the common law-第40章

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ntuitu。　/2/　A　jettison；　in　tempest；　seems　to　have　been　a　good　plea　for　a　factor　in　the　time　of　Edward　III。；　/3/　but　that　cannot　be　relied　on　for　an　analogy。　The　argument　from　the　Marshal's　case　/4/　is　stronger。　There　it　appears　to　have　been　thought　that　burning　of　the　prison　was　as　good　an　excuse　for　an　escape　as　a　release　by　alien　enemies。　This　must　refer　to　an　accidental　fire；　and　would　seem　to　imply　that　he　was　not　liable　in　that　event；　if　not　in　fault。　The　writs　in　the　Register　against　bailees　to　keep　or　carry　goods；　all　have　the　general　allegation　of　negligence；　and　so　do　the　older　precedents　of　declarations；　so　far　as　I　have　observed；　whether　stating　the　custom　of　the　realm　or　not。　/5/　But　a　bailee　was　answerable　for　goods　wrongfully　taken　from　him；　as　an　innkeeper　was　for　goods　stolen　from　his　inn；　irrespective　of　negligence。　/6/

It　is　true　that　the　Marshal's　case　speaks　of　his　negligent　＇201＇　keeping　when　the　prisoners　were　released　by　rebels；　（although　that　was　far　less　likely　to　result　from　negligence；　one　would　think；　than　a　fire　in　the　prison；）　and　that　after　Lord　Coke's　time　negligence　was　alleged；　although　the　goods　had　been　lost　by　wrongful　taking。　So　the　writ　against　innkeepers　is　pro　defectu　hujusmodi　hospitatorum。　In　these　instances；　neglect　only　means　a　failure　de　facto　to　keep　safely。　As　was　said　at　a　much　later　date；　〃everything　is　a　negligence　in　a　carrier　or　hoyman　that　the　law　does　not　excuse。〃　/1/　The　allegation　is　simply　the　usual　allegation　of　actions　on　the　case；　and　seems　to　have　extended　itself　from　the　earlier　declarations　for　damage；　when　case　supplanted　detinue　and　the　use　of　the　former　action　became　universal。　It　can　hardly　have　been　immaterial　to　the　case　for　which　it　was　first　introduced。　But　the　short　reason　for　disbelieving　that　there　was　any　warrant　in　the　old　law　for　making　the　carrier　an　insurer　against　damage　is；　that　there　seem　to　be　no　early　cases　in　which　bailees　were　held　to　such　a　responsibility；　and　that　it　was　not　within　the　principle　on　which　they　were　made　answerable　for　a　loss　by　theft。

Having　traced　the　process　by　which　a　common　carrier　has　been　made　an　insurer；　it　only　remains　to　say　a　word　upon　the　origin　of　the　admitted　exceptions　from　the　risk　assumed。　It　has　been　seen　already　how　loss　by　the　public　enemy　came　to　be　mentioned　by　Chief　Justice　Holt。　It　is　the　old　distinction　taken　in　the　Marshal's　case　that　there　the　bailee　has　no　remedy　over。

With　regard　to　the　act　of　God；　it　was　a　general　principle；　not　peculiar　to　carriers　nor　to　bailees；　that　a　duty　was　＇202＇　discharged　if　an　act　of　God　made　it　impossible　of　performance。　Lord　Coke　mentions　the　case　of　jettison　from　a　Gravesend　barge；　/1/　and　another　of　a　party　bound　to　keep　and　maintain　sea…walls　from　overflowing；　as　subject　to　the　same　limitation；　/2/　and　a　similar　statement　as　to　contracts　in　general　will　be　found　in　the　Year　Books。　/3/　It　is　another　form　of　the　principle　which　has　been　laboriously　reargued　in　our　own　day；　that　parties　are　excused　from　the　performance　of　a　contract　which　has　become　impossible　before　breach　from　the　perishing　of　the　thing；　or　from　change　of　circumstances　the　continued　existence　of　which　was　the　foundation　of　the　contract；　provided　there　was　no　warranty　and　no　fault　on　the　part　of　the　contractor。　Whether　the　act　of　God　has　now　acquired　a　special　meaning　with　regard　to　common　carriers　may　be　left　for　others　to　consider。

It　appears；　from　the　foregoing　evidence；　that　we　cannot　determine　what　classes　of　bailees　are　subject　to　the　strict　responsibility　imposed　on　common　carriers　by　referring　to　the　Praetor's　Edict　and　then　consulting　the　lexicons　under　Nautoe；　Caupones；　or　Stabularii。　The　question　of　precedent　is　simply　to　what　extent　the　old　common　law　of　bailment　still　survives。　We　can　only　answer　it　by　enumerating　the　decisions　in　which　the　old　law　is　applied；　and　we　shall　find　it　hard　to　bring　them　together　under　a　general　principle。　The　rule　in　Southcote's　Case　has　been　done　away　with　for　bailees　in　general：　that　is　clear。　But　it　is　equally　clear　that　it　has　not　maintained　itself；　even　within　the　limits　of　the　public　policy　invented　by　Chief　Justice　＇203＇　Holt。　It　is　not　true　to…day　that　all　bailees　for　reward　exercising　a　public　calling　are　insurers。　No　such　doctrine　is　applied　to　grain…elevators　or　deposit…vaults。　/1/

How　Lord　Holt　came　to　distinguish　between　bailees　for　reward　and　others　has　been　shown　above。　It　is　more　pertinent　here　to　notice　that　his　further　qualification；　exercising　a　public　calling；　was　part　of　a　protective　system　which　has　passed　away。　One　adversely　inclined　might　say　that　it　was　one　of　many　signs　that　the　law　was　administered　in　the　interest　of　the　upper　classes。　It　has　been　shown　above　that　if　a　man　was　a　common　farrier　he　could　be　charged　for　negligence　without　an　assumpsit。　The　same　judge　who　threw　out　that　intimation　established　in　another　case　that　he　could　be　sued　if　he　refused　to　shoe　a　horse　on　reasonable　request。　/2/　Common　carriers　and　common　innkeepers　were　liable　in　like　case；　and　Lord　Holt　stated　the　principle：　〃If　a　man　takes　upon　him　a　public　employment；　he　is　bound　to　serve　the　public　as　far　as　the　employment　extends；　and　for　refusal　an　action　lies。〃　/3/　An　attempt　to　apply　this　doctrine　generally　at　the　present　day　would　be　thought　monstrous。　But　it　formed　part　of　a　consistent　scheme　for　holding　those　who　followed　useful　callings　up　to　the　mark。　Another　part　was　the　liability　of　persons　exercising　a　public　employment　for　loss　or　damage；　enhanced　in　cases　of　bailment　by　what　remained　of　the　rule　in　Southcote's　Case。　The　scheme　has　given　way　to　more　liberal　notions；　but　the　disjecta　membra　still　move。

Lord　Mansfield　stated　his　views　of　public　policy　in　terms　＇204＇　not　unlike　those　used　by　Chief　Justice　Holt　in　Coggs　v。　Bernard；　but　distinctly　confines　their　application　to　common　carriers。　〃But　there　is　a　further　degree　of　responsibility　by　the　custom　of　the　realm；　that　is；　by　the　common　law；　a　carrier　is　in　the　nature　of　an　insurer　。。。。　To　prevent　litigation；　collusion；　and　the　necessity　of　going　into　circumstances　impossible　to　be　unravelled；　the　law　presumes　against　the　carrier；　unless；〃　&c。　/1/

At　the　present　day　it　is　assumed　that　the　principle　is　thus　confined；　and　the　discussion　is　transferred　to　the　question　who　are　common　carriers。　It　is　thus　conceded；　by　implication；　that　Lord　Holt's　rule　has　been　abandoned。　But　the　trouble　is；　that　with　it　disappear　not　only　the　general　system　which　we　have　seen　that　Lord　Holt　entertained；　but　the　special　reasons　repeated　by　Lord　Mansfield。　Those　reasons　apply　to　other　bailees　as　well　as　to　common　carriers。　Besides；　hoymen　and　masters　of　ships　were　not　originally　held　because　they　were　common　carriers；　and　they　were　all　three　treated　as　co…ordinate　species；　even　in　Coggs　v。　Bernard；　where　they　were　mentioned　only　as　so　many　instances　of　bailees　exercising　a　public　calling。　We　do　not　get　a　new　and　single　principle　by　simply　giving　a　single　name　to　all　the　cases　to　be　accounted　for。　If　there　is　a　sound　rule　of　public　policy　which　ought　to　impose　a　special　responsibility　upon　common　carriers；　as　those　words　are　now　understood；　and　upon　no　others；　it　has　never　yet　been　stated。　If；　on　the　other　hand；　there　are　considerations　which　apply　to　a　particular　class　among　those　so　designated；for　instance；　to　railroads；　who　may　have　a　private　individual　at　their　mercy；　or　exercise　a　power　too　vast　for　the　common　welfare；we　do　not　prove　that　the　＇205＇　reasoning　extends　to　a　general　ship　or　a　public　cab　by　calling　all　three　common　carriers。

If　there　is　no　common　rule　of　policy；　and　common　carriers　remain　a　merely　empirical　exception　from　general　doctrine；　courts　may　well　hesitate　to　extend　the　significance　of　those　words。　Furthermore；　notions　of　public　policy　which　would　not　leave　parties　free　to　make　their　own　bargains　are　somewhat　discredited　in　most　departments　of　the　law。　/1/　Hence　it　may　perhaps　be　concluded　that；　if　any　new　case　should　arise；　the　degree　of　responsibility；　and　the　validity　and　interpretation　of　any　contract　of　bailment　that　there　may　be；　should　stand　open　to　argument　on　general　principles；　and　that　the　matter　has　been　set　at　large　so　far　as　early　precedent　is　concerned。

I　hav