the common law-第15章

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sible；　to　say　the　least；　that　even　in　such　a　case　the　intent　would　make　all　the　difference。　I　assume　that　the　act　was　without　excuse　and　wrongful；　and　that　it　would　have　amounted　to　larceny；　if　done　for　the　purpose　of　depriving　the　owner　of　his　horse。　Nevertheless；　if　it　was　done　for　the　sake　of　an　experiment；　and　without　actual　foresight　of　the　destruction；　or　evil　design　against　the　owner；　the　trespasser　might　not　be　held　a　thief。

The　inconsistency；　if　there　is　one；　seems　to　be　explained　by　the　way　in　which　the　law　has　grown。　The　distinctions　of　the　common　law　as　to　theft　are　not　those　of　a　broad　theory　of　legislation；　they　are　highly　technical；　and　very　largely　dependent　upon　history　for　explanation。　/1/

The　type　of　theft　is　taking　to　one's　own　user　It　used　to　be；　and　sometimes　still　is；　thought　that　the　taking　must　be　lucri　catesa；　for　the　sake　of　some　advantage　to　the　thief。　In　such　cases　the　owner　is　deprived　of　his　property　by　the　thief's　keeping　it；　not　by　its　destruction；　and　the　permanence　of　his　loss　can　only　be　judged　of　beforehand　by　the　intent　to　keep。　The　intent　is　therefore　always　necessary；　and　it　is　naturally　stated　in　the　form　of　a　self…regarding　intent。　It　was　an　advance　on　the　old　precedents　when　it　was　decided　that　the　intent　to　deprive　the　owner　of　his　property　was　sufficient。　As　late　as　1815　the　English　judges　stood　only　six　to　five　in　favor　of　the　proposition　＇74＇　that　it　was　larceny　to　take　a　horse　intending　to　kill　it　for　no　other　purpose　than　to　destroy　evidence　against　a　friend。　/1/　Even　that　case；　however；　did　not　do　away　with　the　universality　of　intent　as　a　test；　for　the　destruction　followed　the　taking；　and　it　is　an　ancient　rule　that　the　criminality　of　the　act　must　be　determined　by　the　state　of　things　at　the　time　of　the　taking；　and　not　afterwards。　Whether　the　law　of　larceny　would　follow　what　seems　to　be　the　general　principle　of　criminal　law；　or　would　be　held　back　by　tradition；　could　only　be　decided　by　a　case　like　that　supposed　above；　where　the　same　act　accomplishes　both　taking　and　destruction。　As　has　been　suggested　already；　tradition　might　very　possibly　prevail。

Another　crime　in　which　the　peculiarities　noticed　in　larceny　are　still　more　clearly　marked；　and　at　the　same　time　more　easily　explained；　is　burglary。　It　is　defined　as　breaking　and　entering　any　dwelling…house　by　night　with　intent　to　commit　a　felony　therein。　/2/　The　object　of　punishing　such　a　breaking　and　entering　is　not　to　prevent　trespasses；　even　when　committed　by　night；　but　only　such　trespasses　as　are　the　first　step　to　wrongs　of　a　greater　magnitude；　like　robbery　or　murder。　/3/　In　this　case　the　function　of　intent　when　proved　appears　more　clearly　than　in　theft；　but　it　is　precisely　similar。　It　is　an　index　to　the　probability　of　certain　future　acts　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent。　And　here　the　law　gives　evidence　that　this　is　the　true　explanation。　For　if　the　apprehended　act　did　follow；　then　it　is　no　longer　necessary　to　allege　that　the　breaking　and　entering　was　with　that　intent。　An　indictment　for　burglary　which　charges　that　＇75＇　the　defendant　broke　into　a　dwelling…house　and　stole　certain　property；　is　just　as　good　as　one　which　alleges　that　he　broke　in　with　intent　to　steal。　/1/

It　is　believed　that　enough　has　now　been　said　to　explain　the　general　theory　of　criminal　liability；　as　it　stands　at　common　law。　The　result　may　be　summed　up　as　follows。　All　acts　are　indifferent　per　se。

In　the　characteristic　type　of　substantive　crime　acts　are　rendered　criminal　because　they　are　done　finder　circumstances　in　which　they　will　probably　cause　some　harm　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent。

The　test　of　criminality　in　such　cases　is　the　degree　of　danger　shown　by　experience　to　attend　that　act　under　those　circumstances。

In　such　cases　the　mens　rea；　or　actual　wickedness　of　the　party；　is　wholly　unnecessary；　and　all　reference　to　the　state　of　his　consciousness　is　misleading　if　it　means　anything　more　than　that　the　circumstances　in　connection　with　which　the　tendency　of　his　act　is　judged　are　the　circumstances　known　to　him。　Even　the　requirement　of　knowledge　is　subject　to　certain　limitations。　A　man　must　find　out　at　his　peril　things　which　a　reasonable　and　prudent　man　would　have　inferred　from　the　things　actually　known。　In　some　cases；　especially　of　statutory　crimes；　he　must　go　even　further；　and；　when　he　knows　certain　facts；　must　find　out　at　his　peril　whether　the　other　facts　are　present　which　would　make　the　act　criminal。　A　man　who　abducts　a　girl　from　her　parents　in　England　must　find　out　at　his　peril　whether　she　is　under　sixteen。

＇76＇　In　some　cases　it　may　be　that　the　consequence　of　the　act；　under　the　circumstances；　must　be　actually　foreseen；　if　it　is　a　consequence　which　a　prudent　man　would　not　have　foreseen。　The　reference　to　the　prudent　man；　as　a　standard；　is　the　only　form　in　which　blameworthiness　as　such　is　an　element　of　crime；　and　what　would　be　blameworthy　in　such　a　man　is　an　element；first；　as　a　survival　of　true　moral　standards；　second；　because　to　punish　what　would　not　be　blameworthy　in　an　average　member　of　the　community　would　be　to　enforce　a　standard　which　was　indefensible　theoretically；　and　which　practically　was　too　high　for　that　community。

In　some　cases；　actual　malice　or　intent；　in　the　common　meaning　of　those　words；　is　an　element　in　crime。　But　it　will　be　found　that；　when　it　is　so；　it　is　because　the　act　when　done　maliciously　is　followed　by　harm　which　would　not　have　followed　the　act　alone；　or　because　the　intent　raises　a　strong　probability　that　ail　act；　innocent　in　itself；　will　be　followed　by　other　acts　or　events　in　connection　with　which　it　will　accomplish　the　result　sought　to　be　prevented　by　the　law。

LECTURE　III。

TORTS。　　TRESPASS　AND　NEGLIGENCE。

The　object　of　the　next　two　Lectures　is　to　discover　whether　there　is　any　common　ground　at　the　bottom　of　all　liability　in　tort；　and　if　so；　what　that　ground　is。　Supposing　the　attempt　to　succeed；　it　will　reveal　the　general　principle　of　civil　liability　at　common　law。　The　liabilities　incurred　by　way　of　contract　are　more　or　less　expressly　fixed　by　the　agreement　of　the　parties　concerned；　but　those　arising　from　a　tort　are　independent　of　any　previous　consent　of　the　wrong…doer　to　bear　the　loss　occasioned　by　his　act。　If　A　fails　to　pay　a　certain　sum　on　a　certain　day；　or　to　deliver　a　lecture　on　a　certain　night；　after　having　made　a　binding　promise　to　do　so；　the　damages　which　he　has　to　pay　are　recovered　in　accordance　with　his　consent　that　some　or　all　of　the　harms　which　may　be　caused　by　his　failure　shall　fall　upon　him。　But　when　A　assaults　or　slanders　his　neighbor；　or　converts　his　neighbor's　property；　he　does　a　harm　which　he　has　never　consented　to　bear；　and　if　the　law　makes　him　pay　for　it；　the　reason　for　doing　so　must　be　found　in　some　general　view　of　the　conduct　which　every　one　may　fairly　expect　and　demand　from　every　other；　whether　that　other　has　agreed　to　it　or　not。

Such　a　general　view　is　very　hard　to　find。　The　law　did　not　begin　with　a　theory。　It　has　never　worked　one　out。　The　point　from　which　it　started　and　that　at　which　I　shall　＇78＇　try　to　show　that　it　has　arrived；　are　on　different　planes。　In　the　progress　from　one　to　the　other；　it　is　to　be　expected　that　its　course　should　not　be　straight　and　its　direction　not　always　visible。　All　that　can　be　done　is　to　point　out　a　tendency；　and　to　justify　it。　The　tendency；　which　is　our　main　concern；　is　a　matter　of　fact　to　be　gathered　from　the　cases。　But　the　difficulty　of　showing　it　is　much　enhanced　by　the　circumstance　that；　until　lately；　the　substantive　law　has　been　approached　only　through　the　categories　of　the　forms　of　action。　Discussions　of　legislative　principle　have　been　darkened　by　arguments　on　the　limits　between　trespass　and　case；　or　on　the　scope　of　a　general　issue。　In　place　of　a　theory　of　tort；　we　have　a　theory　of　trespass。　And　even　within　that　narrower　limit；　precedents　of　the　time　of　the　assize　and　jurata　have　been　applied　without　a　thought　of　their　connection　with　a　long　forgotten

procedure。

Since　the　ancient　forms　of　action　have　disappeared；　a　broader　treatment　of　the　subject　ought　to　be　possible。　Ignorance　is　the　best　of　law　reformers。　People　are　glad　to　discuss　a　question　on　general　principles；　when　they　have　forgotten　the　special　knowledge　necessary　for　technical　reasoning。　But　the　pres