the common law-第45章

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ion　from　Cartwright　v。　Green　and　Merry　v。　Green；　/3/　but　I　believe　that　no　warrant　for　it　can　be　found　in　the　cases；　and　still　less　for　the　reason　suggested。

It　will　be　understood；　however；　that　Durfee　v。　Jones　is　perfectly　consistent　with　the　view　here　maintained　of　the　＇226＇　general　nature　of　the　necessary　intent；　and　that　it　only　touches　the　subordinate　question；　whether　the　intent　to　exclude　must　be　directed　to　the　specific　thing；　or　may　be　even　unconsciously　included　in　a　larger　intent；　as　I　am　inclined　to　believe。

Thus　far；　nothing　has　been　said　with　regard　to　the　custody　of　servants。　It　is　a　well…known　doctrine　of　the　criminal　law；　that　a　servant　who　criminally　converts　property　of　his　master　intrusted　to　him　and　in　his　custody　as　servant；　is　guilty　of　theft；　because　he　is　deemed　to　have　taken　the　property　from　his　master's　possession。　This　is　equivalent　to　saying　that　a　servant；　having　the　custody　of　his　master's　property　as　servant；　has　not　possession　of　that　property；　and　it　is　so　stated　in　the　Year　Books。　/1/

The　anomalous　distinction　according　to　which；　if　the　servant　receives　the　thing　from　another　person　for　his　master；　the　servant　has　the　possession；　and　so　cannot　commit　theft；　/2/　is　made　more　rational　by　the　old　cases。　For　the　distinction　taken　in　them　is；　that；　while　the　servant　is　in　the　house　or　with　his　master；　the　latter　retains　possession；　but　if　he　delivers　his　horse　to　his　servant　to　ride　to　market；　or　gives　him　a　bag　to　carry　to　London；　then　the　thing　is　out　of　the　master's　possession　and　in　the　servant's。　/3/　In　this　more　intelligible　form；　the　rule　would　not　now　prevail。　But　one　half　of　it；　that　a　guest　at　a　tavern　has　not　possession　of　the　plate　with　which　he　is　served；　is　no　doubt　still　law；　＇227＇　for　guests　in　general　are　likened　to　servants　in　their　legal　position。　/1/

There　are　few　English　decisions；　outside　the　criminal　on　the　question　whether　a　servant　has　possession。　But　the　Year　Books　do　not　suggest　any　difference　between　civil　and　criminal　cases；　and　there　is　an　almost　tradition　of　courts　and　approved　writers　that　he　has　not；　in　any　case。　A　master　has　maintained　trespass　against　a　servant　for　converting　cloth　which　he　was　employed　to　sell；　/2/　and　the　American　cases　go　the　full　length　of　the　old　doctrine。　It　has　often　been　remarked　；hat　a　servant　must　be　distinguished　from　a　bailee。

But　it　may　be　asked　how　the　denial　of　possession　to　servants　can　be　made　to　agree　with　the　test　proposed；　and　it　will　be　said　with　truth　that　the　servant　has　as　much　the　intent　to　exclude　the　world　at　large　as　a　borrower。　The　law　of　servants　is　unquestionably　at　variance　with　that　test；　and　there　can　be　no　doubt　that　those　who　have　built　their　theories　upon　the　Roman　law　have　been　led　by　this　fact；　coupled　with　the　Roman　doctrine　as　to　bailees　in　general；　to　seek　the　formula　of　reconciliation　where　they　have。　But；　in　truth；　the　exception　with　regard　to　servants　stands　on　purely　historical　grounds。　A　servant　is　denied　possession；　not　from　any　peculiarity　of　intent　with　regard　to　the　things　in　his　custody；　either　towards　his　master　or　other　people；　by　which　he　is　distinguished　＇228＇　from　a　depositary；　but　simply　as　one　of　the　incidents　of　his　status。　It　is　familiar　that　the　status　of　a　servant　maintains　many　marks　of　the　time　when　he　was　a　slave。　The　liability　of　the　master　for　his　torts　is　one　instance。　The　present　is　another。　A　slave's　possession　was　his　owner's　possession　on　the　practical　ground　of　the　owner's　power　over　him；　/1/　and　from　the　fact　that　the　slave　had　no　standing　before　the　law。　The　notion　that　his　personality　was　merged　in　that　of　his　family　head　survived　the　era　of　emancipation。

I　have　shown　in　the　first　Lecture　/2/　that　agency　arose　out　of　the　earlier　relation　in　the　Roman　law；　through　the　extension　pro　hac　vice　to　a　freeman　of　conceptions　derived　from　that　source。　The　same　is　true；　I　think；　of　our　own　law；　the　later　development　of　which　seems　to　have　been　largely　under　Roman　influence。　As　late　as　Blackstone；　agents　appear　under　the　general　head　of　servants；　and　the　first　precedents　cited　for　the　peculiar　law　of　agents　were　cases　of　master　and　servant。　Blackstone's　language　is　worth　quoting：　〃There　is　yet　a　fourth　species　of　servants；　if　they　may　be　so　called；　being　rather　in　a　superior；　a　ministerial　capacity；　such　as　stewards；　factors；　and　bailiffs：　whom；　however；　the　law　considers　as　servants　pro　tempore；　with　regard　to　such　of　their　acts　as　affect　their　master's　or　employer's　property。〃　/3/

＇229＇　It　is　very　true　that　in　modern　times　many　of　the　effects　of　either　relationmaster　and　servant　or　principal　and　agent　may　be　accounted　for　as　the　result　of　acts　done　by　the　master　himself。　If　a　man　tells　another　to　make　a　contract　in　his　name；　or　commands　him　to　commit　a　tort；　no　special　conception　is　needed　to　explain　why　he　is　held；　although　even　in　such　cases；　where　the　intermediate　party　was　a　freeman；　the　conclusion　was　not　reached　until　the　law　had　become　somewhat　mature。　But；　if　the　title　Agency　deserves　to　stand　in　the　law　at　all；　it　must　be　because　some　peculiar　consequences　are　attached　to　the　fact　of　the　relation。　If　the　mere　power　to　bind　a　principal　to　an　authorized　contract　were　all；　we　might　as　well　have　a　chapter　on　ink　and　paper　as　on　agents。　But　it　is　not　all。　Even　in　the　domain　of　contract；　we　find　the　striking　doctrine　that　an　undisclosed　principal　has　the　rights　as　well　as　the　obligations　of　a　known　contractor；that　he　can　be　sued；　and；　more　remarkable；　can　sue　on　his　agent's　contract。　The　first　precedent　cited　for　the　proposition　that　a　promise　to　an　agent　may　be　laid　as　a　promise　to　the　principal；　is　a　case　of　master　and　servant。　/1/

As　my　present　object　is　only　to　show　the　meaning　of　the　doctrine　of　identification　in　its　bearing　upon　the　theory　of　possession；

it　would　be　out　of　place　to　consider　at　any　length　how　far　that　doctrine　must　be　invoked　to　explain　the　liability　of　principals　for　their　agents'　torts；　or　whether　a　more　reasonable　rule　governs　other　cases　than　that　applied　where　the　actor　has　a　tolerably　defined　status　as　a　＇230＇　servant。　I　allow　myself　a　few　words；　because　I　shall　not　be　able　to　return　to　the　subject。

If　the　liability　of　a　master　for　the　torts　of　his　servant　had　hitherto　been　recognized　by　the　courts　as　the　decaying　remnant　of　an　obsolete　institution；　it　would　not　be　surprising　to　find　it　confined　to　the　cases　settled　by　ancient　precedent。　But　such　has　not　been　the　fact。　It　has　been　extended　to　new　relations　by　analogy；　/1/　It　exists　where　the　principal　does　not　stand　in　the　relation　of　paterfamilias　to　the　actual　wrong…doer。　/2/　A　man　may　be　held　for　another　where　the　relation　was　of　such　a　transitory　nature　as　to　exclude　the　conception　of　status；　as　for　the　negligence　of　another　person's　servant　momentarily　acting　for　the　defendant；　or　of　a　neighbor　helping　him　as　a　volunteer；　/3/　and；　so　far　as　known；　no　principal　has　ever　escaped　on　the　ground　of　the　dignity　of　his　agent's　employment。　/4/　The　courts　habitually　speak　as　if　the　same　rules　applied　to　brokers　and　other　agents；　as　to　servants　properly　so　called。　/5/　Indeed；　it　＇231＇　has　been　laid　down　in　terms；　that　the　liability　of　employers　is　not　confined　to　the　case　of　servants；　/1/　although　the　usual　cases　are；　of　course；　those　of　menial　servants；　and　the　like；　who　could　not　pay　a　large　verdict。

On　the　other　hand；　if　the　peculiar　doctrines　of　agency　are　anomalous；　and　form；　as　I　believe；　the　vanishing　point　of　the　servile　status；　it　may　well　happen　that　common　sense　will　refuse　to　carry　them　out　to　their　furthest　applications。　Such　conflicts　between　tradition　and　the　instinct　of　justice　we　may　see　upon　the　question　of　identifying　a　principal　who　knows　the　truth　with　an　agent　who　makes　a　false　representation；　in　order　to　make　out　a　fraud；　as　in　Cornfoot　v。　Fowke；　/2/　or　upon　that　as　to　the　liability　of　a　principal　for　the　frauds　of　his　agent　discussed　in　many　English　cases。　/3/　But；　so　long　as　the　fiction　which　makes　the　root　of　a　master's　liability　is　left　alive；　it　is　as　hopeless　to　reconcile　the　differences　by　logic　as　to　square　the　circle。

In　an　article　in　the　American　Law　Review　/4/　I　referred　＇232＇　to　an　expression　of　Godefroi　with　regard　to　agents；　eadem　est　pers