the common law-第14章

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ve　who　ran　after　a　white　woman；　but　desisted　before　he　caught　her；　has　been　convicted　of　an　attempt　to　commit　rape。　/1/　We　have　seen　what　amounts　to　an　attempt　to　burn　a　haystack；　but　it　was　said　in　the　same　case；　that；　if　the　defendant　had　gone　no　further　than　to　buy　a　box　of　matches　for　the　purpose；　he　would　not　have　been　liable。

Eminent　judges　have　been　puzzled　where　to　draw　the　line；　or　even　to　state　the　principle　on　which　it　should　be　drawn；　between　the　two　sets　of　cases。　But　the　principle　is　believed　to　be　similar　to　that　on　which　all　other　lines　are　drawn　by　the　law。　Public　policy；　that　is　to　say；　legislative　considerations；　are　at　the　bottom　of　the　matter；　the　considerations　being；　in　this　case；　the　nearness　of　the　danger；　the　greatness　of　the　harm；　and　the　degree　of　apprehension　felt。　When　a　man　buys　matches　to　fire　a　haystack；　or　starts　on　a　journey　meaning　to　murder　at　the　end　of　it；　there　is　still　a　considerable　chance　that　he　will　＇69＇　change　his　mind　before　he　comes　to　the　point。　But　when　he　has　struck　the　match；　or　cocked　and　aimed　the　pistol；　there　is　very　little　chance　that　he　will　not　persist　to　the　end；　and　the　danger　becomes　so　great　that　the　law　steps　in。　With　an　object　which　could　not　be　used　innocently；　the　point　of　intervention　might　be　put　further　back；　as　in　the　case　of　the　purchase　of　a　die　for　coining。

The　degree　of　apprehension　may　affect　the　decision；　as　well　as　the　degree　of　probability　that　the　crime　will　be　accomplished。　No　doubt　the　fears　peculiar　to　a　slaveowning　community　had　their　share　in　the　conviction　which　has　just　been　mentioned。

There　is　one　doubtful　point　which　should　not　be　passed　over。　It　has　been　thought　that　to　shoot　at　a　block　of　wood　thinking　it　to　be　a　man　is　not　an　attempt　to　murder；　/1/　and　that　to　put　a　hand　into　an　empty　pocket；　intending　to　pick　it；　is　not　an　attempt　to　commit　larceny；　although　on　the　latter　question　there　is　a　difference　of　opinion。　/2/　The　reason　given　is；　that　an　act　which　could　not　have　effected　the　crime　if　the　actor　had　been　allowed　to　follow　it　up　to　all　results　to　which　in　the　nature　of　things　it　could　have　led；　cannot　be　an　attempt　to　commit　that　crime　when　interrupted。　At　some　point　or　other；　of　course；　the　law　must　adopt　this　conclusion；　unless　it　goes　on　the　theory　of　retribution　for　guilt；　and　not　of　prevention　of　harm。

But　even　to　prevent　harm　effectually　it　will　not　do　to　be　too　exact。　I　do　not　suppose　that　firing　a　pistol　at　a　man　with　intent　to　kill　him　is　any　the　less　an　attempt　to　murder　because　the　bullet　misses　its　aim。　Yet　there　the　act　has　produced　the　whole　effect　possible　to　it　in　the　＇7O＇　course　of　nature。　It　is　just　as　impossible　that　that　bullet　under　those　circumstances　should　hit　that　man；　as　to　pick　an　empty　pocket。　But　there　is　no　difficulty　in　saying　that　such　an　act　under　such　circumstances　is　so　dangerous；　so　far　as　the　possibility　of　human　foresight　is　concerned；　that　it　should　be　punished。　No　one　can　absolutely　know；　though　many　would　be　pretty　sure；　exactly　where　the　bullet　will　strike；　and　if　the　harm　is　done；　it　is　a　very　great　harm。　If　a　man　fires　at　a　block；　no　harm　can　possibly　ensue；　and　no　theft　can　be　committed　in　an　empty　pocket；　besides　that　the　harm　of　successful　theft　is　less　than　that　of　murder。　Yet　it　might　be　said　that　even　such　things　as　these　should　be　punished；　in　order　to　make　discouragement　broad　enough　and　easy　to　understand。

There　remain　to　be　considered　certain　substantive　crimes；　which　differ　in　very　important　ways　from　murder　and　the　like；　and　for　the　explanation　of　which　the　foregoing　analysis　of　intent　in　criminal　attempts　and　analogous　misdemeanors　will　be　found　of　service。

The　type　of　these　is　larceny。　Under　this　name　acts　are　punished　which　of　themselves　would　not　be　sufficient　to　accomplish　the　evil　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent；　and　which　are　treated　as　equally　criminal；　whether　the　evil　has　been　accomplished　or　not。　Murder；　manslaughter；　and　arson；　on　the　other　hand；　are　not　committed　unless　the　evil　is　accomplished；　and　they　all　consist　of　acts　the　tendency　of　which　under　the　surrounding　circumstances　is　to　hurt　or　destroy　person　or　property　by　the　mere　working　of　natural　laws。

In　larceny　the　consequences　immediately　flowing　from　the　act　are　generally　exhausted　with　little　or　no　harm　to　the　owner。　Goods　are　removed　from　his　possession　by　＇71＇　trespass；　and　that　is　all；　when　the　crime　is　complete。　But　they　must　be　permanently　kept　from　him　before　the　harm　is　done　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent。　A　momentary　loss　of　possession　is　not　what　has　been　guarded　against　with　such　severe　penalties。　What　the　law　means　to　prevent　is　the　loss　of　it　wholly　and　forever；　as　is　shown　by　the　fact　that　it　is　not　larceny　to　take　for　a　temporary　use　without　intending　to　deprive　the　owner　of　his　property。　If　then　the　law　punishes　the　mere　act　of　taking；　it　punishes　an　act　which　will　not　of　itself　produce　the　evil　effect　sought　to　be　prevented；　and　punishes　it　before　that　effect　has　in　any　way　come　to　pass。

The　reason　is　plain　enough。　The　law　cannot　wait　until　the　property　has　been　used　up　or　destroyed　in　other　hands　than　the　owner's；　or　until　the　owner　has　died；　in　order　to　make　sure　that　the　harm　which　it　seeks　to　prevent　has　been　done。　And　for　the　same　reason　it　cannot　confine　itself　to　acts　likely　to　do　that　harm。　For　the　harm　of　permanent　loss　of　property　will　not　follow　from　the　act　of　taking；　but　only　from　the　series　of　acts　which　constitute　removing　and　keeping　the　property　after　it　has　been　taken。　After　these　preliminaries；　the　bearing　of　intent　upon　the　crime　is　easily　seen。

According　to　Mr。　Bishop；　larceny　is　〃the　taking　and　removing；　by　trespass；　of　personal　property　which　the　trespasser　knows　to　belong　either　generally　or　specially　to　another；　with　the　intent　to　deprive　such　owner　of　his　ownership　therein；　and　perhaps　it　should　be　added；　for　the　sake　of　some　advantage　to　the　trespasser；　a　proposition　on　which　the　decisions　are　not　harmonious。〃　/1/

There　must　be　an　intent　to　deprive　such　owner　of　his　＇72＇　ownership　therein；　it　is　said。　But　why？　Is　it　because　the　law　is　more　anxious　not　to　put　a　man　in　prison　for　stealing　unless　he　is　actually　wicked；　than　it　is　not　to　hang　him　for　killing　another？　That　can　hardly　be。　The　true　answer　is；　that　the　intent　is　an　index　to　the　external　event　which　probably　would　have　happened；　and　that；　if　the　law　is　to　punish　at　all；　it　must；　in　this　case；　go　on　probabilities；　not　on　accomplished　facts。　The　analogy　to　the　manner　of　dealing　with　attempts　is　plain。　Theft　may　be　called　an　attempt　to　permanently　deprive　a　man　of　his　property；　which　is　punished　with　the　same　severity　whether　successful　or　not。　If　theft　can　rightly　be　considered　in　this　way；　intent　must　play　the　same　part　as　in　other　attempts。　An　act　which　does　not　fully　accomplish　the　prohibited　result　may　be　made　wrongful　by　evidence　that　but　for　some　interference　it　would　have　been　followed　by　other　acts　co…ordinated　with　it　to　produce　that　result。　This　can　only　be　shown　by　showing　intent。　In　theft　the　intent　to　deprive　the　owner　of　his　property　establishes　that　the　thief　would　have　retained；　or　would　not　have　taken　steps　to　restore；　the　stolen　goods。　Nor　would　it　matter　that　the　thief　afterwards　changed　his　mind　and　returned　the　goods。　From　the　point　of　view　of　attempt；　the　crime　was　already　complete　when　the　property　was　carried　off。

It　may　be　objected　to　this　view；　that；　if　intent　is　only　a　makeshift　which　from　a　practical　necessity　takes　the　place　of　actual　deprivation；　it　ought　not　to　be　required　where　the　actual　deprivation　is　wholly　accomplished；　provided　the　same　criminal　act　produces　the　whole　effect。　Suppose；　for　instance；　that　by　one　and　the　same　motion　a　man　seizes　and　backs　another's　horse　over　a　precipice。　The　whole　evil　which　the　law　seeks　to　prevent　is　the　natural　and　manifestly　＇73＇　certain　consequence　of　the　act　under　the　known　circumstances。　In　such　a　case；　if　the　law　of　larceny　is　consistent　with　the　theories　here　maintained；　the　act　should　be　passed　upon　according　to　its　tendency；　and　the　actual　intent　of　the　wrong…doer　not　in　any　way　considered。　Yet　it　is　possible；　to　say　the　least；　that　even　in　such　a　case　the　intent　would　make　all　the　difference。　I　assume