the common law-第13章

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property；　or　the　thing　itself；　if　living；　as　an　end；　and　for　the　sake　of　the　harm。　Malice　in　this　sense　has　nothing　in　common　with　the　malice　of　murder。

Statutory　law　need　not　profess　to　be　consistent　with　itself；　or　with　the　theory　adopted　by　judicial　decisions。　Hence　there　is　strictly　no　need　to　reconcile　such　a　statute　with　the　principles　which　have　been　explained。　But　there　is　no　inconsistency。　Although　punishment　must　be　confined　to　compelling　external　conformity　to　a　rule　of　conduct；　so　far　that　it　can　always　be　avoided　by　avoiding　or　doing　certain　acts　as　required；　with　whatever　intent　or　for　whatever　motive；　still　the　prohibited　conduct　may　not　be　hurtful　unless　it　is　accompanied　by　a　particular　state　of　feeling。

Common　disputes　about　property　are　satisfactorily　settled　by　compensation。　But　every　one　knows　that　sometimes　secret　harm　is　done　by　neighbor　to　neighbor　out　of　＇64＇　pure　malice　and　spite。　The　damage　can　be　paid　for；　but　the　malignity　calls　for　revenge；　and　the　difficulty　of　detecting　the　authors　of　such　wrongs；　which　are　always　done　secretly；　affords　a　ground　for　punishment；　even　if　revenge　is　thought　insufficient。

How　far　the　law　will　go　in　this　direction　it　is　hard　to　say。　The　crime　of　arson　is　defined　to　be　the　malicious　and　wilful　burning　of　the　house　of　another　man；　and　is　generally　discussed　in　close　connection　with　malicious　mischief。　It　has　been　thought　that　the　burning　was　not　malicious　where　a　prisoner　set　fire　to　his　prison；　not　from　a　desire　to　consume　the　building；　but　solely　to　effect　his　escape。　But　it　seems　to　be　the　better　opinion　that　this　is　arson；　/1/　in　which　case　an　intentional　burning　is　malicious　within　the　meaning　of　the　rule。　When　we　remember　that　arson　was　the　subject　of　one　of　the　old　appeals　which　take　us　far　back　into　the　early　law；　/2/　we　may　readily　understand　that　only　intentional　burnings　were　redressed　in　that　way。　/3/　The　appeal　of　arson　was　brother　to　the　appeal　de　pace　et　plagis。　As　the　latter　was　founded　on　a　warlike　assault；　the　former　supposed　a　house…firing　for　robbery　or　revenge；　/4/　such　as　that　by　which　Njal　perished　in　the　Icelandic　Saga。　But　this　crime　seems　to　have　had　the　same　history　as　others。　As　soon　as　intent　is　admitted　to　be　sufficient；　the　law　is　on　the　high…road　to　an　external　standard。　A　man　who　intentionally　sets　fire　to　his　own　house；　which　is　so　near　to　other　houses　that　the　fire　will　manifestly　endanger　them；　is　guilty　of　arson　if　one　of　the　other　houses　is　burned　in　consequence。　/5/　In　this　case；　an　act　which　would　not　＇65＇　have　been　arson；　taking　only　its　immediate　consequences　into　account；　becomes　arson　by　reason　of　more　remote　consequences　which　were　manifestly　likely　to　follow；　whether　they　were　actually　intended　or　not。　If　that　may　be　the　effect　of　setting　fire　to　things　which　a　man　has　a　right　to　burn；　so　far　as　they　alone　are　concerned；　why；　on　principle；　should　it　not　be　the　effect　of　any　other　act　which　is　equally　likely　under　the　surrounding　circumstances　to　cause　the　same　harm。　/1/　Cases　may　easily　be　imagined　where　firing　a　gun；　or　making　a　chemical　mixture；　or　piling　up　oiled　rags；　or　twenty　other　things；　might　be　manifestly　dangerous　in　the　highest　degree　and　actually　lead　to　a　conflagration。　If；　in　such　cases；　the　crime　is　held　to　have　been　committed；　an　external　standard　is　reached；　and　the　analysis　which　has　been　made　of　murder　applies　here。

There　is　another　class　of　cases　in　which　intent　plays　an　important　part；　for　quite　different　reasons　from　those　which　have　been　offered　to　account　for　the　law　of　malicious　mischief。　The　most　obvious　examples　of　this　class　are　criminal　attempts。　Attempt　and　intent；　of　course；　are　two　distinct　things。　Intent　to　commit　a　crime　is　not　itself　criminal。　There　is　no　law　against　a　man's　intending　to　commit　a　murder　the　day　after　tomorrow。　The　law　only　deals　with　conduct。　An　attempt　is　an　overt　act。　It　differs　from　the　attempted　crime　in　this；　that　the　act　has　failed　to　bring　about　the　result　which　would　have　given　it　the　character　of　the　principal　crime。　If　an　attempt　to　murder　results　in　death　within　a　year　and　a　day；　it　is　murder。　If　an　attempt　to　steal　results　in　carrying　off　the　owner's　goods；　it　is　larceny。

If　an　act　is　done　of　which　the　natural　and　probable　＇66＇　effect　under　the　circumstances　is　the　accomplishment　of　a　substantive　crime；　the　criminal　law；　while　it　may　properly　enough　moderate　the　severity　of　punishment　if　the　act　has　not　that　effect　in　the　particular　case；　can　hardly　abstain　altogether　from　punishing　it；　on　any　theory。　It　has　been　argued　that　an　actual　intent　is　all　that　can　give　the　act　a　criminal　character　in　such　instances。　/1/　But　if　the　views　which　I　have　advanced　as　to　murder　and　manslaughter　are　sound；　the　same　principles　ought　logically　to　determine　the　criminality　of　acts　in　general。　Acts　should　be　judged　by　their　tendency　under　the　known　circumstances；　not　by　the　actual　intent　which　accompanies　them。

It　may　be　true　that　in　the　region　of　attempts；　as　elsewhere；　the　law　began　with　cases　of　actual　intent；　as　those　cases　are　the　most　obvious　ones。　But　it　cannot　stop　with　them；　unless　it　attaches　more　importance　to　the　etymological　meaning　of　the　word　attempt　than　to　the　general　principles　of　punishment。　Accordingly　there　is　at　least　color　of　authority　for　the　proposition　that　an　act　is　punishable　as　an　attempt；　if；　supposing　it　to　have　produced　its　natural　and　probable　effect；　it　would　have　amounted　to　a　substantive　crime。　/2/

But　such　acts　are　not　the　only　punishable　attempts。　There　is　another　class　in　which　actual　intent　is　clearly　necessary；　and　the　existence　of　this　class　as　well　as　the　name　（attempt）　no　doubt　tends　to　affect　the　whole　doctrine。　Some　acts　may　be　attempts　or　misdemeanors　which　＇67＇　could　not　have　effected　the　crime　unless　followed　by　other　acts　on　the　part　of　the　wrong…doer。　For　instance；　lighting　a　match　with　intent　to　set　fire　to　a　haystack　has　been　held　to　amount　to　a　criminal　attempt　to　burn　it；　although　the　defendant　blew　out　the　match　on　seeing　that　he　was　watched。　/1/　So　the　purchase　of　dies　for　making　counterfeit　coin　is　a　misdemeanor；　although　of　course　the　coin　would　not　be　counterfeited　unless　the　dies　were　used。　/2/

In　such　cases　the　law　goes　on　a　new　principle；　different　from　that　governing　most　substantive　crimes。　The　reason　for　punishing　any　act　must　generally　be　to　prevent　some　harm　which　is　foreseen　as　likely　to　follow　that　act　under　the　circumstances　in　which　it　is　done。　In　most　substantive　crimes　the　ground　on　which　that　likelihood　stands　is　the　common　working　of　natural　causes　as　shown　by　experience。　But　when　an　act　is　punished　the　natural　effect　of　which　is　not　harmful　under　the　circumstances；　that　ground　alone　will　not　suffice。　The　probability　does　not　exist　unless　there　are　grounds　for　expecting　that　the　act　done　will　be　followed　by　other　acts　in　connection　with　which　its　effect　will　be　harmful；　although　not　so　otherwise。　But　as　in　fact　no　such　acts　have　followed；　it　cannot；　in　general；　be　assumed；　from　the　mere　doing　of　what　has　been　done；　that　they　would　have　followed　if　the　actor　had　not　been　interrupted。　They　would　not　have　followed　it　unless　the　actor　had　chosen；　and　the　only　way　generally　available　to　show　that　he　would　have　chosen　to　do　them　is　by　showing　that　he　intended　to　do　them　when　he　did　what　he　did。　The　accompanying　intent　in　that　case　renders　the　otherwise　＇68＇　innocent　act　harmful；　because　it　raises　a　probability　that　it　will　be　followed　by　such　other　acts　and　events　as　will　all　together　result　in　harm。　The　importance　of　the　intent　is　not　to　show　that　the　act　was　wicked；　but　to　show　that　it　was　likely　to　be　followed　by　hurtful　consequences。

It　will　be　readily　seen　that　there　are　limits　to　this　kind　of　liability。　The　law　does　not　punish　every　act　which　is　done　with　the　intent　to　bring　about　a　crime。　If　a　man　starts　from　Boston　to　Cambridge　for　the　purpose　of　committing　a　murder　when　he　gets　there；　but　is　stopped　by　the　draw　and　goes　home；　he　is　no　more　punishable　than　if　he　had　sat　in　his　chair　and　resolved　to　shoot　somebody；　but　on　second　thoughts　had　given　up　the　notion。　On　the　other　hand；　a　slave　who　ran　after　a　white　woman；　but　desisted　before　he　caught　her；　has　been　convicted　of　an　attempt