the common law-第36章

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　them　as　he　keeps　his　own　goods；　。。。　or　if　they　happen　to　be　stolen　or　purloined；　that　he　shall　not　be　answerable　for　them；　for　he　who　accepted　them　ought　to　take　them　in　such　or　the　like　manner；　or　otherwise　he　may　be　charged　by　his　general　acceptance。〃

Down　to　this　time；　at　least；　it　was　clear　law　that；　if　a　person　accepted　the　possession　of　goods　to　keep　for　another　even　as　a　favor；　and　lost　them　by　wrongful　taking；　wholly　without　his　fault；　he　was　bound　to　make　good　the　loss；　unless　when　he　took　possession　he　expressly　stipulated　against　such　a　responsibility。　The　attempts　of　Lord　Holt　in　Coggs　v。　Bernard；　and　of　Sir　William　Jones　in　his　book　on　Bailments；　to　show　that　Southcote　v。　Bennet　was　not　sustained　by　authority；　were　futile；　as　any　one　who　will　Study　the　Year　Books　for　himself　may　see。　The　same　principle　was　laid　down　seven　years　before　by　Peryam；　＇180＇　C。　B。；　in　Drake　v。　Royman；　/1/　and　Southcote's　Case　was　followed　as　a　leading　precedent　without　question　for　a　hundred　years。

Thus　the　circle　of　analogies　between　the　English　and　the　early　German　law　is　complete。　There　is　the　same　procedure　for　lost　property；　turning　on　the　single　question　whether　the　plaintiff　had　lost　possession　against　his　will；　the　same　principle　that；　if　the　person　intrusted　with　the　property　parted　with　it　to　another；　the　owner　could　not　recover　it；　but　must　get　his　indemnity　from　his　bailee；　the　same　inverted　explanation；　that　the　bailee　could　sue　because　he　was　answerable　over；　but　the　substance　of　the　true　doctrine　in　the　rule　that　when　he　had　no　remedy　he　was　not　answerable；　and；　finally；　the　same　absolute　responsibility　for　loss；　even　when　happening　without　fault　on　the　part　of　the　person　intrusted。　The　last　and　most　important　of　these　principles　is　seen　in　force　as　late　as　the　reign　of　Queen　Elizabeth。　We　have　now　to　follow　its　later　fortunes。

A　common　carrier　is　liable　for　goods　which　are　stolen　from　him；　or　otherwise　lost　from　his　charge　except　by　the　act　of　God　or　the　public　enemy。　Two　notions　have　been　entertained　with　regard　to　the　source　of　this　rule：　one；　that　it　was　borrowed　from　the　Roman　law；　/2/　the　other；　that　it　was　introduced　by　custom；　as　an　exception　to　the　general　law　of　bailment；　in　the　reigns　of　Elizabeth　and　James　I。　/3/

I　shall　try　to　show　that　both　these　notions　are　wrong；　that　this　strict　responsibility　is　a　fragmentary　survival　from　the　general　law　of　bailment　which　I　have　just　explained；　＇181＇　the　modifications　which　the　old　law　has　undergone　were　due　in　part　to　a　confusion　of　ideas　which　came　the　displacement　of　detinue　by　the　action　on　the　case；　in　part　to　conceptions　of　public　policy　which　were　read　into　the　precedents　by　Lord　Holt；　and　in　part　to　still　later　conceptions　of　policy　which　have　been　read　into　the　reasonings　of　Lord　Holt　by　later　judges。

Southcote's　Case　was　decided　in　the　forty…third　year　of　Queen　Elizabeth　（A。D。　1601）。　I　think　the　first　mention　of　a　carrier；　pertinent　to　the　question；　occurs　in　Woodlife's　Case；　/1/　decided　four　or　five　years　earlier　（38　or　39　Eliz。；　A。D。　1596　or　1597）。　It　was　an　action　of　account　for　merchandise　delivered　to　the　defendant；　it　would　seem　as　a　factor　（〃pur　merchandizer〃）clearly　not　as　a　carrier。　Plea；　robbery　at　sea　with　defendant's　own　goods。　Gawdy；　one　of　the　judges　who　decided　Southcote's　Case；　thought　the　plea　bad；　but　Popham；　C。　J。　said　that；　though　it　would　not　be　a　good　plea　for　a　carrier　because　he　is　paid　for　his　carriage；　there　was　a　difference　in　this　respect　between　carriers　and　other　servants　and　factors。

This　is　repeated　in　Southcote's　Case；　and　appears　to　involve　a　double　distinction；first　between　paid　and　unpaid　bailees；　next　between　bailees　and　servants。　If　the　defendant　was　a　servant　not　having　control　over　the　goods；　he　might　not　fall　within　the　law　of　bailment；　and　factors　are　treated　on　the　footing　of　servants　in　the　early　law。

The　other　diversity　marked　the　entrance　of　the　doctrine　of　consideration　into　the　law　of　bailment。　Consideration　originally　meant　quid　pro　quo；　as　will　be　explained　hereafter。　It　was　thus　dealt　with　in　Doctor　and　Student　/2/　when　the　principle　was　still　young。　Chief　Justice　＇183＇　Popham　probably　borrowed　his　distinction　between　paid　and　unpaid　bailees　from　that　work；　where　common　carriers　are　mentioned　as　an　example　of　the　former　class。　A　little　earlier；　reward　made　no　difference。　/1/

But　in　Woodlife's　Case；　in　reply　to　what　the　Chief　Justice　had　said；　Gawdy　cited　the　case　of　the　Marshal　of　the　King's　Bench；　/2/　stated　above；　whereupon　Popham　fell　back　on　the　old　distinction　that　the　jailer　had　a　remedy　over　against　the　rebels；　but　that　there　was　no　remedy　over　in　the　case　at　bar。

The　other　cases　relied　on　were　some　of　those　on　general　bailment　collected　above；　the　same　authorities；　in　short；　on　which　Southcote's　Case　was　founded。　The　principle　adopted　was　the　same　as　in　Southcote's　Case；　subject　only　to　the　question　whether　the　defendant　fell　within　it。　Nothing　was　said　of　any　custom　of　the　realm；　or　ever　had　been　in　any　reported　case　before　this　time；　and　I　believe　this　to　be　the　first　instance　in　which　carriers　are　in　any　way　distinguished　from　any　other　class　of　persons　intrusted　with　goods。　There　is　no　hint　of　any　special　obligation　peculiar　to　them　in　the　old　books；　and　it　certainly　is　not　true；　that　this　case　introduced　one。　It　will　be　noticed；　with　reference　to　what　follows；　that　Popham　does　not　speak　of　common　carriers；　but　of　carriers。

Next　came　Southcote's　Case　/3/　（43　Eliz。；　A。D。　1601）；　which　presented　the　old　law　pure　and　simple；　irrespective　of　reward　or　any　modern　innovation。　In　this　and　the　earlier　instances　of　loss　by　theft；　the　action　was　detinue；　counting；　we　may　presume；　simply　on　a　delivery　and　wrongful　detainer。

＇183＇　But　about　this　time　important　changes　took　place　in　the　procedure　usually　adopted；　which　must　be　explained。　If　the　chattel　could　be　returned　in　specie；　detinue　afforded　no　satisfaction　for　damage　which　it　might　have　suffered　through　the　bailee's　neglect。　/1/　The　natural　remedy　for　such　damage　was　the　action　on　the　case。　But　before　this　could　be　made　entirely　satisfactory；　there　were　certain　difficulties　to　be　overcome。　The　neglect　which　occasioned　the　damage　might　be　a　mere　omission；　and　what　was　there　akin　to　trespass　in　a　nonfeasance　to　sustain　the　analogy　upon　which　trespass　on　the　case　was　founded？　Moreover；　to　charge　a　man　for　not　acting；　you　must　show　that　it　was　his　duty　to　act。　As　pleadings　were　formerly　construed；　it　would　not　have　been　enough　to　allege　that　the　plaintiff's　goods　were　damaged　by　the　defendant's　negligence。　/2/　These　troubles　had　been　got　over　by　the　well…known　words；　super　se　assumpsit；　which　will　be　explained　later。　Assumpsit　did　not　for　a　long　time　become　an　independent　action　of　contract；　and　the　allegation　was　simply　the　inducement　to　an　action　of　tort。　The　ground　of　liability　was　that　the　defendant　had　started　upon　the　undertaking；　so　that　his　negligent　omission；　which　let　in　the　damage；　could　be　connected　with　his　acts　as　a　part　of　his　dealing　with　the　thing。　/3/　We　shall　find　Lord　Holt　recognizing　this　original　purport　of　assumpsit　when　we　come　to　Coggs　v。　Bernard。　0f　course　it　was　not　confined　to　cases　of　bailment。

But　there　was　another　way　besides　this　by　which　the　defendant　could　be　charged　with　a　duty　and　made　liable　＇184＇　in　case；　and　which；　although　less　familiar　to　lawyers；　has　a　special　bearing　on　the　law　of　carriers　in　later　times。　If　damage　had　been　done　or　occasioned　by　the　act　or　omission　of　the　defendant　in　the　pursuit　of　some　of　the　more　common　callings；　such　as　that　of　a　farrier；　it　seems　that　the　action　could　be　maintained；　without　laying　an　assumpsit；　on　the　allegation　that　he　was　a　〃common〃　farrier。　/l　/　The　latter　principle　was　also　wholly　independent　of　bailment。　It　expressed　the　general　obligation　of　those　exercising　a　public　or　〃common〃　business　to　practise　their　art　on　demand；　and　show　skill　in　it。　〃For；〃　as　Fitzherbert　says；　〃it　is　the　duty　of　every　artificer　to　exercise　his　art　rightly　and　truly　as　he　ought。〃　/2/

When　it　had　thus　been　established　that　case　would　lie　for　damage　when　occasioned　by　the　omission；　as　well　as　when　caused　by　the　act；　of　the　defendant；　there　was　no　reason　for　denying　it；