the common law-第41章

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inciples；　and　that　the　matter　has　been　set　at　large　so　far　as　early　precedent　is　concerned。

I　have　treated　of　the　law　of　carriers　at　greater　length　than　is　proportionate；　because　it　seems　to　me　an　interesting　example　of　the　way　in　which　the　common　law　has　grown　up；　and；　especially；　because　it　is　an　excellent　illustration　of　the　principles　laid　down　at　the　end　of　the　first　Lecture。　I　now　proceed　to　the　discussion　for　the　sake　of　which　an　account　of　the　law　of　bailment　was　introduced；　and　to　which　an　understanding　of　that　part　of　the　law　is　a　necessary　preliminary。

＇206＇　LECTURE　VI。

POSSESSION。

POSSESSION　is　a　conception　which　is　only　less　important　than　contract。　But　the　interest　attaching　to　the　theory　of　possession　does　not　stop　with　its　practical　importance　in　the　body　of　English　law。　The　theory　has　fallen　into　the　hands　of　the　philosophers；　and　with　them　has　become　a　corner…stone　of　more　than　one　elaborate　structure。　It　will　be　a　service　to　sound　thinking　to　show　that　a　far　more　civilized　system　than　the　Roman　is　framed　upon　a　plan　which　is　irreconcilable　with　the　a　priori　doctrines　of　Kant　and　Hegel。　Those　doctrines　are　worked　out　in　careful　correspondence　with　German　views　of　Roman　law。　And　most　of　the　speculative　jurists　of　Germany；　from　Savigny　to　Ihering；　have　been　at　once　professors　of　Roman　law；　and　profoundly　influenced　if　not　controlled　by　some　form　of　Kantian　or　post…Kantian　philosophy。　Thus　everything　has　combined　to　give　a　special　bent　to　German　speculation；　which　deprives　it　of　its　claim　to　universal　authority。

Why　is　possession　protected　by　the　law；　when　the　possessor　is　not　also　an　owner？　That　is　the　general　problem　which　has　much　exercised　the　German　mind。　Kant；　it　is　well　known；　was　deeply　influenced　in　his　opinions　upon　ethics　and　law　by　the　speculations　of　Rousseau。　Kant；　Rousseau；　and　the　Massachusetts　Bill　of　Rights　agree　that　all　men　are　born　free　and　equal；　and　one　or　the　other　branch　of　that　declaration　has　afforded　the　answer　to　the　＇207＇　question　why　possession　should　be　protected　from　that　day　to　this。　Kant　and　Hegel　start　from　freedom。　The　freedom　of　the　will；　Kant　said；　is　the　essence　of　man。　It　is　an　end　in　itself；　it　is　that　which　needs　no　further　explanation；　which　is　absolutely　to　be　respected；　and　which　it　is　the　very　end　and　object　of　all　government　to　realize　and　affirm。　Possession　is　to　be　protected　because　a　man　by　taking　possession　of　an　object　has　brought　it　within　the　sphere　of　his　will。　He　has　extended　his　personality　into　or　over　that　object。　As　Hegel　would　have　said；　possession　is　the　objective　realization　of　free　will。　And　by　Kant's　postulate；　the　will　of　any　individual　thus　manifested　is　entitled　to　absolute　respect　from　every　other　individual；　and　can　only　be　overcome　or　set　aside　by　the　universal　will；　that　is；　by　the　state；　acting　through　its　organs；　the　courts。

Savigny　did　not　follow　Kant　on　this　point。　He　said　that　every　act　of　violence　is　unlawful；　and　seemed　to　consider　protection　of　possession　a　branch　of　protection　to　the　person。　/1/　But　to　this　it　was　answered　that　possession　was　protected　against　disturbance　by　fraud　as　well　as　by　force；　and　his　view　is　discredited。　Those　who　have　been　contented　with　humble　grounds　of　expediency　seem　to　have　been　few　in　number；　and　have　recanted　or　are　out　of　favor。

The　majority　have　followed　in　the　direction　pointed　out　by　Kant。　Bruns；　an　admirable　writer；　expresses　a　characteristic　yearning　of　the　German　mind；　when　he　demands　an　internal　juristic　necessity　drawn　from　the　nature　of　possession　itself；　and　therefore　rejects　empirical　reasons。　/2/　He　finds　the　necessity　he　seeks　in　the　freedom　of　the　human　will；　which　the　whole　legal　system　does　but　recognize　＇208＇　and　carry　out。　Constraint　of　it　is　a　wrong；　which　must　be　righted　without　regard　to　conformity　of　the　will　to　law；　and　so　on　in　a　Kantian　vein。　/1/　So　Gans；　a　favorite　disciple　of　Hegel；　〃The　will　is　of　itself　a　substantial　thing　to　be　protected；　and　this　individual　will　has　only　to　yield　to　the　higher　common　will。〃　/2/　So　Puchta；　a　great　master；　〃The　will　which　wills　itself；　that　is；　the　recognition　of　its　own　personality；　is　to　be　protected。〃　/3/

The　chief　variation　from　this　view　is　that　of　Windscheid；　a　writer　now　in　vogue。　He　prefers　the　other　branch　of　the　declaration　in　the　Bill　of　Rights。　He　thinks　that　the　protection　to　possession　stands　on　the　same　grounds　as　protection　against　injuria；　that　every　one　is　the　equal　of　every　other　in　the　state；　and　that　no　one　shall　raise　himself　over　the　other。　/4/　Ihering；　to　be　sure；　a　man　of　genius；　took　an　independent　start；　and　said　that　possession　is　ownership　on　the　defensive；　and　that；　in　favor　of　the　owner；　he　who　is　exercising　ownership　in　fact　（i。　e。　the　possessor）　is　freed　from　the　necessity　of　proving　title　against　one　who　is　in　an　unlawful　position。　But　to　this　it　was　well　answered　by　Bruns；　in　his　later　work；　that　it　assumes　the　title　of　disseisors　to　be　generally　worse　than　that　of　disseisees；　which　cannot　be　taken　for　granted；　and　which　probably　is　not　true　in　fact。　/5/

It　follows　from　the　Kantian　doctrine；　that　a　man　in　possession　is　to　be　confirmed　and　maintained　in　it　until　he　is　put　out　by　an　action　brought　for　the　purpose。　Perhaps　＇209＇　another　fact　besides　those　which　have　been　mentioned　has　influenced　this　reasoning；　and　that　is　the　accurate　division　between　possessory　and　petitory　actions　or　defences　in　Continental　procedure。　/1/　When　a　defendant　in　a　possessory　action　is　not　allowed　to　set　up　title　in　himself；　a　theorist　readily　finds　a　mystical　importance　in　possession。

But　when　does　a　man　become　entitled　to　this　absolute　protection？　On　the　principle　of　Kant；　it　is　not　enough　that　he　has　the　custody　of　a　thing。　A　protection　based　on　the　sacredness　of　man's　personality　requires　that　the　object　should　have　been　brought　within　the　sphere　of　that　personality；　that　the　free　will　should　have　unrestrainedly　set　itself　into　that　object。　There　must　be　then　an　intent　to　appropriate　it；　that　is；　to　make　it　part　of　one's　self；　or　one's　own。

Here　the　prevailing　view　of　the　Roman　law　comes　in　to　fortify　principle　with　precedent。　We　are　told　that；　of　the　many　who　might　have　the　actual　charge　or　custody　of　a　thing；　the　Roman　law　recognized　as　possessor　only　the　owner；　or　one　holding　as　owner　and　on　his　way　to　become　one　by　lapse　of　time。　In　later　days　it　made　a　few　exceptions　on　practical　grounds。　But　beyond　the　pledgee　and　the　sequester　（a　receiver　appointed　by　the　court）　these　exceptions　are　unimportant　and　disputed。　/2/　Some　of　the　Roman　jurists　state　in　terms　that　depositaries　and　borrowers　have　not　possession　of　the　things　intrusted　to　them。　/3/　Whether　the　German　interpretation　of　the　sources　goes　too　far　or　not；　it　must　be　taken　account　of　in　the　examination　of　German　theories。

＇210＇　Philosophy　by　denying　possession　to　bailees　in　general　cunningly　adjusted　itself　to　the　Roman　law；　and　thus　put　itself　in　a　position　to　claim　the　authority　of　that　law　for　the　theory　of　which　the　mode　of　dealing　with　bailees　was　merely　a　corollary。　Hence　I　say　that　it　is　important　to　show　that　a　far　more　developed；　more　rational；　and　mightier　body　of　law　than　the　Roman；　gives　no　sanction　to　either　premise　or　conclusion　as　held　by　Kant　and　his　successors。

In　the　first　place；　the　English　law　has　always　had　the　good　sense　/1/　to　allow　title　to　be　set　up　in　defence　to　a　possessory　action。　In　the　assize　of　novel　disseisin；　which　which　was　a　true　possessory　action；　the　defendant　could　always　rely　on　his　title。　/2/　Even　when　possession　is　taken　or　kept　in　a　way　which　is　punished　by　the　criminal　law；　as　in　case　of　forcible　entry　and　detainer；　proof　of　title　allows　the　defendant　to　retain　it；　and　in　many　cases　has　been　held　an　answer　to　an　action　of　trespass。　So　in　trespass　for　taking　goods　the　defendant　may　set　up　title　in　himself。　There　might　seem　to　be　a　trace　of　the　distinction　in　the　general　rule；　that　the　title　cannot　be　tried　in　trespass　quare　clausum。　But　this　is　an　exception　commonly　put　on　the　ground　that　the　judgment　cannot　change　the　property；　as　trespass　for　chattels　or　trover　can。　/3/　The　rule　that　you　cannot　go　into　title　in　a　possessory　action　presupposes　great　difficulty　in　the　proof；　the　probatio