the common law-第25章

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he　community　can　aid　its　judgment。　/1/　Therefore　it　aids　its　conscience　by　taking　the　opinion　of　the　jury。

But　supposing　a　state　of　facts　often　repeated　in　practice；　is　it　to　be　imagined　that　the　court　is　to　go　on　leaving　the　standard　to　the　jury　forever？　Is　it　not　manifest；　on　the　contrary；　that　if　the　jury　is；　on　the　whole；　as　fair　a　tribunal　as　it　is　represented　to　be；　the　lesson　which　can　be　got　from　that　source　will　be　learned？　Either　the　court　will　find　that　the　fair　teaching　of　experience　is　that　the　conduct　complained　of　usually　is　or　is　not　blameworthy；　and　therefore；　unless　explained；　is　or　is　not　a　ground　of　liability；　or　it　will　find　the　jury　oscillating　to　and　fro；　and　will　see　the　necessity　of　making　up　its　mind　for　itself。　There　is　no　reason　why　any　other　such　question　should　not　be　settled；　as　well　as　that　of　liability　for　stairs　with　smooth　strips　of　brass　upon　their　edges。　The　exceptions　would　mainly　be　found　where　the　standard　was　rapidly　changing；　as；　for　in。　stance；　in　some　questions　of　medical　treatment。　/2/

＇124＇　If　this　be　the　proper　conclusion　in　plain　cases；　further　consequences　ensue。　Facts　do　not　often　exactly　repeat　themselves　in　practice；　but　cases　with　comparatively　small　variations　from　each　other　do。　A　judge　who　has　long　sat　at　nisi　prius　ought　gradually　to　acquire　a　fund　of　experience　which　enables　him　to　represent　the　common　sense　of　the　community　in　ordinary　instances　far　better　than　an　average　jury。　He　should　be　able　to　lead　and　to　instruct　them　in　detail；　even　where　he　thinks　it　desirable；　on　the　whole；　to　take　their　opinion。　Furthermore；　the　sphere　in　which　he　is　able　to　rule　without　taking　their　opinion　at　all　should　be　continually　growing。

It　has　often　been　said；　that　negligence　is　pure　matter　of　fact；　or　that；　after　the　court　has　declared　the　evidence　to　be　such　that　negligence　may　be　inferred　from　it；　the　jury　are　always　to　decide　whether　the　inference　shall　be　drawn。　/1/　But　it　is　believed　that　the　courts；　when　they　lay　down　this　broad　proposition；　are　thinking　of　cases　where　the　conduct　to　be　passed　upon　is　not　proved　directly；　and　the　main　or　only　question　is　what　that　conduct　was；　not　what　standard　shall　be　applied　to　it　after　it　is　established。

Most　cases　which　go　to　the　jury　on　a　ruling　that　there　is　evidence　from　which　they　may　find　negligence；　do　not　go　to　them　principally　on　account　of　a　doubt　as　to　the　standard；　but　of　a　doubt　as　to　the　conduct。　Take　the　case　where　the　fact　in　proof　is　an　event　such　as　the　dropping　of　a　brick　from　a　railway　bridge　over　a　highway　upon　the　plaintiff；　the　fact　must　be　inferred　that　the　dropping　was　＇125＇　due；　not　to　a　sudden　operation　of　weather；　but　to　a　gradual　falling　out　of　repair　which　it　was　physically　possible　for　the　defendant　to　have　prevented；　before　there　can　be　any　question　as　to　the　standard　of　conduct。　/1/

So；　in　the　case　of　a　barrel　falling　from　a　warehouse　window；　it　must　be　found　that　the　defendant　or　his　servants　were　in　charge　of　it；　before　any　question　of　standard　can　arise。　/2/　It　will　be　seen　that　in　each　of　these　well…known　cases　the　court　assumed　a　rule　which　would　make　the　defendant　liable　if　his　conduct　was　such　as　the　evidence　tended　to　prove。　When　there　is　no　question　as　to　the　conduct　established　by　the　evidence；　as　in　the　case　of　a　collision　between　two　trains　belonging　to　the　same　company；　the　jury　have；　sometimes　at　least；　been　told　in　effect　that；　if　they　believed　the　evidence；　the　defendant　was　liable。　/3/

The　principal　argument　that　is　urged　in　favor　of　the　view　that　a　more　extended　function　belongs　to　the　jury　as　matter　of　right；　is　the　necessity　of　continually　conforming　our　standards　to　experience。　No　doubt　the　general　foundation　of　legal　liability　in　blameworthiness；　as　determined　by　the　existing　average　standards　of　the　community；　should　always　be　kept　in　mind；　for　the　purpose　of　keeping　such　concrete　rules　as　from　time　to　time　may　be　laid　down　conformable　to　daily　life。　No　doubt　this　conformity　is　the　practical　justification　for　requiring　a　man　to　know　the　civil　law；　as　the　fact　that　crimes　are　also　generally　sins　is　one　of　the　practical　justifications　for　requiring　a　man　to　know　the　criminal　law。　But　these　considerations　only　lead　to　＇126＇　the　conclusion　that　precedents　should　be　overruled　when　they　become　inconsistent　with　present　conditions；　and　this　has　generally　happened；　except　with　regard　to　the　construction　of　deeds　and　wills。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is　very　desirable　to　know　as　nearly　as　we　can　the　standard　by　which　we　shall　be　judged　at　a　given　moment；　and；　moreover；　the　standards　for　a　very　large　part　of　human　conduct　do　not　vary　from　century　to　century。

The　considerations　urged　in　this　Lecture　are　of　peculiar　importance　in　this　country；　or　at　least　in　States　where　the　law　is　as　it　stands　in　Massachusetts。　In　England；　the　judges　at　nisi　prius　express　their　opinions　freely　on　the　value　and　weight　of　the　evidence；　and　the　judges　in　banc；　by　consent　of　parties；　constantly　draw　inferences　of　fact。　Hence　nice　distinctions　as　to　the　province　of　court　and　jury　are　not　of　the　first　necessity。　But　when　judges　are　forbidden　by　statute　to　charge　the　jury　with　respect　to　matters　of　fact；　and　when　the　court　in　banc　will　never　hear　a　case　calling　for　inferences　of　fact；　it　becomes　of　vital　importance　to　understand　that；　when　standards　of　conduct　are　left　to　the　jury；　it　is　a　temporary　surrender　of　a　judicial　function　which　may　be　resumed　at　any　moment　in　any　case　when　the　court　feels　competent　to　do　so。　Were　this　not　so；　the　almost　universal　acceptance　of　the　first　proposition　in　this　Lecture；　that　the　general　foundation　of　liability　for　unintentional　wrongs　is　conduct　different　from　that　of　a　prudent　man　under　the　circumstances；　would　leave　all　our　rights　and　duties　throughout　a　great　part　of　the　law　to　the　necessarily　more　or　less　accidental　feelings　of　a　jury。

It　is　perfectly　consistent　with　the　views　maintained　in　this　Lecture　that　the　courts　have　been　very　slow　to　withdraw　questions　of　negligence　from　the　jury；　without　distinguishing　＇127＇　nicely　whether　the　doubt　concerned　the　facts　or　the　standard　to　be　applied。　Legal；　like　natural　divisions；　however　clear　in　their　general　outline；　will　be　found　on　exact　scrutiny　to　end　in　a　penumbra　or　debatable　land。　This　is　the　region　of　the　jury；　and　only　cases　falling　on　this　doubtful　border　are　likely　to　be　carried　far　in　court。　Still；　the　tendency　of　the　law　must　always　be　to　narrow　the　field　of　uncertainty。　That　is　what　analogy；　as　well　as　the　decisions　on　this　very　subject；　would　lead　us　to　expect。

The　growth　of　the　law　is　very　apt　to　take　place　in　this　way。　Two　widely　different　cases　suggest　a　general　distinction；　which　is　a　clear　one　when　stated　broadly。　But　as　new　eases　cluster　around　the　opposite　poles；　and　begin　to　approach　each　other；　the　distinction　becomes　more　difficult　to　trace；　the　determinations　are　made　one　way　or　the　other　on　a　very　slight　preponderance　of　feeling；　rather　than　of　articulate　reason；　and　at　last　a　mathematical　line　is　arrived　at　by　the　contact　of　contrary　decisions；　which　is　so　far　arbitrary　that　it　might　equally　well　have　been　drawn　a　little　farther　to　the　one　side　or　to　the　other；　but　which　must　have　been　drawn　somewhere　in　the　neighborhood　of　；where　it　falls。　/1/

In　this　way　exact　distinctions　have　been　worked　out　upon　questions　in　which　the　elements　to　be　considered　are　few。　For　instance；　what　is　a　reasonable　time　for　presenting　negotiable　paper；　or　what　is　a　difference　in　kind　and　what　a　difference　only　in　quality；　or　the　rule　against　perpetuities。

An　example　of　the　approach　of　decisions　towards　each　other　from　the　opposite　poles；　and　of　the　function　of　the　jury　midway；　is　to　be　found　in　the　Massachusetts　adjudications；　＇128＇　that；　if　a　child　of　two　years　and　four　months　is　unnecessarily　sent　unattended　across　and　down　a　street　in　a　large　city；　he　cannot　recover　for　a　negligent　injury；　/1/　that　to　allow　a　boy　of　eight　to　be　abroad　alone　is　not　necessarily　negligent；　/2/　and　that　the　effect　of　permitting　a　boy　of　ten　to　be　abroad　after　dark　is　for　the　jury；　/3/　a　coupled　with　the　statement；　which　may　be　ventured　on　without　authority；　that　such　a　permission　to　a　young　man　of　twenty　possessed　of　common　in