the common law-第28章

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id；　the　plaintiff　may　meet　this　defence　in　some　cases　by　showing　that　the　words　were　spoken　with　actual　malice。

All　this　sounds　as　if　at　least　actual　intent　to　cause　the　damage　complained　of；　if　not　malevolence；　were　at　the　bottom　of　this　class　of　wrongs。　Yet　it　is　not　so。　For　although　the　use　of　the　phrase　〃malice〃　points　as　usual　to　an　original　moral　standard；　the　rule　that　it　is　presumed　upon　proof　of　speaking　certain　words　is　equivalent　to　saying　that　the　overt　conduct　of　speaking　those　words　may　be　actionable　whether　the　consequence　of　damage　to　the　plaintiff　was　intended　or　not。　And　this　fails　in　with　the　general　theory；　because　the　manifest　tendency　of　slanderous　words　is　to　harm　the　person　of　whom　they　are　spoken。　Again；　the　real　substance　of　the　defence　is　not　that　the　damage　＇139＇　was　not　intended；　　that　would　be　no　defence　at　all；　but　that；　whether　it　was　intended　or　not；that　is；　even　if　the　defendant　foresaw　it　and　foresaw　it　with　pleasure；the　manifest　facts　and　circumstances　under　which　he　said　it　were　such　that　the　law　considered　the　damage　to　the　plaintiff　of　less　importance　than　the　benefit　of　free　speaking。

It　is　more　difficult　to　apply　the　same　analysis　to　the　last　stage　of　the　process；　but　perhaps　it　is　not　impossible。　It　is　said　that　the　plaintiff　may　meet　a　case　of　privilege　thus　made　out　on　the　part　of　the　defendant；　by　proving　actual　malice；　that　is；　actual　intent　to　cause　the　damage　complained　of。　But　how　is　this　actual　malice　made　out？　It　is　by　showing　that　the　defendant　knew　the　statement　which　he　made　was　false；　or　that　his　untrue　statements　were　grossly　in　excess　of　what　the　occasion　required。　Now　is　it　not　very　evident　that　the　law　is　looking　to　a　wholly　different　matter　from　the　defendant's　intent？　The　fact　that　the　defendant　foresaw　and　foresaw　with　pleasure　the　damage　to　the　plaintiff；　is　of　no　more　importance　in　this　case　than　it　would　be　where　the　communication　was　privileged。　The　question　again　is　wholly　a　question　of　knowledge；　or　other　external　standard。　And　what　makes　even　knowledge　important？　It　is　that　the　reason　for　which　a　man　is　allowed　in　the　other　instances　to　make　false　charges　against　his　neighbors　is　wanting。　It　is　for　the　public　interest　that　people　should　be　free　to　give　the　best　information　they　can　under　certain　circumstances　without　fear；　but　there　is　no　public　benefit　in　having　lies　told　at　any　time；　and　when　a　charge　is　known　to　be　false；　or　is　in　excess　of　what　is　required　by　the　occasion；　it　is　not　necessary　to　make　that　charge　in　order　to　speak　freely；　and　＇140＇　therefore　it　falls　under　the　ordinary　rule；　that　certain　charges　are　made　at　the　party's　peril　in　case　they　turn　out　to　be　false；　whether　evil　consequences　were　intended　or　not。　The　defendant　is　liable；　not　because　his　intent　was　evil；　but　because　he　made　false　charges　without　excuse。

It　will　be　seen　that　the　peril　of　conduct　here　begins　farther　back　than　with　deceit；　as　the　tendency　of　slander　is　more　universally　harmful。　There　must　be　some　concomitant　circumstances。　There　must　at　least　be　a　human　being　in　existence　whom　the　statement　designates。　There　must　be　another　human　being　within　hearing　who　understands　the　statement；　and　the　statement　must　be　false。　But　it　is　arguable　that　the　latter　of　these　facts　need　not　be　known；　as　certainly　the　falsity　of　the　charge　need　not　be；　and　that　a　man　must　take　the　risk　of　even　an　idle　statement　being　heard；　unless　he　made　it　under　known　circumstances　of　privilege。　It　would　be　no　great　curtailment　of　freedom　to　deny　a　man　immunity　in　attaching　a　charge　of　crime　to　the　name　of　his　neighbor；　even　when　he　supposes　himself　alone。　But　it　does　not　seem　clear　that　the　law　would　go　quite　so　far　as　that。

The　next　form　of　liability　is　comparatively　insignificant。　I　mean　the　action　for　malicious　prosecution。　A　man　may　recover　damages　against　another　for　maliciously　and　without　probable　cause　instituting　a　criminal；　or；　in　some　cases；　a　civil　prosecution　against　him　upon　a　false　charge。　The　want　of　probable　cause　refers；　of　course；　only　to　the　state　of　the　defendant's　knowledge；　not　to　his　intent。　It　means　the　absence　of　probable　cause　in　the　facts　known　to　the　defendant　when　he　instituted　the　suit。　But　the　standard　applied　to　the　defendant's　consciousness　is　external　to　it。　The　question　is　not　whether　he　thought　the　＇141＇　facts　to　constitute　probable　cause；　but　whether　the　court　thinks　they　did。

Then　as　to　malice。　The　conduct　of　the　defendant　consists　in　instituting　proceedings　on　a　charge　which　is　in　fact　false；　and　which　has　not　prevailed。　That　is　the　root　of　the　whole　matter。　If　the　charge　was　true；　or　if　the　plaintiff　has　been　convicted；　even　though　he　may　be　able　now　to　prove　that　he　was　wrongly　convicted；　the　defendant　is　safe；　however　great　his　malice；　and　however　little　ground　he　had　for　his　charge。

Suppose；　however；　that　the　charge　is　false；　and　does　not　prevail。　It　may　readily　be　admitted　that　malice　did　originally　mean　a　malevolent　motive；　an　actual　intent　to　harm　the　plaintiff　by　making　a　false　charge。　The　legal　remedy　here；　again；　started　from　the　moral　basis；　the　occasion　for　it；　no　doubt；　being　similar　to　that　which　gave　rise　to　the　old　law　of　conspiracy；　that　a　man's　enemies　would　sometimes　seek　his　destruction　by　setting　the　criminal　law　in　motion　against　him。　As　it　was　punishable　to　combine　for　such　a　purpose；　it　was　concluded；　with　some　hesitation；　that；　when　a　single　individual　wickedly　attempted　the　same　thing；　he　should　be　liable　on　similar　grounds。　/1/　I　must　fully　admit　that　there　is　weighty　authority　to　the　effect　that　malice　in　its　ordinary　sense　is　to　this　day　a　distinct　fact　to　be　proved　and　to　be　found　by　the　jury。

But　this　view　cannot　be　accepted　without　hesitation。　It　is　admitted　that；　on　the　one　side；　the　existence　of　probable　cause；　believed　in；　is　a　justification　notwithstanding　malice；　/2/　that；　on　the　other；　〃it　is　not　enough　to　show　＇142＇　that　the　case　appeared　sufficient　to　this　particular　party；　but　it　must　be　sufficient　to　induce　a　sober；　sensible　and　discreet　person　to　act　upon　it；　or　it　must　fail　as　a　justification　for　the　proceeding　upon　general　grounds。〃　/1/　On　the　one　side；　malice　alone　will　not　make　a　man　liable　for　instituting　a　groundless　prosecution；　on　the　other；　his　justification　will　depend；　not　on　his　opinion　of　the　facts；　but　on　that　of　the　court。　When　his　actual　moral　condition　is　disregarded　to　this　extent；　it　is　a　little　hard　to　believe　that　the　existence　of　an　improper　motive　should　be　material。　Yet　that　is　what　malice　must　mean　in　this　case；　if　it　means　anything。　/2/　For　the　evil　effects　of　a　successful　indictment　are　of　course　intended　by　one　who　procures　all　other　to　be　indicted。　I　cannot　but　think　that　a　jury　would　be　told　that　knowledge　or　belief　that　the　charge　was　false　at　the　time　of　making　it　was　conclusive　evidence　of　malice。　And　if　so；　on　grounds　which　need　not　be　repeated；　malice　is　not　the　important　thing；　but　the　facts　known　to　the　defendant。

Nevertheless；　as　it　is　obviously　treading　on　delicate　ground　to　make　it　actionable　to　set　the　regular　processes　of　the　law　in　motion；　it　is；　of　course；　entirely　possible　to　say　that　the　action　shall　be　limited　to　those　cases　where　the　charge　was　preferred　from　improper　motives；　at　least　if　the　defendant　thought　that　there　was　probable　cause。　Such　a　limitation　would　stand　almost　alone　in　the　law　of　civil　liability。　But　the　nature　of　the　wrong　is　peculiar；　and；　moreover；　it　is　quite　consistent　with　the　theory　of　liability　here　advanced　that　it　should　be　confined　in　any　given　instance　to　actual　wrong…doing　in　a　moral　sense。

The　only　other　cause　of　action　in　which　the　moral　condition　＇143＇　of　the　defendant's　consciousness　might　seem　to　be　important　is　conspiracy。　The　old　action　going　by　that　name　was　much　like　malicious　prosecution；　and　no　doubt　was　originally　confined　to　cases　where　several　persons　had　conspired　to　indict　another　from　malevolent　motives。　But　in　the　modern　action　on　the　case；　where　conspiracy　is　charged；　the　allegation　as　a　rule　only　means　that　two　or　more　persons　were　so　far　co…operating　in　their　acts　that　the　act　of　any　one　was　the　act　of　all。　Generally　speaking；　the　liability　depends　not　on　the　co…operation　or　conspiring；　but　on　the　charac