the common law-第43章

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d　by　dramatic　reinforcement；　I　may　add　that　possessory　rights　pass　by　descent　or　devise；　as　well　as　by　conveyance；　/1/　and　that　they　are　taxed　as　property　in　some　of　the　States。　/2/

We　are　now　ready　to　analyze　possession　as　understood　by　the　common　law。　In　order　to　discover　the　facts　which　constitute　it；　it　will　be　found　best　to　study　them　at　the　moment　when　possession　is　first　gained。　For　then　they　must　＇216＇　all　be　present　in　the　same　way　that　both　consideration　and　promise　must　be　present　at　the　moment　of　making　a　contract。　But　when　we　turn　to　the　continuance　of　possessory　rights；　or；　as　is　commonly　said；　the　continuance　of　possession；　it　will　be　agreed　by　all　schools　that　less　than　all　the　facts　required　to　call　those　rights　into　being　need　continue　presently　true　in　order　to　keep　them　alive。

To　gain　possession；　then；　a　man　must　stand　in　a　certain　physical　relation　to　the　object　and　to　the　rest　of　the　world；　and　must　have　a　certain　intent。　These　relations　and　this　intent　are　the　facts　of　which　we　are　in　search。

The　physical　relation　to　others　is　simply　a　relation　of　manifested　power　coextensive　with　the　intent；　and　will　need　to　have　but　little　said　about　it　when　the　nature　of　the　intent　is　settled。　When　I　come　to　the　latter；　I　shall　not　attempt　a　similar　analysis　to　that　which　has　been　pursued　with　regard　to　intent　as　an　element　of　liability。　For　the　principles　developed　as　to　intent　in　that　connection　have　no　relation　to　the　present　subject；　and　any　such　analysis　so　far　as　it　did　not　fail　would　be　little　more　than　a　discussion　of　evidence。　The　intent　inquired　into　here　must　be　overtly　manifested；　perhaps；　but　all　theories　of　the　grounds　on　which　possession　is　protected　would　seem　to　agree　in　leading　to　the　requirement　that　it　should　be　actual；　subject；　of　course；　to　the　necessary　limits　of　legal　investigation。

But；　besides　our　power　and　intent　as　towards　our　fellow…men；　there　must　be　a　certain　degree　of　power　over　the　object。　If　there　were　only　one　other　man　in　the　world；　and　he　was　safe　under　lock　and　key　in　jail；　the　person　having　the　key　would　not　possess　the　swallows　that　flew　over　the　prison。　This　element　is　illustrated　by　cases　of　capture；　＇217＇　although　no　doubt　the　point　at　which　the　line　is　drawn　is　affected　by　consideration　of　the　degree　of　power　obtained　as　against　other　people；　as　well　as　by　that　which　has　been　gained　over　the　object。　The　Roman　and　the　common　law　agree　that；　in　general；　fresh　pursuit　of　wild　animals　does　not　give　the　pursuer　the　rights　of　possession。　Until　escape　has　been　made　impossible　by　some　means；　another　may　step　in　and　kill　or　catch　and　carry　off　the　game　if　he　can。　Thus　it　has　been　held　that　an　action　does　not　lie　against　a　person　for　killing　and　taking　a　fox　which　had　been　pursued　by　another；　and　was　then　actually　in　the　view　of　the　person　who　had　originally　found；　started；　and　chased　it。　/1/　The　Court　of　Queen's　Bench　even　went　so　far　as　to　decide；　notwithstanding　a　verdict　the　other　way；　that　when　fish　were　nearly　surrounded　by　a　seine；　with　an　opening　of　seven　fathoms　between　the　ends；　at　which　point　boats　were　stationed　to　frighten　them　from　escaping；　they　were　not　reduced　to　possession　as　against　a　stranger　who　rowed　in　through　the　opening　and　helped　himself。　/2/　But　the　difference　between　the　power　over　the　object　which　is　sufficient　for　possession；　and　that　which　is　not；　is　clearly　one　of　degree　only；　and　the　line　may　be　drawn　at　different　places　at　different　times　on　grounds　just　referred　to。　Thus　we　are　told　that　the　legislature　of　New　York　enacted；　in　1844；　that　any　one　who　started　and　pursued　deer　in　certain　counties　of　that　State　should　be　deemed　in　possession　of　the　game　so　long　as　he　continued　in　fresh　pursuit　of　it；　/3/　and　to　that　extent　modified　the　New　York　decisions　just　cited。　So；　while　Justinian　decided　that　a　wild　beast　so　＇218＇　badly　wounded　that　it　might　easily　be　taken　must　be　actually　taken　before　it　belongs　to　the　captors；　/1/　Judge　Lowell；　with　equal　reason；　has　upheld　the　contrary　custom　of　the　American　whalemen　in　the　Arctic　Ocean；　mentioned　above；　which　gives　a　whale　to　the　vessel　whose　iron　first　remains　in　it；　provided　claim　be　made　before　cutting　in。　/2/

We　may　pass　from　the　physical　relation　to　the　object　with　these　few　examples；　because　it　cannot　often　come　into　consideration　except　in　the　case　of　living　and　wild　things。　And　so　we　come　to　the　intent；　which　is　the　really　troublesome　matter。　It　is　just　here　that　we　find　the　German　jurists　unsatisfactory；　for　reasons　which　I　have　already　explained。　The　best　known　theories　have　been　framed　as　theories　of　the　German　interpretation　of　the　Roman　law；　under　the　influence　of　some　form　of　Kantian　or　post…Kantian　philosophy。　The　type　of　Roman　possession；　according　to　German　opinion；　was　that　of　an　owner；　or　of　one　on　his　way　to　become　owner。　Following　this　out；　it　was　said　by　Savigny；　the　only　writer　on　the　subject　with　whom　English　readers　are　generally　acquainted；　that　the　animus　domini；　or　intent　to　deal　with　the　thing　as　owner；　is　in　general　necessary　to　turn　a　mere　physical　detention　into　juridical　possession。　/3/　We　need　not　stop　to　inquire　whether　this　modern　form　or　the　＇Greek　characters＇　（animus　dominantis；　animus　dominandi）　of　Theophilus　/4/　and　the　Greek　sources　is　more　exact；　for　either　excludes；　as　the　civilians　and　canonists　do；　and　as　the　＇219＇　German　theories　must；　most　bailees　and　termors　from　the　list　of　possessors。　/1/

The　effect　of　this　exclusion　as　interpreted　by　the　Kantian　philosophy　of　law；　has　been　to　lead　the　German　lawyers　to　consider　the　intent　necessary　to　possession　as　primarily　self…regarding。　Their　philosophy　teaches　them　that　a　man's　physical　power　over　an　object　is　protected　because　he　has　the　will　to　make　it　his；　and　it　has　thus　become　a　part　of　his　very　self；　the　external　manifestation　of　his　freedom。　/2/　The　will　of　the　possessor　being　thus　conceived　as　self…regarding；　the　intent　with　which　he　must　hold　is　pretty　clear：　he　must　hold　for　his　own　benefit。　Furthermore；　the　self…regarding　intent　must　go　to　the　height　of　an　intent　to　appropriate；　for　otherwise；　it　seems　to　be　implied；　the　object　would　not　truly　be　brought　under　the　personality　of　the　possessor。

The　grounds　for　rejecting　the　criteria　of　the　Roman　law　have　been　shown　above。　Let　us　begin　afresh。　Legal　duties　are　logically　antecedent　to　legal　rights。　What　may　be　their　relation　to　moral　rights　if　there　are　any；　and　whether　moral　rights　are　not　in　like　manner　logically　the　offspring　of　moral　duties；　are　questions　which　do　not　concern　us　here。　These　are　for　the　philosopher；　who　approaches　the　law　from　without　as　part　of　a　larger　series　of　human　manifestations。　The　business　of　the　jurist　is　to　make　known　the　content　of　the　law；　that　is；　to　work　upon　it　from　within；　or　logically；　arranging　and　distributing　it；　in　order；　from　its　stemmum　genus　to　its　infima　species；　so　far　as　practicable。　Legal　duties　then　come　before　legal　＇220＇　rights。　To　put　it　more　broadly；　and　avoid　the　word　duty；　which　is　open　to　objection；　the　direct　working　of　the　law　is　to　limit　freedom　of　action　or　choice　on　the　part　of　a　greater　or　less　number　of　persons　in　certain　specified　ways；　while　the　power　of　removing　or　enforcing　this　limitation　which　is　generally　confided　to　certain　other　private　persons；　or；　in　other　words；　a　right　corresponding　to　the　burden；　is　not　a　necessary　or　universal　correlative。　Again；　a　large　part　of　the　advantages　enjoyed　by　one　who　has　a　right　are　not　created　by　the　law。　The　law　does　not　enable　me　to　use　or　abuse　this　book　which　lies　before　me。　That　is　a　physical　power　which　I　have　without　the　aid　of　the　law。　What　the　law　does　is　simply　to　prevent　other　men　to　a　greater　or　less　extent　from　interfering　with　my　use　or　abuse。　And　this　analysis　and　example　apply　to　the　case　of　possession；　as　well　as　to　ownership。

Such　being　the　direct　working　of　the　law　in　the　case　of　possession；　one　would　think　that　the　animus　or　intent　most　nearly　parallel　to　its　movement　would　be　the　intent　of　which　we　are　in　search。　If　what　the　law　does　is　to　exclude　others　from　interfering　with　the　object；　it　would　seem　that　the　intent　which　the　law　should　require　is　an　intent　to　exclude　others。　I　believe　that　such　an　intent　is　all　that　th