the common law-第22章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


a　sacrifice　of　individual　peculiarities　going　beyond　a　certain　point；　is　necessary　to　the　general　welfare。　If；　for　instance；　a　man　is　born　hasty　and　awkward；　is　always　having　accidents　and　hurting　himself　or　his　neighbors；　no　doubt　his　congenital　defects　will　be　allowed　for　in　the　courts　of　Heaven；　but　his　slips　are　no　less　troublesome　to　his　neighbors　than　if　they　sprang　from　guilty　neglect。　His　neighbors　accordingly　require　him；　at　his　proper　peril；　to　come　up　to　their　standard；　and　the　courts　which　they　establish　decline　to　take　his　personal　equation　into　account。

The　rule　that　the　law　does；　in　general；　determine　liability　by　blameworthiness；　is　subject　to　the　limitation　that　minute　differences　of　character　are　not　allowed　for。　The　law　considers；　in　other　words；　what　would　be　blameworthy　in　the　average　man；　the　man　of　ordinary　intelligence　and　prudence；　and　determines　liability　by　that。　If　we　fall　below　the　level　in　those　gifts；　it　is　our　misfortune；　so　much　as　that　we　must　have　at　our　peril；　for　the　reasons　just　given。　But　he　who　is　intelligent　and　prudent　does　not　act　at　his　peril；　in　theory　of　law。　On　the　contrary；　it　is　＇109＇　only　when　he　fails　to　exercise　the　foresight　of　which　he　is　capable；　or　exercises　it　with　evil　intent；　that　he　is　answerable　for　the　consequences。

There　are　exceptions　to　the　principle　that　every　man　is　presumed　to　possess　ordinary　capacity　to　avoid　harm　to　his　neighbors；　which　illustrate　the　rule；　and　also　the　moral　basis　of　liability　in　general。　When　a　man　has　a　distinct　defect　of　such　a　nature　that　all　can　recognize　it　as　making　certain　precautions　impossible；　he　will　not　be　held　answerable　for　not　taking　them。　A　blind　man　is　not　required　to　see　at　his　peril；　and　although　he　is；　no　doubt；　bound　to　consider　his　infirmity　in　regulating　his　actions；　yet　if　he　properly　finds　himself　in　a　certain　situation；　the　neglect　of　precautions　requiring　eyesight　would　not　prevent　his　recovering　for　an　injury　to　himself；　and；　it　may　be　presumed；　would　not　make　him　liable　for　injuring　another。　So　it　is　held　that；　in　cases　where　he　is　the　plaintiff；　an　infant　of　very　tender　years　is　only　bound　to　take　the　precautions　of　which　an　infant　is　capable；　the　same　principle　may　be　cautiously　applied　where　he　is　defendant。　/1/　Insanity　is　a　more　difficult　matter　to　deal　with；　and　no　general　rule　can　be　laid　down　about　it。　There　is　no　doubt　that　in　many　cases　a　man　may　be　insane；　and　yet　perfectly　capable　of　taking　the　precautions；　and　of　being　influenced　by　the　motives；　which　the　circumstances　demand。　But　if　insanity　of　a　pronounced　type　exists；　manifestly　incapacitating　the　sufferer　from　complying　with　the　rule　which　he　has　broken；　good　sense　would　require　it　to　be　admitted　as　an　excuse。

Taking　the　qualification　last　established　in　connection　with　the　general　proposition　previously　laid　down；　it　will　＇110＇　now　be　assumed　that；　on　the　one　hand；　the　law　presumes　or　requires　a　man　to　possess　ordinary　capacity　to　avoid　harming　his　neighbors；　unless　a　clear　and　manifest　incapacity　be　shown；　but　that；　on　the　other；　it　does　not　in　general　hold　him　liable　for　unintentional　injury；　unless；　possessing　such　capacity；　he　might　and　ought　to　have　foreseen　the　danger；　or；　in　other　words；　unless　a　man　of　ordinary　intelligence　and　forethought　would　have　been　to　blame　for　acting　as　he　did。　The　next　question　is；　whether　this　vague　test　is　all　that　the　law　has　to　say　upon　the　matter；　and　the　same　question　in　another　form；　by　whom　this　test　is　to　be　applied。

Notwithstanding　the　fact　that　the　grounds　of　legal　liability　are　moral　to　the　extent　above　explained；　it　must　be　borne　in　mind　that　law　only　works　within　the　sphere　of　the　senses。　If　the　external　phenomena；　the　manifest　acts　and　omissions；　are　such　as　it　requires；　it　is　wholly　indifferent　to　the　internal　phenomena　of　conscience。　A　man　may　have　as　bad　a　heart　as　he　chooses；　if　his　conduct　is　within　the　rules。　In　other　words；　the　standards　of　the　law　are　external　standards；　and；　however　much　it　may　take　moral　considerations　into　account；　it　does　so　only　for　the　purpose　of　drawing　a　line　between　such　bodily　motions　and　rests　as　it　permits；　and　such　as　it　does　not。　What　the　law　really　forbids；　and　the　only　thing　it　forbids；　is　the　act　on　the　wrong　side　of　the　line；　be　that　act　blameworthy　or　otherwise。

Again；　any　legal　standard　must；　in　theory；　be　one　which　would　apply　to　all　men；　not　specially　excepted；　under　the　same　circumstances。　It　is　not　intended　that　the　public　force　should　fall　upon　an　individual　accidentally；　or　at　the　whim　of　any　body　of　men。　The　standard；　that　is；　＇111＇　must　be　fixed。　In　practice；　no　doubt；　one　man　may　have　to　pay　and　another　may　escape；　according　to　the　different　feelings　of　different　juries。　But　this　merely　shows　that　the　law　does　not　perfectly　accomplish　its　ends。　The　theory　or　intention　of　the　law　is　not　that　the　feeling　of　approbation　or　blame　which　a　particular　twelve　may　entertain　should　be　the　criterion。　They　are　supposed　to　leave　their　idiosyncrasies　on　one　side；　and　to　represent　the　feeling　of　the　community。　The　ideal　average　prudent　man；　whose　equivalent　the　jury　is　taken　to　be　in　many　cases；　and　whose　culpability　or　innocence　is　the　supposed　test；　is　a　constant；　and　his　conduct　under　given　circumstances　is　theoretically　always　the　same。

Finally；　any　legal　standard　must；　in　theory；　be　capable　of　being　known。　When　a　man　has　to　pay　damages；　he　is　supposed　to　have　broken　the　law；　and　he　is　further　supposed　to　have　known　what　the　law　was。

If；　now；　the　ordinary　liabilities　in　tort　arise　from　failure　to　comply　with　fixed　and　uniform　standards　of　external　conduct；　which　every　man　is　presumed　and　required　to　know；　it　is　obvious　that　it　ought　to　be　possible；　sooner　or　later；　to　formulate　these　standards　at　least　to　some　extent；　and　that　to　do　so　must　at　last　be　the　business　of　the　court。　It　is　equally　clear　that　the　featureless　generality；　that　the　defendant　was　bound　to　use　such　care　as　a　prudent　man　would　do　under　the　circumstances；　ought　to　be　continually　giving　place　to　the　specific　one；　that　he　was　bound　to　use　this　or　that　precaution　under　these　or　those　circumstances。　The　standard　which　the　defendant　was　bound　to　come　up　to　was　a　standard　of　specific　acts　or　omissions；　with　reference　to　the　specific　circumstances　in　which　he　found　himself。　If　in　the　whole　department　of　＇112＇　unintentional　wrongs　the　courts　arrived　at　no　further　utterance　than　the　question　of　negligence；　and　left　every　case；　without　rudder　or　compass；　to　the　jury；　they　would　simply　confess　their　inability　to　state　a　very　large　part　of　the　law　which　they　required　the　defendant　to　know；　and　would　assert；　by　implication；　that　nothing　could　be　learned　by　experience。　But　neither　courts　nor　legislatures　have　ever　stopped　at　that　point。

》From　the　time　of　Alfred　to　the　present　day；　statutes　and　decisions　have　busied　themselves　with　defining　the　precautions　to　be　taken　in　certain　familiar　cases；　that　is；　with　substituting　for　the　vague　test　of　the　care　exercised　by　a　prudent　man；　a　precise　one　of　specific　acts　or　omissions。　The　fundamental　thought　is　still　the　same；　that　the　way　prescribed　is　that　in　which　prudent　men　are　in　the　habit　of　acting；　or　else　is　one　laid　down　for　cases　where　prudent　men　might　otherwise　be　in　doubt。

It　will　be　observed　that　the　existence　of　the　external　tests　of　liability　which　will　be　mentioned；　while　it　illustrates　the　tendency　of　the　law　of　tort　to　become　more　and　more　concrete　by　judicial　decision　and　by　statute；　does　not　interfere　with　the　general　doctrine　maintained　as　to　the　grounds　of　liability。　The　argument　of　this　Lecture；　although　opposed　to　the　doctrine　that　a　man　acts　or　exerts　force　at　his　peril；　is　by　no　means　opposed　to　the　doctrine　that　he　does　certain　particular　acts　at　his　peril。　It　is　the　coarseness；　not　the　nature；　of　the　standard　which　is　objected　to。　If；　when　the　question　of　the　defendant's　negligence　is　left　to　a　jury；　negligence　does　not　mean　the　actual　state　of　the　defendant's　mind；　but　a　failure　to　act　as　a　prudent　man　of　average　intelligence　would　have　done；　he　is　required　to　conform　to　an　objective　standard　at　his　＇113＇　peril；　even　in　that　case。　When　a　more　exact　and　specific　rule　has　been　arrived　at；　he　must　obey　that　rule