the common law-第19章

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But　there　is　no　difference　in　principle　between　the　case　where　a　natural　cause　or　physical　factor　intervenes　after　the　act　in　some　way　not　to　be　foreseen；　and　turns　what　seemed　innocent　to　harm；　and　the　case　where　such　a　cause　or　factor　intervenes；　unknown；　at　the　time；　as；　for　the　matter　of　that；　it　did　in　the　English　cases　cited。　If　a　man　is　excused　in　the　one　case　because　he　is　not　to　blame；　he　must　be　in　the　other。　The　difference　taken　in　Gibbons　v。　Pepper；　cited　above；　is　not　between　results　which　are　and　those　which　are　not　the　consequences　of　the　defendant's　acts：　it　is　between　consequences　which　he　was　bound　as　a　reasonable　man　to　contemplate；　and　those　which　he　was　not。　Hard　spurring　is　just　so　much　more　likely　to　lead　to　harm　than　merely　riding　a　horse　in　the　street；　that　the　court　thought　that　the　defendant　would　be　bound　to　look　out　for　the　consequences　of　the　one；　while　it　would　not　hold　him　liable　for　those　resulting　merely　from　the　other；　＇94＇　because　the　possibility　of　being　run　away　with　when　riding　quietly；　though　familiar；　is　comparatively　slight。　If；　however；　the　horse　had　been　unruly；　and　had　been　taken　into　a　frequented　place　for　the　purpose　of　being　broken；　the　owner　might　have　been　liable；　because　〃it　was　his　fault　to　bring　a　wild　horse　into　a　place　where　mischief　might　probably　be　done。〃

To　return　to　the　example　of　the　accidental　blow　with　a　stick　lifted　in　self…　defence；　there　is　no　difference　between　hitting　a　person　standing　in　one's　rear　and　hitting　one　who　was　pushed　by　a　horse　within　range　of　the　stick　just　as　it　was　lifted；　provided　that　it　was　not　possible；　under　the　circumstances；　in　the　one　case　to　have　known；　in　the　other　to　have　anticipated；　the　proximity。　In　either　case　there　is　wanting　the　only　element　which　distinguishes　voluntary　acts　from　spasmodic　muscular　contractions　as　a　ground　of　liability。　In　neither　of　them；　that　is　to　say；　has　there　been　an　opportunity　of　choice　with　reference　to　the　consequence　complained　of；a　chance　to　guard　against　the　result　which　has　come　to　pass。　A　choice　which　entails　a　concealed　consequence　is　as　to　that　consequence　no　choice。

The　general　principle　of　our　law　is　that　loss　from　accident　must　lie　where　it　falls；　and　this　principle　is　not　affected　by　the　fact　that　a　human　being　is　the　instrument　of　misfortune。　But　relatively　to　a　given　human　being　anything　is　accident　which　he　could　not　fairly　have　been　expected　to　contemplate　as　possible；　and　therefore　to　avoid。　In　the　language　of　the　late　Chief　Justice　Nelson　of　New　York：　〃No　case　or　principle　can　be　found；　or　if　found　can　be　maintained；　subjecting　an　individual　to　liability　for　＇95＇　an　act　done　without　fault　on　his　part　。。。。　All　the　cases　concede　that　an　injury　arising　from　inevitable　accident；　or；　which　in　law　or　reason　is　the　same　thing；　from　an　act　that　ordinary　human　care　and　foresight　are　unable　to　guard　against；　is　but　the　misfortune　of　the　sufferer；　and　lays　no　foundation　for　legal　responsibility。〃　/1/　If　this　were　not　so；　any　act　would　be　sufficient；　however　remote；　which　set　in　motion　or　opened　the　door　for　a　series　of　physical　sequences　ending　in　damage；　such　as　riding　the　horse；　in　the　case　of　the　runaway；　or　even　coming　to　a　place　where　one　is　seized　with　a　fit　and　strikes　the　plaintiff　in　an　unconscious　spasm。　Nay；　why　need　the　defendant　have　acted　at　all；　and　why　is　it　not　enough　that　his　existence　has　been　at　the　expense　of　the　plaintiff？　The　requirement　of　an　act　is　the　requirement　that　the　defendant　should　have　made　a　choice。　But　the　only　possible　purpose　of　introducing　this　moral　element　is　to　make　the　power　of　avoiding　the　evil　complained　of　a　condition　of　liability。　There　is　no　such　power　where　the　evil　cannot　be　foreseen。　/2/　Here　we　reach　the　argument　from　policy；　and　I　shall　accordingly　postpone　for　a　moment　the　discussion　of　trespasses　upon　land；　and　of　conversions；　and　will　take　up　the　liability　for　cattle　separately　at　a　later　stage。

A　man　need　not；　it　is　true；　do　this　or　that　act；　the　term　act　implies　a　choice；…　…but　he　must　act　somehow。　Furthermore；　the　public　generally　profits　by　individual　activity。　As　action　cannot　be　avoided；　and　tends　to　the　public　good；　there　is　obviously　no　policy　in　throwing　the　hazard　of　what　is　at　once　desirable　and　inevitable　upon　the　actor。　＇96＇　The　state　might　conceivably　make　itself　a　mutual　insurance　company　against　accidents；　and　distribute　the　burden　of　its　citizens'　mishaps　among　all　its　members。　There　might　be　a　pension　for　paralytics；　and　state　aid　for　those　who　suffered　in　person　or　estate　from　tempest　or　wild　beasts。　As　between　individuals　it　might　adopt　the　mutual　insurance　principle　pro　tanto；　and　divide　damages　when　both　were　in　fault；　as　in　the　rusticum　judicium　of　the　admiralty；　or　it　might　throw　all　loss　upon　the　actor　irrespective　of　fault。　The　state　does　none　of　these　things；　however；　and　the　prevailing　view　is　that　its　cumbrous　and　expensive　machinery　ought　not　to　be　set　in　motion　unless　some　clear　benefit　is　to　be　derived　from　disturbing　the　status　quo。　State　interference　is　an　evil；　where　it　cannot　be　shown　to　be　a　good。　Universal　insurance；　if　desired；　can　be　better　and　more　cheaply　accomplished　by　private　enterprise。　The　undertaking　to　redistribute　losses　simply　on　the　ground　that　they　resulted　from　the　defendant's　act　would　not　only　be　open　to　these　objections；　but；　as　it　is　hoped　the　preceding　discussion　has　shown；　to　the　still　graver　one　of　offending　the　sense　of　justice。　Unless　my　act　is　of　a　nature　to　threaten　others；　unless　under　the　circumstances　a　prudent　man　would　have　foreseen　the　possibility　of　harm；　it　is　no　more　justifiable　to　make　me　indemnify　my　neighbor　against　the　consequences；　than　to　make　me　do　the　same　thing　if　I　had　fallen　upon　him　in　a　fit；　or　to　compel　me　to　insure　him　against　lightning。

I　must　now　recur　to　the　conclusions　drawn　from　innocent　trespasses　upon　land；　and　conversions；　and　the　supposed　analogy　of　those　cases　to　trespasses　against　the　person；　lest　the　law　concerning　the　latter　should　be　supposed　to　lie　between　two　antinomies；　each　necessitating　with　equal　cogency　an　opposite　conclusion　to　the　other。

＇97＇　Take　first　the　case　of　trespass　upon　land　attended　by　actual　damage。　When　a　man　goes　upon　his　neighbor's　land；　thinking　it　is　his　own；　he　intends　the　very　act　or　consequence　complained　of。　He　means　to　intermeddle　with　a　certain　thing　in　a　certain　way；　and　it　is　just　that　intended　intermeddling　for　which　he　is　sued。　/1/　Whereas；　if　he　accidentally　hits　a　stranger　as　he　lifts　his　staff　in　self　defence；　the　fact；　which　is　the　gist　of　the　action；namely；　the　contact　between　the　staff　and　his　neighbor's　head；was　not　intended；　and　could　not　have　been　foreseen。　It　might　be　answered；　to　be　sure；　that　it　is　not　for　intermeddling　with　property；　but　for　intermeddling　with　the　plaintiff's　property；　that　a　man　is　sued；　and　that　in　the　supposed　cases；　just　as　much　as　in　that　of　the　accidental　blow；　the　defendant　is　ignorant　of　one　of　the　facts　making　up　the　total　environment；　and　which　must　be　present　to　make　his　action　wrong。　He　is　ignorant；　that　is　to　say；　that　the　true　owner　either　has　or　claims　any　interest　in　the　property　in　question；　and　therefore　he　does　not　intend　a　wrongful　act；　because　he　does　not　mean　to　deal　with　his　neighbor's　property。　But　the　answer　to　this　is；　that　he　does　intend　to　do　the　damage　complained　of。　One　who　diminishes　the　value　of　property　by　intentional　damage　knows　it　belongs　to　somebody。　If　he　thinks　it　belongs　to　himself；　he　expects　whatever　harm　he　may　do　to　come　out　of　his　own　pocket。　It　would　be　odd　if　he　were　to　get　rid　of　the　burden　by　discovering　that　it　belonged　to　his　neighbor。　It　is　a　very　different　thing　to　say　that　he　who　intentionally　does　harm　must　bear　the　loss；　from　saying　that　one　from　whose　acts　harm　follows　accidentally；　as　＇98＇　a　consequence　which　could　not　have　been　foreseen；　must　bear　it。

Next；　suppose　the　act　complained　of　is　an　exercise　of　dominion　over　the　plaintiff's　property；　such　as　a　merely　technical　trespass　or　a　conversion。　If　the　defendant　thought　that　the　property　belonged　to　himself；　there　seems　to　be　no　abstract　injustice　in　requiring　him　to　know　the　limits　of　his　own　titles；　or；　if　he　thought　that　it　belonged　to　another；　in　hold