the common law-第21章

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　said　about　their　falling　in；　ipso　invito；　that　is　no　plea；　but　he　ought　to　show　that　he　could　not　do　it　in　any　other　way；　or　that　he　did　all　in　his　power　to　keep　them　out〃；　and　both　the　judges　put　the　unlawfulness　of　the　entry　upon　the　plaintiff's　land　as　a　consequence　of　the　unlawfulness　of　dropping　the　thorns　there。　Choke　admits　that；　if　the　thorns　or　a　tree　had　been　blown　over　upon　the　plaintiff's　land；　the　defendant　might　have　entered　to　get　them。　Chief　Justice　Crew　says　of　this　case；　in　Millen　v。　Fawdry；　/2/　that　the　opinion　was　that　〃trespass　lies；　because　he　did　not　plead　that　he　did　his　best　endeavor　to　hinder　their　falling　there；　yet　this　was　a　hard　case。〃　The　statements　of　law　by　counsel　in　argument　may　be　left　on　one　side；　although　Brian　is　quoted　and　mistaken　for　one　of　the　judges　by　Sir　William　Blackstone；　in　Scott　v。　Shepherd。

The　principal　authorities　are　the　shooting　cases；　and；　as　shooting　is　an　extra…　hazardous　act；　it　would　not　be　surprising　if　it　should　be　held　that　men　do　it　at　their　peril　in　public　places。　The　liability　has　been　put　on　the　general　ground　of　fault；　however；　wherever　the　line　of　necessary　＇104＇　precaution　may　be　drawn。　In　Weaver　v。　Ward；　/1/　the　defendant　set　up　that　the　plaintiff　and　he　were　skirmishing　in　a　trainband；　and　that　when　discharging　his　piece　he　wounded　the　plaintiff　by　accident　and　misfortune；　and　against　his　own　will。　On　demurrer；　the　court　says　that　〃no　man　shall　be　excused　of　a　trespass；　。。。　except　it　may　be　judged　utterly　without　his　fault。　As　if　a　man　by　force　take　my　hand　and　strike　you；　or　if　here　the　defendant　had　said；　that　the　plaintiff　ran　cross　his　piece　when　it　was　discharging；　or　had　set　forth　the　case　with　the　circumstances　so　as　it　had　appeared　to　the　court　that　it　had　been　inevitable；　and　that　the　defendant　had　committed　no　negligence　to　give　occasion　to　the　hurt。〃　The　later　cases　simply　follow　Weaver　v。　Ward。

The　quotations　which　were　made　above　in　favor　of　the　strict　doctrine　from　Sir　T。　Raymond；　in　Bessey　v。　Olliot；　and　from　Sir　William　Blackstone；　in　Scott　v。　Shepherd；　are　both　taken　from　dissenting　opinions。　In　the　latter　case　it　is　pretty　clear　that　the　majority　of　the　court　considered　that　to　repel　personal　danger　by　instantaneously　tossing　away　a　squib　thrown　by　another　upon　one's　stall　was　not　a　trespass；　although　a　new　motion　was　thereby　imparted　to　the　squib；　and　the　plaintiff's　eye　was　put　out　in　consequence。　The　last　case　cited　above；　in　stating　the　arguments　for　absolute　responsibility；　was　Leame　v。　Bray。　/2/　The　question　under　discussion　was　whether　the　action　（for　running　down　the　plaintiff）　should　not　have　been　case　rather　than　trespass；　the　defendant　founding　his　objection　to　trespass　on　the　ground　that　the　injury　happened　through　his　neglect；　but　was　not　done　wilfully。　There　was　therefore　no　question　of　absolute　responsibility　for　one's　acts　＇105＇　before　the　court；　as　negligence　was　admitted；　and　the　language　used　is　all　directed　simply　to　the　proposition　that　the　damage　need　not　have　been　done　intentionally。

In　Wakeman　v。　Robinson；　/1/another　runaway　case；　there　was　evidence　that　the　defendant　pulled　the　wrong　rein；　and　that　he　ought　to　have　kept　a　straight　course。　The　jury　were　instructed　that；　if　the　injury　was　occasioned　by　an　immediate　act　of　the　defendant；　it　was　immaterial　whether　the　act　was　wilful　or　accidental。　On　motion　for　a　new　trial；　Dallas；　C。　J。　said；　〃If　the　accident　happened　entirely　without　default　on　the　part　of　the　defendant；　or　blame　imputable　to　him；　the　action　does　not　lie　。。。。The　accident　was　clearly　occasioned　by　the　default　of　the　defendant。　The　weight　of　evidence　was　all　that　way。　I　am　now　called　upon　to　grant　a　new　trial；　contrary　to　the　justice　of　the　case；　upon　the　ground；　that　the　jury　were　not　called　on　to　consider　whether　the　accident　was　unavoidable；　or　occasioned　by　the　fault　of　the　defendant。　There　can　be　no　doubt　that　the　learned　judge　who　presided　would　have　taken　the　opinion　of　the　jury　on　that　ground；　if　he　had　been　requested　so　to　do。〃　This　language　may　have　been　inapposite　under　the　defendant's　plea　（the　general　issue）；　but　the　pleadings　were　not　adverted　to；　and　the　doctrine　is　believed　to　be　sound。

In　America　there　have　been　several　decisions　to　the　point。　In　Brown　v。　Kendall；　/2/　Chief　Justice　Shaw　settled　the　question　for　Massachusetts。　That　was　trespass　for　assault　and　battery；　and　it　appeared　that　the　defendant；　while　trying　to　separate　two　fighting　dogs；　had　raised　his　stick　over　his　shoulder　in　the　act　of　striking；　and　had　accidentally　hit　the　plaintiff　in　the　eye；　inflicting　upon　him　a　＇106＇　severe　injury。　The　case　was　stronger　for　the　plaintiff　than　if　the　defendant　had　been　acting　in　self…defence；　but　the　court　held　that；　although　the　defendant　was　bound　by　no　duty　to　separate　the　dogs；　yet；　if　he　was　doing　a　lawful　act；　he　was　not　liable　unless　he　was　wanting　in　the　care　which　men　of　ordinary　prudence　would　use　under　the　circumstances；　and　that　the　burden　was　on　the　plaintiff　to　prove　the　want　of　such　care。

In　such　a　matter　no　authority　is　more　deserving　of　respect　than　that　of　Chief　Justice　Shaw；　for　the　strength　of　that　great　judge　lay　in　an　accurate　appreciation　of　the　requirements　of　the　community　whose　officer　he　was。　Some；　indeed　many；　English　judges　could　be　named　who　have　surpassed　him　in　accurate　technical　knowledge；　but　few　have　lived　who　were　his　equals　in　their　understanding　of　the　grounds　of　public　policy　to　which　all　laws　must　ultimately　be　referred。　It　was　this　which　made　him；　in　the　language　of　the　late　Judge　Curtis；　the　greatest　magistrate　which　this　country　has　produced。

Brown　v。　Kendall　has　been　followed　in　Connecticut；　/1/　in　a　case　where　a　man　fired　a　pistol；　in　lawful　self…defence　as　he　alleged；　and　hit　a　bystander。　The　court　was　strongly　of　opinion　that　the　defendant　was　not　answerable　on　the　general　principles　of　trespass；　unless　there　was　a　failure　to　use　such　care　as　was　practicable　under　the　circumstances。　The　foundation　of　liability　in　trespass　as　well　as　case　was　said　to　be　negligence。　The　Supreme　Court　of　the　United　States　has　given　the　sanction　of　its　approval　to　the　same　doctrine。　/2/　The　language　of　Harvey　v。　Dunlop　/3/　has　been　＇107＇　quoted；　and　there　is　a　case　in　Vermont　which　tends　in　the　same　direction。　/1/

Supposing　it　now　to　be　conceded　that　the　general　notion　upon　which　liability　to　an　action　is　founded　is　fault　or　blameworthiness　in　some　sense；　the　question　arises；　whether　it　is　so　in　the　sense　of　personal　moral　shortcoming；　as　would　practically　result　from　Austin's　teaching。　The　language　of　Rede；　J。；　which　has　been　quoted　from　the　Year　Book；　gives　a　sufficient　answer。〃　In　trespass　the　intent〃　（we　may　say　more　broadly；　the　defendant's　state　of　mind）　〃cannot　be　construed。〃　Suppose　that　a　defendant　were　allowed　to　testify　that；　before　acting；　he　considered　carefully　what　would　be　the　conduct　of　a　prudent　man　under　the　circumstances；　and；　having　formed　the　best　judgment　he　could；　acted　accordingly。　If　the　story　was　believed；　it　would　be　conclusive　against　the　defendant's　negligence　judged　by　a　moral　standard　which　would　take　his　personal　characteristics　into　account。　But　supposing　any　such　evidence　to　have　got　before　the　jury；　it　is　very　clear　that　the　court　would　say；　Gentlemen；　the　question　is　not　whether　the　defendant　thought　his　conduct　was　that　of　a　prudent　man；　but　whether　you　think　it　was。　/2/

Some　middle　point　must　be　found　between　the　horns　of　this　dilemma。

＇108　The　standards　of　the　law　are　standards　of　general　application。　The　law　takes　no　account　of　the　infinite　varieties　of　temperament；　intellect；　and　education　which　make　the　internal　character　of　a　given　act　so　different　in　different　men。　It　does　not　attempt　to　see　men　as　God　sees　them；　for　more　than　one　sufficient　reason。　In　the　first　place；　the　impossibility　of　nicely　measuring　a　man's　powers　and　limitations　is　far　clearer　than　that　of　ascertaining　his　knowledge　of　law；　which　has　been　thought　to　account　for　what　is　called　the　presumption　that　every　man　knows　the　law。　But　a　more　satisfactory　explanation　is；　that；　when　men　live　in　society；　a　certain　average　of　conduct；　a　sacrifice　of　individual　peculiarities　going　beyond　a　certain　point；　is　necessary　to　the　general　we