the common law-第37章

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When　it　had　thus　been　established　that　case　would　lie　for　damage　when　occasioned　by　the　omission；　as　well　as　when　caused　by　the　act；　of　the　defendant；　there　was　no　reason　for　denying　it；　even　if　the　negligent　custody　had　resulted　in　the　destruction　of　the　property。　/3/　From　this　it　was　but　a　step　to　extend　the　same　form　of　action　to　all　cases　of　loss　by　a　bailee；　and　so　avoid　the　defendant's　right　to　wage　his　law。　Detinue；　the　primitive　remedy；　retained　that　mark　of　primitive　procedure。　The　last　extension　was　made　about　the　time　of　Southcote's　Case。　/4/　But　when　the　＇185＇　same　form　of　action　thus　came　to　be　used　alike　for　damage　or　destruction　by　the　bailee's　neglect　and　for　loss　by　a　wrong…doer　against　whom　the　bailee　had　a　remedy　over；　a　source　was　opened　for　confusion　with　regard　to　the　foundation　and　nature　of　the　defendant's　duty。

In　truth；　there　were　two　sets　of　duties；one　not　peculiar　to　bailees；　arising　from　the　assumpsit　or　public　calling　of　the　defendant；　as　just　explained；　the　other；　the　ancient　obligation；　peculiar　to　them　as　such；　of　which　Southcote's　Case　was　an　example。　But　any　obligation　of　a　bailee　might　be　conceived　of　as　part　of　a　contract　of　bailment；　after　assumpsit　had　become　appropriated　to　contract；　the　doctrine　of　consideration　had　been　developed；　（both　of　which　had　happened　in　Lord　Coke's　time；）　it　seemed　unnecessary　to　distinguish　nicely　between　the　two　sets　of　duties　just　mentioned；　provided　a　consideration　and　special　promise　could　be　alleged。　Furthermore；　as　formerly　the　defendant's　public　calling　had　the　same　effect　as　an　assumpsit　for　the　purpose　of　charging　him　in　tort；　it　seems　now　to　have　been　thought　an　equally　good　substitute　for　a　special　promise；　in　order　to　charge　him　in　assumpsit。　In　Rogers　v。　Head；　/1/　the　argument　was；　that　to　charge　one　in　assumpsit　you　must　show　either　his　public　calling　at　the　time　of　the　delivery；　or　a　special　promise　on　sufficient　consideration。　This　argument　assumes　that　a　bailee　who　received　goods　in　the　course　of　a　public　employment；　＇186＇　for　instance　as　a　common　carrier；　could　be　charged　in　this　form　of　action　for　a　breach　of　either　of　the　above　sets　of　duties；　by　alleging　either　his　public　calling　or　his　reward　and　a　special　promise。　It　seems　to　have　been　admitted；　as　was　repeatedly　decided　before　and　since　that　case；　that　one　who　was　not　a　common　carrier　could　have　been　charged　for　non…delivery　in　a　special　action；　that　is；　in　case　as　distinguished　from　assumpsit。

Suppose；　next；　that　the　plaintiff　sued　in　case　for　a　tort。　As　before；　the　breach　of　duty　complained　of　might　be　such　damage　to　property　as　had　always　been　sued　for　in　that　form　of　action；　or　it　might　be　a　loss　by　theft　for　which　detinue　would　formerly　have　been　brought；　and　which　fell　on　the　bailee　only　by　reason　of　the　bailment。　If　the　goods　had　been　stolen；　the　bailee's　liability　rested　neither　on　his　common　calling　nor　on　his　assumpsit　and　his　neglect；　but　arose　from　the　naked　facts　that　he　had　accepted　a　delivery　and　that　the　goods　were　gone；　and　in　such　cases　it　ought　to　have　been　enough　to　allege　those　facts　in　the　declaration。　/1/　But　it　was　very　natural　that　the　time…honored　foundations　for　the　action　on　the　case　in　its　more　limited　application　should　still　be　laid　in　the　pleadings；　even　after　the　scope　of　the　action　had　been　enlarged。　We　shall　have　to　inquire；　later；　whether　the　principles　of　Southcote's　Case　were　not　also　extended　in　the　opposite　direction　to　cases　not　falling　within　it。　The　reasons　for　the　rule　which　it　laid　down　had　lost　their　meaning　centuries　before　Gawdy　and　Clench　were　born；　when　owners　had　acquired　the　right　to　sue　for　the　wrongful　taking　of　property　in　the　hands　＇187＇　and　the　rule　itself　was　a　dry　precedent　likely　to　be　followed　according　to　the　letter　because　the　spirit　had　departed。　It　had　begun　to　totter　when　the　reporter　cautioned　bailees　to　accept　in　such　terms　as　to　get　rid　of　it。　/1/

Accordingly；　although　that　decision　was　the　main　authority　relied　on　for　the　hundred　years　between　it　and　Coggs　v。　Bernard　whenever　a　peculiar　responsibility　was　imposed　upon　bailees；　we　find　that　sometimes　an　assumpsit　was　laid　as　in　the　early　precedents；　/2/　or　more　frequently　that　the　bailee　was　alleged　to　be　a　common　bargeman；　or　common　carrier；　or　the　like；　without　much　reference　to　the　special　nature　of　the　tort　in　question；　and　that　the　true　bearing　of　the　allegation　was　sometimes　lost　sight　of。　At　first；　however；　there　were　only　some　slight　signs　of　confusion　in　the　language　of　one　or　two　cases；　and　if　the　duty　was　conceived　to　fall　within　the　principle　of　Southcote's　Case；　pleaders　did　not　always　allege　the　common　or　public　calling　which　was　held　unnecessary。　/3/　But　they　also　adopted　other　devices　from　the　precedents　in　case；　or　to　strengthen　an　obligation　which　they　did　not　well　understand。　Chief　Justice　Popham　had　sanctioned　a　distinction　between　paid　and　unpaid　bailees；　hence　it　was　deemed　prudent　to　lay　a　reward。　Negligence　was　of　course　averred；　and　finally　it　became　frequent　to　allege　an　obligation　by　the　law　and　custom　of　the　realm。　This　last　deserves　a　little　further　attention。

There　is　no　writ　in　the　Register　alleging　any　special　obligation　of　common　carriers　by　the　custom　of　the　realm。　But　the　writ　against　innkeepers　did　lay　a　duly　〃by　the　＇188＇　law　and　custom　of　England；〃　and　it　was　easy　to　adopt　the　phrase。　The　allegation　did　not　so　much　imply　the　existence　of　a　special　principle；　as　state　a　proposition　of　law　in　the　form　which　was　then　usual。　There　are　other　writs　of　trespass　which　allege　a　common…law　duty　in　the　same　way；　and　others　again　setting　forth　a　statutory　obligation。　/1/　So　〃the　judges　were　sworn　to　execute　justice　according　to　law　and　the　custom　of　England。〃　/2/

The　duties　of　a　common　carrier；　so　far　as　the　earlier　evidence　goes；　were　simply　those　of　bailees　in　general；　coupled　with　the　liabilities　generally　attached　to　the　exercise　of　a　public　calling。　The　word　〃common〃　addressed　itself　only　to　the　latter　point；　as　has　been　shown　above。　This　is　further　illustrated　by　the　fact　that；　when　the　duty　was　thus　set　forth；　it　was　not　alleged　as　an　obligation　peculiar　to　common　carriers　as　such；　but　was　laid　as　the　custom　of　law　of　common　hoymen；　or　lightermen；　&c。；　according　to　the　business　of　the　party　concerned。　It　will　be　noticed　that　Chief　Justice　Holt　in　Coggs　v。　Bernard　states　the　liability　as　applicable　to　all　bailees　for　reward；　exercising　a　public　employment；　and　mentions　common　hoymen　and　masters　of　ships　alongside　of；　not　as　embraced　under；　common　carriers。　It　will　also　be　noticed　in　the　cases　before　that　time；　that　there　is　no　settled　formula　for　the　obligation　in　question；　but　that　it　is　set　forth　in　each　case　that　the　defendant　was　answerable　for　what　he　was　said　to　have　done　or　omitted　in　the　particular　instance。　/3/

＇189＇　Returning　now　to　the　succession　of　the　cases；　Rich　v。　Kneeland　is　the　next　in　order　（11　Jac。　I。；　A。D。　1613）。　It　was　an　action　on　the　case　（tort）；　against　a　common　hoyman。　In　Croke's　report　nothing　is　said　of　custom；　but　the　declaration　avers　that　the　defendant　was　a　common　bargeman；　that　the　plaintiff　delivered　him　a　portmanteau；　&c。　to　carry；　and　paid　him　for　it；　and　that　the　defendant　tam　negligenter　custodivit；　that　it　was　taken　from　him　by　persons　unknown；like　the　second　count　in　Morse　v。　Slue；　below。　The　plea　was　demurred　to；　and　adjudged　for　the　plaintiff。　A　writ　of　error　being　brought；　it　was　assigned　that　〃this　action　lies　not　against　a　common　bargeman　without　special　promise。　But　all　the　Justices　and　Barons　held；　that　it　well　lies　as　against　a　common　carrier　upon　the　land。〃　If　we　follow　this　report；　it　seems　at　the　first　glance　that　importance　was　attributed　to　the　common　calling。　But　as　the　loss　was　clearly　within　the　principle　of　Southcote's　Case；　which　required　neither　special　promise　nor　common　calling　for　its　application；　and　which　remained　unquestioned　law　for　three　quarters　of　a　century　later；　the　court　must　have　referred　to　the　form　of　action　employed　（case）；　and　not　to　the　liability　of　the　defendant　in　some　form　of　action　（detinue）。　The　objection　was　that　〃this　action　lies　not；〃　not　that　the　defendant　not　liable；　〃without　special　promise。〃　Even　thus　narrowed；　it　rather　countenances　the