the common law-第24章

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＇118＇　It　was　lawful　in　ploughing　to　turn　the　horses　on　adjoining　land；　and　if　while　so　turning　the　beasts　took　a　mouthful　of　grass；　or　subverted　the　soil　with　the　plough；　against　the　will　of　the　driver；　he　had　a　good　justification；　because　the　law　will　recognize　that　a　man　cannot　at　every　instant　govern　his　cattle　as　he　will。　/1/　So　it　was　said　that；　if　a　man　be　driving　cattle　through　a　town；　and　one　of　them　goes　into　another　man's　house；　and　he　follows　him；　trespass　does　not　lie　for　this。　/2/　So　it　was　said　by　Doderidge；　J。；　in　the　same　case；　that　if　deer　come　into　my　land　out　of　the　forest；　and　I　chase　them　with　dogs；　it　is　excuse　enough　for　me　to　wind　my　horn　to　recall　the　dogs；　because　by　this　the　warden　of　the　forest　has　notice　that　a　deer　is　being　chased。　/3/

The　very　case　of　Mason　v。　Keeling；　/4/　which　is　referred　to　in　the　first　Lecture　for　its　echo　of　primitive　notions；　shows　that　the　working　rules　of　the　law　had　long　been　founded　on　good　sense。　With　regard　to　animals　not　then　treated　as　property；　which　in　the　main　were　the　wilder　animals；　the　law　was　settled　that；　〃if　they　are　of　a　tame　nature；　there　must　be　notice　of　the　ill　quality；　and　the　law　takes　notice；　that　a　dog　is　not　of　a　fierce　nature；　but　rather　the　contrary。〃　/5/　If　the　animals　〃are　such　as　are　naturally　＇119＇　mischievous　in　their　kind；　he　shall　answer　for　hurt　done　by　them；　without　any　notice。〃　/1/　The　latter　principle　has　been　applied　to　the　case　of　a　bear；　/2/　and　amply　accounts　for　the　liability　of　the　owner　of　such　animals　as　horses　and　oxen　in　respect　of　trespasses　upon　land；　although；　as　has　been　seen；　it　was　at　one　time　thought　to　stand　upon　his　ownership。　It　is　said　to　be　the　universal　nature　of　cattle　to　stray；　and；　when　straying　in　cultivated　land；　to　do　damage　by　trampling　down　and　eating　the　crops；　whereas　a　dog　does　no　harm。　It　is　also　said　to　be　usual　and　easy　to　restrain　them。　/3/　If；　as　has　been　suggested；　the　historical　origin　of　the　rule　was　different；　it　does　not　matter。

Following　the　same　line　of　thought；　the　owner　of　cattle　is　not　held　absolutely　answerable　for　all　damage　which　they　may　do　the　person。　According　to　Lord　Holt　in　the　alcove　opinion；　these　animals；　〃which　are　not　so　familiar　to　mankind〃　as　dogs；　〃the　owner　ought　to　confine；　and　take　all　reasonable　caution　that　they　do　no　mischief。。。。　But　。。。　if　the　owner　puts　a　horse　or　an　ox　to　grass　in　his　field；　which　is　adjoining　to　the　highway；　and　the　horse　or　the　ox　breaks　the　hedge　and　runs　into　the　highway；　and　kicks　or　gores　some　passenger；　an　action　will　not　lie　against　the　owner；　otherwise；　if　he　had　notice　that　they　had　done　such　a　thing　before。〃

＇120＇　Perhaps　the　most　striking　authority　for　the　position　that　the　judge's　duties　are　not　at　an　end　when　the　question　of　negligence　is　reached；　is　shown　by　the　discussions　concerning　the　law　of　bailment。　Consider　the　judgment　in　Coggs　v。　Bernard；　/1/　the　treatises　of　Sir　William　Jones　and　Story；　and　the　chapter　of　Kent　upon　the　subject。　They　are　so　many　attempts　to　state　the　duty　of　the　bailee　specifically；　according　to　the　nature　of　the　bailment　and　of　the　object　bailed。　Those　attempts；　to　be　sure；　were　not　successful；　partly　because　they　were　attempts　to　engraft　upon　the　native　stock　a　branch　of　the　Roman　law　which　was　too　large　to　survive　the　process；　but　more　especially　because　the　distinctions　attempted　were　purely　qualitative；　and　were　therefore　useless　when　dealing　with　a　jury。　/2/　To　instruct　a　jury　that　they　must　find　the　defendant　guilty　of　gross　negligence　before　he　can　be　charged；　is　open　to　the　reproach　that　for　such　a　body　the　word　〃gross〃　is　only　a　vituperative　epithet。　But　it　would　not　be　so　with　a　judge　sitting　in　admiralty　without　a　jury。　The　Roman　law　and　the　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　agree　that　the　word　means　something。　/3/　Successful　or　not；　it　is　enough　for　the　present　argument　that　the　attempt　has　been　made。

The　principles　of　substantive　law　which　have　been　established　by　the　courts　are　believed　to　have　been　somewhat　obscured　by　having　presented　themselves　oftenest　in　the　form　of　rulings　upon　the　sufficiency　of　evidence。　When　a　judge　rules　that　there　is　no　evidence　of　negligence；　he　does　something　more　than　is　embraced　in　an　ordinary　ruling　that　there　is　no　evidence　of　a　fact。　He　rules　that　＇121＇　acts　or　omissions　proved　or　in　question　do　not　constitute　a　ground　of　legal　liability；　and　in　this　way　the　law　is　gradually　enriching　itself　from　daily　life；　as　it　should。　Thus；　in　Crafton　v。　Metropolitan　Railway　Co。；　/1/　the　plaintiff　slipped　on　the　defendant's　stairs　and　was　severely　hurt。　The　cause　of　his　slipping　was　that　the　brass　nosing　of　the　stairs　had　been　worn　smooth　by　travel　over　it；　and　a　builder　testified　that　in　his　opinion　the　staircase　was　unsafe　by　reason　of　this　circumstance　and　the　absence　of　a　hand…rail。　There　was　nothing　to　contradict　this　except　that　great　numbers　of　persons　had　passed　over　the　stairs　and　that　no　accident　had　happened　there；　and　the　plaintiff　had　a　verdict。　The　court　set　the　verdict　aside；　and　ordered　a　nonsuit。　The　ruling　was　in　form　that　there　was　no　evidence　of　negligence　to　go　to　the　jury；　but　this　was　obviously　equivalent　to　saying；　and　did　in　fact　mean；　that　the　railroad　company　had　done　all　that　it　was　bound　to　do　in　maintaining　such　a　staircase　as　was　proved　by　the　plaintiff。　A　hundred　other　equally　concrete　instances　will　be　found　in　the　text…books。

On　the　other　hand；　if　the　court　should　rule　that　certain　acts　or　omissions　coupled　with　damage　were　conclusive　evidence　of　negligence　unless　explained；　it　would；　in　substance　and　in　truth；　rule　that　such　acts　or　omissions　were　a　ground　of　liability；　/2/　or　prevented　a　recovery；　as　the　case　might　be。　Thus　it　is　said　to　be　actionable　negligence　to　let　a　house　for　a　dwelling　knowing　it　to　be　so　infected　with　small…pox　as　to　be　dangerous　to　health；　and　concealing　the　knowledge。　/3/　To　explain　the　acts　or　omissions　in　such　a　＇122＇　case　would　be　to　prove　different　conduct　from　that　ruled　upon；　or　to　show　that　they　were　not；　juridically　speaking；　the　cause　of　the　damage　complained　of。　The　ruling　assumes；　for　the　purposes　of　the　ruling；　that　the　facts　in　evidence　are　all　the　facts。

The　cases　which　have　raised　difficulties　needing　explanation　are　those　in　which　the　court　has　ruled　that　there　was　prima　facie　evidence　of　negligence；　or　some　evidence　of　negligence　to　go　to　the　jury。

Many　have　noticed　the　confusion　of　thought　implied　in　speaking　of　such　cases　as　presenting　mixed　questions　of　law　and　fact。　No　doubt；　as　has　been　said　above；　the　averment　that　the　defendant　has　been　guilty　of　negligence　is　a　complex　one：　first；　that　he　has　done　or　omitted　certain　things；　second；　that　his　alleged　conduct　does　not　come　up　to　the　legal　standard。　And　so　long　as　the　controversy　is　simply　on　the　first　half；　the　whole　complex　averment　is　plain　matter　for　the　jury　without　special　instructions；　just　as　a　question　of　ownership　would　be　where　the　only　dispute　was　as　to　the　fact　upon　which　the　legal　conclusion　was　founded。　/1/　But　when　a　controversy　arises　on　the　second　half；　the　question　whether　the　court　or　the　jury　ought　to　judge　of　the　defendant's　conduct　is　wholly　unaffected　by　the　accident；　whether　there　is　or　is　not　also　a　dispute　as　to　what　that　conduct　was。　If　there　is　such　a　dispute；　it　is　entirely　possible　to　give　a　series　of　hypothetical　instructions　adapted　to　every　state　of　facts　which　it　is　open　to　the　jury　to　find。　If　there　is　no　such　dispute；　the　court　may　still　take　their　opinion　as　to　the　standard。　The　problem　is　＇123＇　to　explain　the　relative　functions　of　court　and　jury　with　regard　to　the　latter。

When　a　case　arises　in　which　the　standard　of　conduct；　pure　and　simple；　is　submitted　to　the　jury；　the　explanation　is　plain。　It　is　that　the　court；　not　entertaining　any　clear　views　of　public　policy　applicable　to　the　matter；　derives　the　rule　to　be　applied　from　daily　experience；　as　it　has　been　agreed　that　the　great　body　of　the　law　of　tort　has　been　derived。　But　the　court　further　feels　that　it　is　not　itself　possessed　of　sufficient　practical　experience　to　lay　down　the　rule　intelligently。　It　conceives　that　twelve　men　taken　from　the　practical　part　of　the　community　can　aid　its　judgment。　/1/　Therefore　it　aids　its　conscience　b