the common law-第50章

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Our　law　does　not　enforce　every　promise　which　a　man　may　make。　Promises　made　as　ninety…nine　promises　out　of　a　hundred　are；　by　word　of　mouth　or　simple　writing；　are　not　binding　unless　there　is　a　consideration　for　them。　That　is；　as　it　is　commonly　explained；　unless　the　promisee　has　either　conferred　a　benefit　on　the　promisor；　or　incurred　a　detriment；　as　the　inducement　to　the　promise。

It　has　been　thought　that　this　rule　was　borrowed　from　Roman　law　by　the　Chancery；　and；　after　undergoing　some　modification　there；　passed　into　the　common　law。

But　this　account　of　the　matter　is　at　least　questionable。　So　far　as　the　use　of　words　goes；　I　am　not　aware　that　consideration　is　distinctly　called　cause　before　the　reign　of　Elizabeth；　in　the　earlier　reports　it　always　appears　as　quid　pro　quo。　Its　first　appearance；　so　far　as　I　know；　is　in　Fleta's　account　of　the　action　of　debt；　/1/　and　although　I　am　inclined　to　believe　that　Fleta's　statement　is　not　to　be　trusted；　a　careful　consideration　of　the　chronological　order　of　the　cases　in　the　Year　Books　will　show；　I　think；　that　the　doctrine　was　fully　developed　in　debt　before　any　mention　of　it　in　equity　can　be　found。　One　of　the　earliest　＇254＇　references　to　what　a　promisor　was　to　have　for　his　undertaking　was　in　the　action　of　assumpsit。　/1/　But　the　doctrine　certainly　did　not　originate　there。　The　first　mention　of　consideration　in　connection　with　equity　which　I　have　seen　is　in　the　form　of　quid　pro　quo；　/2/　and　occurs　after　the　requirement　had　been　thoroughly　established　in　debt。　/3/

The　single　fact　that　a　consideration　was　never　required　for　contracts　under　seal；　unless　Fleta　is　to　be　trusted　against　the　great　weight　of　nearly　contemporaneous　evidence；　goes　far　to　show　that　the　rule　cannot　have　originated　on　grounds　of　policy　as　a　rule　of　substantive　law。　And　conversely；　the　coincidence　of　the　doctrine　with　a　peculiar　mode　of　procedure　points　very　strongly　to　the　probability　that　the　peculiar　requirement　and　the　peculiar　procedure　were　connected。　It　will　throw　light　on　the　question　to　put　together　a　few　undisputed　facts；　and　to　consider　what　consequences　naturally　followed。　It　will　therefore　be　desirable　to　examine　the　action　of　debt　a　little　further。　But　it　is　only　fair　to　admit；　at　the　outset；　that　I　offer　the　explanation　which　follows　with　great　hesitation；　and；　I　think；　with　a　full　appreciation　of　the　objections　which　might　be　urged。

It　was　observed　a　moment　ago；　that；　in　order　to　recover　against　a　defendant　who　denied　his　debt；　the　plaintiff　had　to　show　something　for　it；　otherwise　he　was　turned　over　to　the　limited　jurisdiction　of　the　spiritual　tribunals。　/4/　This　requirement　did　not　mean　evidence　in　the　modern　sense。　It　meant　simply　that　he　must　maintain　his　cause　in　one　of　the　ways　then　recognized　by　law。　These　were　three；　the　＇255＇　duel；　a　writing；　and　witnesses。　The　duel　need　not　be　discussed；　as　it　soon　ceased　to　be　used　in　debt；　and　has　no　bearing　on　what　I　have　to　say。　Trial　by　writing　and　by　witnesses；　on　the　other　hand；　must　both　be　carefully　studied。　It　will　be　convenient　to　consider　the　latter　first　and　to　find　out　what　these　witnesses　were。

One　thing　we　know　at　the　start；　they　were　not　witnesses　as　we　understand　the　term。　They　were　not　produced　before　a　jury　for　examination　and　cross…　examination；　nor　did　their　testimony　depend　for　its　effect　on　being　believed　by　the　court　that　heard　it。　Nowadays；　a　case　is　not　decided　by　the　evidence；　but　by　a　verdict；　or　a　finding　of　facts；　followed　by　a　judgment。　The　oath　of　a　witness　has　no　effect　unless　it　is　believed。　But　in　the　time　of　Henry　II。　our　trial　by　jury　did　not　exist。　When　an　oath　was　allowed　to　be　sworn　it　had　the　same　effect；　whether　it　was　believed　or　not。　There　was　no　provision　for　sifting　it　by　a　second　body。　In　those　cases　where　a　trial　by　witnesses　was　possible；　if　the　party　called　on　to　go　forward　could　find　a　certain　number　of　men　who　were　willing　to　swear　in　a　certain　form；　there　was　an　end　of　the　matter。

Now　this　seems　like　a　more　primitive　way　of　establishing　a　debt　than　the　production　of　the　defendant's　written　acknowledgement；　and　it　is　material　to　discover　its　origin。

The　cases　in　which　this　mode　of　trial　was　used　appear　from　the　early　books　and　reports　to　have　been　almost　wholly　confined　to　claims　arising　out　of　a　sale　or　loan。　And　the　question　at　once　occurs；　whether　we　are　not　upon　traces　of　an　institution　which　was　already　ancient　when　Glanvill　wrote。　For　centuries　before　the　Conquest　Anglo…Saxon　law　/1/　had　required　the　election　of　a　certain　＇256＇　number　of　official　witnesses；　two　or　three　of　whom　were　to　be　called　in　to　every　bargain　of　sale。　The　object　for　which　these　witnesses　were　established　is　not　commonly　supposed　to　have　been　the　proof　of　debts。　They　go　back　to　a　time　when　theft　and　similar　offences　were　the　chief　ground　of　litigation；　and　the　purpose　for　which　they　were　appointed　was　to　afford　a　means　of　deciding　whether　a　person　charged　with　having　stolen　property　had　come　by　it　rightfully　or　not。　A　defendant　could　clear　himself　of　the　felony　by　their　oath　that　he　had　bought　or　received　the　thing　openly　in　the　way　appointed　by　law。

Having　been　present　at　the　bargain；　the　witnesses　were　able　to　swear　to　what　they　had　seen　and　heard；　if　any　question　arose　between　the　parties。　Accordingly；　their　use　was　not　confined　to　disposing　of　a　charge　of　felony。　But　that　particular　service　identifies　the　transaction　witnesses　of　the　Saxon　period。　Now　we　know　that　the　use　of　these　witnesses　did　not　at　once　disappear　under　Norman　influence。　They　are　found　with　their　old　function　in　the　laws　of　William　the　Conqueror。　/1/　The　language　of　Glanvill　seems　to　prove　that　they　were　still　known　under　Henry　II。　He　says　that；　if　a　purchaser　cannot　summon　in　the　man　from　whom　he　bought；　to　warrant　the　property　to　him　and　defend　the　suit；　（for　if　he　does；　the　peril　is　shifted　to　the　seller；）　then　if　the　purchaser　has　sufficient　proof　of　his　having　lawfully　bought　the　thing；　de　legittimo　marcatu　suo；　it　will　clear　him　of　felony。　But　if　he　have　not　sufficient　suit；　he　will　be　in　danger。　/2/　This　is　the　law　of　William　over　again。　It　follows　that　purchasers　still　used　the　transaction　witnesses。

But　Glanvill　also　seems　to　admit　the　use　of　witness　to　establish　debts。　/1/　As　the　transaction　witnesses　were　formerly　available　for　this　purpose；　I　see　no　reason　to　doubt　that　they　still　were；　and　that　he　is　speaking　of　them　here　also。　/2/　Moreover；　for　a　long　time　after　Henry　II。；　whenever　an　action　was　brought　for　a　debt　of　which　there　was　no　written　evidence；　the　plaintiff；　when　asked　what　he　had　to　show　for　it；　always　answered　〃good　suit；〃　and　tendered　his　witnesses；　who　were　sometimes　examined　by　the　court。　/3/　I　think　it　is　not　straining　the　evidence　to　infer　that　the　〃good　suit〃　of　the　later　reports　was　the　descendant　of　the　Saxon　transaction　witnesses；　as　it　has　been　shown　that　Glanvill's　secta　was。　/4/

Assuming　this　step　in　the　argument　to　have　been　taken；　it　will　be　well　to　recall　again　for　a　moment　the　original　nature　of　the　witness　oath。　It　was　confined　to　facts　within　the　witnesses'　knowledge　by　sight　and　hearing。　But　as　the　purposes　for　which　witnesses　were　provided　only　required　their　presence　when　property　changed　hands；　the　principal　case　in　which　they　could　be　of　service　between　the　parties　＇258＇　to　a　bargain　was　when　a　debt　was　claimed　by　reason　of　the　delivery　of　property。　The　purpose　did　not　extend　to　agreements　which　were　executory　on　both　sides；　because　there　no　question　of　theft　could　arise。　And　Glanvill　shows　that　in　his　time　the　King's　Court　did　not　enforce　such　agreements。　/1/　Now；　if　the　oath　of　the　secta　could　only　be　used　to　establish　a　debt　where　the　transaction　witnesses　could　have　sworn；　it　will　be　seen；　readily　enough；　how　an　accident　of　procedure　may　have　led　to　a　most　important　rule　of　substantive　law。

The　rule　that　witnesses　could　only　swear　to　facts　within　their　knowledge；　coupled　with　the　accident　that　these　witnesses　were　not　used　in　transactions　which　might　create　a　debt；　except　for　a　particular　fact；　namely；　the　delivery　of　property；　together　with　the　further　accident　that　this　delivery　was　quid　pro　quo；　was　equivalent　to　the　rule　that；　when　a　debt　was　proved　by　witnesses　there　must　be　quid　pro　quo。