the common law-第51章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


at；　when　a　debt　was　proved　by　witnesses　there　must　be　quid　pro　quo。　But　these　debts　proved　by　witnesses；　instead　of　by　deed　are　what　we　call　simple　contract　debts；　and　thus　beginning　with　debt；　and　subsequently　extending　itself　to　other　contracts；　is　established　our　peculiar　and　most　important　doctrine　that　every　simple　contract　must　have　a　consideration。　This　was　never　the　law　as　to　debts　or　contracts　proved　in　the　usual　way　by　the　defendant's　seal；　and　the　fact　that　it　applied　only　to　obligations　which　were　formerly　established　by　a　procedure　of　limited　use；　＇259＇　goes　far　to　show　that　the　connection　with　procedure　was　not　accidental。

The　mode　of　proof　soon　changed；　but　as　late　as　the　reign　of　Queen　Elizabeth　we　find　a　trace　of　this　original　connection。　It　is　said；　〃But　the　common　law　requires　that　there　should　be　a　new　cause　（i。　e。　consideration）；　whereof　the　country　may　have　intelligence　or　knowledge　for　the　trial　of　it；　if　need　be；　so　that　it　is　necessary　for　the　Public…weal。〃　/1/　Lord　Mansfield　showed　his　intuition　of　the　historical　grounds　of　our　law　when　he　said；　〃I　take　it　that　the　ancient　notion　about　the　want　of　consideration　was　for　the　sake　of　evidence　only；　for　when　it　is　reduced　into　writing；　as　in　covenants；　specialties；　bonds；　etc。；　there　was　no　objection　to　the　want　of　consideration。〃　/2/

If　it　should　be　objected　that　the　preceding　argument　is　necessarily　confined　to　debt；　whereas　the　requirement　of　consideration　applies　equally　to　all　simple　contracts；　the　answer　is；　that　in　all　probability　the　rule　originated　with　debt；　and　spread　from　debt　to　other　contracts。

But；　again；　it　may　be　asked　whether　there　were　no　other　contracts　proved　by　witness　except　those　which　have　been　mentioned。　Were　there　no　contracts　proved　in　that　way　to　which　the　accidental　consideration　was　wanting？　To　this　also　there　is　an　easy　answer。　The　contracts　enforced　by　the　civil　courts；　even　as　late　as　Henry　II。；　were　few　and　simple。　The　witness　procedure　was　no　doubt　broad　enough　for　all　the　contracts　which　were　made　in　early　times。　Besides　those　of　sale；　loan；　and　the　like；　which　have　been　mentioned；　I　find　but　two　contractual　＇260＇　obligations。　These　were　the　warranties　accompanying　a　sale　and　suretyship　which　was　referred　to　at　the　beginning　of　the　Lecture。　Of　the　former；　warranty　of　title　was　rather　regarded　as　an　obligation　raised　by　the　law　out　of　the　relation　of　buyer　and　seller　than　as　a　contract。　Other　express　warranties　were　matters　within　the　knowledge　of　the　transaction　witnesses；　and　were　sworn　to　by　them　in　Saxon　times。　/1/

But　in　the　Norman　period　warranty　is　very　little　heard　of；　except　with　regard　to　land；　and　then　it　was　decided　by　the　duel。　It　so　wholly　disappeared；　except　where　it　was　embodied　in　a　deed；　that　it　can　have　had　no　influence　upon　the　law　of　consideration。　I　shall　therefore　assume；　without　more　detail；　that　it　does　not　bear　upon　the　case。

Then　as　to　the　pledge　or　surety。　He　no　longer　paid　with　his　body；　unless　in　very　exceptional　cases；　but　his　liability　was　translated　into　money；　and　enforced　in　an　action　of　debt。　This　time…honored　contract；　like　the　other　debts　of　Glanvill's　time；　could　be　established　by　witness　without　a　writing；　/2/　and　in　this　case　there　was　not　such　a　consideration；　such　a　benefit　to　the　promisor；　as　the　law　required　when　the　doctrine　was　first　enunciated。　But　this　also　is　unimportant；　because　his　liability　on　the　oath　of　witness　came　to　an　end；　as　well　as　that　of　the　warrantor；　before　the　foundations　were　laid　for　the　rule　which　I　am　seeking　to　explain。　A　writing　soon　came　to　be　required；　as　will　be　seen　in　a　moment。

The　result　so　far　is；　that　the　only　action　of　contract　in　Glanvill's　time　was　debt；　that　the　only　debts　recovered　＇261＇　without　writing　were　those　which　have　been　described；　and　that　the　only　one　of　these　for　which　there　was　not　quid　pro　quo　ceased　to　be　recoverable　in　that　way　by　the　reign　of　Edward　III。

But　great　changes　were　beginning　in　the　reign　of　Henry　II。　More　various　and　complex　contracts　soon　came　to　be　enforced。　It　may　be　asked；　Why　was　not　the　scope　of　the　witness　oath　enlarged；　or；　if　any　better　proof　were　forthcoming；　why　was　not　the　secta　done　away　with；　and　other　oral　testimony　admitted？　In　any　event；　what　can　the　law　of　Henry　II。's　time　have　to　do　with　consideration；　which　not　heard　of　until　centuries　later？

It　is　manifest　that　a　witness　oath；　which　disposes　of　a　case　by　the　simple　fact　that　it　is　sworn；　is　not　a　satisfactory　mode　of　proof。　A　written　admission　of　debt　produced　in　court；　and　sufficiently　identified　as　issuing　from　the　defendant；　is　obviously　much　better。　The　only　weak　point　about　a　writing　is　the　means　of　identifying　it　as　the　defendant's；　and　this　difficulty　disappeared　as　soon　as　the　use　of　seals　became　common。　This　had　more　or　less　taken　place　in　Glanvill's　time；　and　then　all　that　a　party　had　to　do　was　to　produce　the　writing　and　satisfy　the　court　by　inspection　that　the　impression　on　the　wax　fitted　his　opponent's　seal。　/1/　The　oath　of　the　secta　could　always　be　successfully　met　by　wager　of　law；　/2/　that　is；　by　a　counter　oath　the　part　of　the　defendant；　with　the　same　or　double　the　number　of　fellow…swearers　produced　by　the　plaintiff。　But　a　writing　proved　to　be　the　defendant's　could　not　be　contradicted。　＇262＇　/1/　For　if　a　man　said　he　was　bound；　he　was　bound。　There　was　no　question　of　consideration；　because　there　was　as　yet　no　such　doctrine。　He　was　equally　bound　if　he　acknowledged　all　obligation　in　any　place　having　a　record；　such　as　the　superior　courts；　by　which　his　acknowledgment　could　be　proved。　Indeed；　to　this　day　some　securities　are　taken　simply　by　an　oral　admission　before　the　clerk　of　a　court　noted　by　him　in　his　papers。　The　advantage　of　the　writing　was　not　only　that　it　furnished　better　proof　in　the　old　cases；　but　also　that　it　made　it　possible　to　enforce　obligations　for　which　there　would　otherwise　have　been　no　proof　at　all。

What　has　been　said　sufficiently　explains　the　preference　of　proof　by　writing　to　proof　by　the　old…fashioned　witness　oath。　But　there　were　other　equally　good　reasons　why　the　latter　should　not　be　extended　beyond　its　ancient　limits。　The　transaction　witnesses　were　losing　their　statutory　and　official　character。　Already　in　Glanvill's　time　the　usual　modes　of　proving　a　debt　were　by　the　duel　or　by　writing。　/2/　A　hundred　years　later　Bracton　shows　that　the　secta　had　degenerated　to　the　retainers　and　household　of　the　party；　and　he　says　that　their　oath　raises　but　a　slight　presumption。　/3/

Moreover；　a　new　mode　of　trial　was　growing　up；　which；　although　it　was　not　made　use　of　in　these　cases　/4/　for　a　good　while；　must　have　tended　to　diminish　the　estimate　set　on　the　witness　oath　by　contrast。　This　was　the　beginning　of　our　trial　by　jury。　It　was　at　first　an　inquest　of　the　neighbors　＇263＇　most　likely　to　know　about　a　disputed　matter　of　fact。　They　spoke　from　their　own　knowledge；　but　they　were　selected　by　an　officer　of　the　court　instead　of　by　the　interested　party；　and　were　intended　to　be　impartial。　/1/　Soon　witnesses　were　summoned　before　them；　not；　as　of　old；　to　the　case　by　their　oath；　but　to　aid　the　inquest　to　find　a　verdict　by　their　testimony。　With　the　advent　of　this　enlightened　procedure；　the　secta　soon　ceased　to　decide　the　case；　and　it　may　well　be　asked　why　it　did　not　disappear　and　leave　no　traces。

Taking　into　account　the　conservatism　of　the　English　law；　and　the　fact　that；　before　deeds　came　in；　the　only　debts　for　which　there　had　been　a　remedy　were　debts　proved　by　the　transaction　witnesses；　it　would　not　have　been　a　surprise　to　find　the　tender　of　suit　persisting　in　those　cases。　But　there　was　another　reason　still　more　imperative。　The　defence　in　debt　where　there　was　no　deed　was　by　wager　of　law。　/2/　A　section　of　Magna　Charta　was　interpreted　to　prohibit　a　man's　being　put　to　his　law　on　the　plaintiff's　own　statement　without　good　witness。　/3/　Hence；　the　statute　required　witnessthat　is；　the　sectain　every　case　of　debt　where　the　plaintiff　did　not　rely　upon　a　writing。　Thus　it　happened　that　suit　continued　to　be　tendered　in　those　cases　where　it　had　been　of　old；　/4/　and　as　the　defendant；　if　he　did　not　admit　the　debt　in　such　cases；　always　waged　his　law；　it　was　long　before　the　inquest　got　much　foothold。

To　establish　a　debt　which　arose