a　parol　obligation　founded　on　voluntary　payments　by　the　obligee　and　one　founded　on　a　payment　at　the　obligor's　request。　It　also　speaks　of　the　debt　or　〃duty〃　in　that　case　as　arising　by　cause　of　payments。　Somewhat　similar　language　is　used　in　the　next　reign。　/2/　So；　in　the　twelfth　year　of　Henry　IV。；　/3/　there　is　an　approach　to　the　thought：　〃If　money　is　promised　to　a　man　for　making　a　release；　and　he　makes　the　release；　he　will　have　a　good　action　of　debt　in　the　matter。〃　In　the　next　reign　/4/　it　was　decided　that；　in　such　a　case；　the　plaintiff　could　not　recover　without　having　executed　the　release；　which　is　explained　by　the　editor　on　the　ground　that　ex　nudo　pacto　non　oritur　actio。　But　the　most　important　fact　is；　that　from　Edward　I。　to　Henry　VI。　we　find　no　case　where　a　debt　was　recovered；　unless　a　consideration　had　in　fact　been　received。

Another　fact　to　be　noticed　is；　that　since　Edward　III。　debts　arising　from　a　transaction　without　writing　are　said　to　arise　from　contract；　as　distinguished　from　debts　arising　from　an　obligation。　/5/　Hence；　when　consideration　was　required　as　such；　it　was　required　in　contracts　not　under　seal；　whether　debts　or　not。　Under　Henry　VI。　quid　pro　quo　became　a　necessity　in　all　such　contracts。　In　the　third　year　of　that　reign　/6/　it　was　objected　to　au　action　upon　an　＇268＇　assumpsit　for　not　building　a　mill；　that　it　was　not　shown　what　the　defendant　was　to　have　for　doing　it。　In　the　thirty…sixth　year　of　the　same　reign　（A。D。　1459）；　the　doctrine　appears　full　grown；　and　is　assumed　to　be　familiar。　/1/

The　case　turned　upon　a　question　which　was　debated　for　centuries　before　it　was　settled；　whether　debt　would　lie　for　a　sum　of　money　promised　by　the　defendant　to　the　plaintiff　if　he　would　marry　the　defendant's　daughter。　But　whereas　formerly　the　debate　had　been　whether　the　promise　was　not　so　far　incident　to　the　marriage　that　it　belonged　exclusively　to　the　jurisdiction　of　the　spiritual　courts；　it　now　touched　the　purely　mundane　doubt　whether　the　defendant　had　had　quid　pro　quo。

It　will　be　remembered　that　the　fact　formerly　sworn　to　by　the　transaction　witnesses　was　a　benefit　to　the　defendant；　namely；　a　delivery　of　the　things　sold　or　the　money　lent　to　him。　Such　cases；　also；　offer　the　most　obvious　form　of　consideration。　The　natural　question　is；　what　the　promisor　was　to　have　for　his　promise。　/2/　It　is　only　by　analysis　that　the　supposed　policy　of　the　law　is　seen　to　be　equally　satisfied　by　a　detriment　incurred　by　the　promisee。　It　therefore　not　unnaturally　happened　that　the　judges；　when　they　first　laid　down　the　law　that　there　must　be　quid　pro　quo；　were　slow　to　recognize　a　detriment　to　the　contractee　as　satisfying　the　requirement　which　had　been　laid　down。　In　the　case　which　I　have　mentioned　some　of　the　judges　were　inclined　to　hold　that　getting　rid　of　his　daughter　was　a　sufficient　benefit　to　the　defendant　to　make　him　a　debtor　for　the　money　which　he　promised；　and　there　was　even　some　hint　of　the　opinion；　that　marrying　the　lady　was　a　＇269＇　consideration；　because　it　was　a　detriment　to　the　promisee。　/1/　But　the　other　opinion　prevailed；　at　least　for　a　time；　because　the　defendant　had　had　nothing　from　the　plaintiff　to　raise　a　debt。　/2/

So　it　was　held　that　a　service　rendered　to　a　third　person　upon　the　defendant's　request　and　promise　of　a　reward　would　not　be　enough；　/3/　although　not　without　strong　opinions　to　the　contrary；　and　for　a　time　the　precedents　were　settled。　It　beca