the common law-第11章

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　guilty　party　would　have　been　very　glad　to　have　a　stranger　find　the　child　and　save　it。　/2/

But　again；　What　is　foresight　of　consequences？　It　is　a　picture　of　a　future　state　of　things　called　up　by　knowledge　of　the　present　state　of　things；　the　future　being　viewed　as　standing　to　the　present　in　the　relation　of　effect　to　cause。　Again；　we　must　seek　a　reduction　to　lower　terms。　If　the　known　present　state　of　things　is　such　that　the　act　done　will　very　certainly　cause　death；　and　the　probability　is　a　matter　of　common　knowledge；　one　who　does　the　act；　＇54＇　knowing　the　present　state　of　things；　is　guilty　of　murder；　and　the　law　will　not　inquire　whether　he　did　actually　foresee　the　consequences　or　not。　The　test　of　foresight　is　not　what　this　very　criminal　foresaw；　but　what　a　man　of　reasonable　prudence　would　have　foreseen。

On　the　other　hand；　there　must　be　actual　present　knowledge　of　the　present　facts　which　make　an　act　dangerous。　The　act　is　not　enough　by　itself。　An　act；　it　is　true；　imports　intention　in　a　certain　sense。　It　is　a　muscular　contraction；　and　something　more。　A　spasm　is　not　an　act。　The　contraction　of　the　muscles　must　be　willed。　And　as　an　adult　who　is　master　of　himself　foresees　with　mysterious　accuracy　the　outward　adjustment　which　will　follow　his　inward　effort；　that　adjustment　may　be　said　to　be　intended。　But　the　intent　necessarily　accompanying　the　act　ends　there。　Nothing　would　follow　from　the　act　except　for　the　environment。　All　acts；　taken　apart　from　their　surrounding　circumstances；　are　indifferent　to　the　law。　For　instance；　to　crook　the　forefinger　with　a　certain　force　is　the　same　act　whether　the　trigger　of　a　pistol　is　next　to　it　or　not。　It　is　only　the　surrounding　circumstances　of　a　pistol　loaded　and　cocked；　and　of　a　human　being　in　such　relation　to　it；　as　to　be　manifestly　likely　to　be　hit；　that　make　the　act　a　wrong。　Hence；　it　is　no　sufficient　foundation　for　liability；　on　any　sound　principle；　that　the　proximate　cause　of　loss　was　an　act。

The　reason　for　requiring　an　act　is；　that　an　act　implies　a　choice；　and　that　it　is　felt　to　be　impolitic　and　unjust　to　make　a　man　answerable　for　harm；　unless　he　might　have　chosen　otherwise。　But　the　choice　must　be　made　with　a　chance　of　contemplating　the　consequence　complained　of；　or　else　it　has　no　bearing　on　responsibility　for　that　consequence。　＇55＇　If　this　were　not　true；　a　man　might　be　held　answerable　for　everything　which　would　not　have　happened　but　for　his　choice　at　some　past　time。　For　instance；　for　having　in　a　fit　fallen　on　a　man；　which　he　would　not　have　done　had　he　not　chosen　to　come　to　the　city　where　he　was　taken　ill。

All　foresight　of　the　future；　all　choice　with　regard　to　any　possible　consequence　of　action；　depends　on　what　is　known　at　the　moment　of　choosing。　An　act　cannot　be　wrong；　even　when　done　under　circumstances　in　which　it　will　be　hurtful；　unless　those　circumstances　are　or　ought　to　be　known。　A　fear　of　punishment　for　causing　harm　cannot　work　as　a　motive；　unless　the　possibility　of　harm　may　be　foreseen。　So　far；　then；　as　criminal　liability　is　founded　upon　wrong…doing　in　any　sense；　and　so　far　as　the　threats　and　punishments　of　the　law　are　intended　to　deter　men　from　bringing　about　various　harmful　results；　they　must　be　confined　to　cases　where　circumstances　making　the　conduct　dangerous　were　known。

Still；　in　a　more　limited　way；　the　same　principle　applies　to　knowledge　that　applies　to　foresight。　It　is　enough　that　such　circumstances　were　actually　known　as　would　have　led　a　man　of　common　understanding　to　infer　from　them　the　rest　of　the　group　making　up　the　present　state　of　things。　For　instance；　if　a　workman　on　a　house…top　at　mid…day　knows　that　the　space　below　him　is　a　street　in　a　great　city；　he　knows　facts　from　which　a　man　of　common　understanding　would　infer　that　there　were　people　passing　below。　He　is　therefore　bound　to　draw　that　inference；　or；　in　other　words；　is　chargeable　with　knowledge　of　that　fact　also；　whether　he　draws　the　inference　or　not。　If　then；　he　throws　down　a　heavy　beam　into　the　street；　he　does　an　act　＇56＇　which　a　person　of　ordinary　prudence　would　foresee　is　likely　to　cause　death；　or　grievous　bodily　harm；　and　he　is　dealt　with　as　if　he　foresaw　it；　whether　he　does　so　in　fact　or　not。　If　a　death　is　caused　by　the　act；　he　is　guilty　of　murder。　/1/　But　if　the　workman　has　reasonable　cause　to　believe　that　the　space　below　is　a　private　yard　from　which　every　one　is　excluded；　and　which　is　used　as　a　rubbish　heap；　his　act　is　not　blameworthy；　and　the　homicide　is　a　mere　misadventure。

To　make　an　act　which　causes　death　murder；　then；　the　actor　ought；　on　principle；　to　know；　or　have　notice　of　the　facts　which　make　the　act　dangerous。　There　are　certain　exceptions　to　this　principle　which　will　be　stated　presently；　but　they　have　less　application　to　murder　than　to　some　smaller　statutory　crimes。　The　general　rule　prevails　for　the　most　part　in　murder。

But　furthermore；　on　the　same　principle；　the　danger　which　in　fact　exists　under　the　known　circumstances　ought　to　be　of　a　class　which　a　man　of　reasonable　prudence　could　foresee。　Ignorance　of　a　fact　and　inability　to　foresee　a　consequence　have　the　same　effect　on　blameworthiness。　If　a　consequence　cannot　be　foreseen；　it　cannot　be　avoided。　But　there　is　this　practical　difference；　that　whereas；　in　most　cases；　the　question　of　knowledge　is　a　question　of　the　actual　condition　of　the　defendant's　consciousness；　the　question　of　what　he　might　have　foreseen　is　determined　by　the　standard　of　the　prudent　man；　that　is；　by　general　experience。　For　it　is　to　be　remembered　that　the　object　of　the　law　is　to　prevent　human　life　being　endangered　or　taken；　and　that；　although　it　so　far　considers　blameworthiness　in　punishing　as　not　to　hold　a　man　responsible　for　consequences　which　＇57＇　no　one；　or　only　some　exceptional　specialist；　could　have　foreseen；　still　the　reason　for　this　limitation　is　simply　to　make　a　rule　which　is　not　too　hard　for　the　average　member　of　the　community。　As　the　purpose　is　to　compel　men　to　abstain　from　dangerous　conduct；　and　not　merely　to　restrain　them　from　evil　inclinations；　the　law　requires　them　at　their　peril　to　know　the　teachings　of　common　experience；　just　as　it　requires　them　to　know　the　law。　Subject　to　these　explanations；　it　may　be　said　that　the　test　of　murder　is　the　degree　of　danger　to　life　attending　the　act　under　the　known　circumstances　of　the　case。　/1/

It　needs　no　further　explanation　to　show　that；　when　the　particular　defendant　does　for　any　reason　foresee　what　an　ordinary　man　of　reasonable　prudence　would　not　have　foreseen；　the　ground　of　exemption　no　longer　applies。　A　harmful　act　is　only　excused　on　the　ground　that　the　party　neither　did　foresee；　nor　could　with　proper　care　have　foreseen　harm。

It　would　seem；　at　first　sight；　that　the　above　analysis　ought　to　exhaust　the　whole　subject　of　murder。　But　it　does　not　without　some　further　explanation。　If　a　man　forcibly　resists　an　officer　lawfully　making　an　arrest；　and　kills　him；　knowing　him　to　be　an　officer；　it　may　be　murder；　although　no　act　is　done　which；　but　for　his　official　function；　would　be　criminal　at　all。　So；　if　a　man　does　an　act　with　intent　to　commit　a　felony；　and　thereby　accidentally　kills　another；　for　instance；　if　he　fires　at　chickens；　intending　to　steal　them；　and　accidentally　kills　the　owner；　whom　he　does　not　see。　Such　a　case　as　this　last　seems　hardly　to　be　reconcilable　with　the　general　principles　which　have　been　laid　down。　It　has　been　argued　somewhat　as　＇58＇　follows：The　only　blameworthy　act　is　firing　at　the　chickens；　knowing　them　to　belong　to　another。　It　is　neither　more　nor　less　so　because　an　accident　happens　afterwards；　and　hitting　a　man；　whose　presence　could　not　have　been　suspected；　is　an　accident。　The　fact　that　the　shooting　is　felonious　docs　not　make　it　any　more　likely　to　kill　people。　If　the　object　of　the　rule　is　to　prevent　such　accidents；　it　should　make　accidental　killing　with　firearms　murder；　not　accidental　killing　in　the　effort　to　steal；　while；　if　its　object　is　to　prevent　stealing；　it　would　do　better　to　hang　one　thief　in　every　thousand　by　lot。

Still；　the　law　is　intelligible　as　it　stands。　The　general　test　of　murder　is　the　degree　of　danger　attending　the　acts　under　the　known　state　of　facts。　If　certain　acts　are　regarded　as　peculiarly　dangerous　under　certain　circumstances；　a　legislator　may　make　them　punishable　if　done　under　these　circum