the common law-第10章

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he　criminal　could　not　have　known　that　he　was　breaking　the　law；　but　to　admit　the　excuse　at　all　would　be　to　encourage　ignorance　where　the　law…maker　has　determined　to　make　men　know　and　obey；　and　justice　to　the　individual　is　rightly　outweighed　by　the　larger　interests　on　the　other　side　of　the　scales。

＇49＇　If　the　foregoing　arguments　are　sound；　it　is　already　manifest　that　liability　to　punishment　cannot　be　finally　and　absolutely　determined　by　considering　the　actual　personal　unworthiness　of　the　criminal　alone。　That　consideration　will　govern　only　so　far　as　the　public　welfare　permits　or　demands。　And　if　we　take　into　account　the　general　result　which　the　criminal　law　is　intended　to　bring　about；　we　shall　see　that　the　actual　state　of　mind　accompanying　a　criminal　act　plays　a　different　part　from　what　is　commonly　supposed。

For　the　most　part；　the　purpose　of　the　criminal　law　is　only　to　induce　external　conformity　to　rule。　All　law　is　directed　to　conditions　of　things　manifest　to　the　senses。　And　whether　it　brings　those　conditions　to　pass　immediately　by　the　use　of　force；　as　when　it　protects　a　house　from　a　mob　by　soldiers；　or　appropriates　private　property　to　public　use；　or　hangs　a　man　in　pursuance　of　a　judicial　sentence；　or　whether　it　brings　them　about　mediately　through　men's　fears；　its　object　is　equally　an　external　result。　In　directing　itself　against　robbery　or　murder；　for　instance；　its　purpose　is　to　put　a　stop　to　the　actual　physical　taking　and　keeping　of　other　men's　goods；　or　the　actual　poisoning；　shooting；　stabbing；　and　otherwise　putting　to　death　of　other　men。　If　those　things　are　not　done；　the　law　forbidding　them　is　equally　satisfied；　whatever　the　motive。

Considering　this　purely　external　purpose　of　the　law　together　with　the　fact　that　it　is　ready　to　sacrifice　the　individual　so　far　as　necessary　in　order　to　accomplish　that　purpose；　we　can　see　more　readily　than　before　that　the　actual　degree　of　personal　guilt　involved　in　any　particular　transgression　cannot　be　the　only　element；　if　it　is　an　element　at　all；　in　the　liability　incurred。　So　far　from　its　＇5O＇　being　true；　as　is　often　assumed；　that　the　condition　of　a　man's　heart　or　conscience　ought　to　be　more　considered　in　determining　criminal　than　civil　liability；　it　might　almost　be　said　that　it　is　the　very　opposite　of　truth。　For　civil　liability；　in　its　immediate　working；　is　simply　a　redistribution　of　an　existing　loss　between　two　individuals；　and　it　will　be　argued　in　the　next　Lecture　that　sound　policy　lets　losses　lie　where　they　fall；　except　where　a　special　reason　can　be　shown　for　interference。　The　most　frequent　of　such　reasons　is；　that　the　party　who　is　charged　has　been　to　blame。

It　is　not　intended　to　deny　that　criminal　liability；　as　well　as　civil；　is　founded　on　blameworthiness。　Such　a　denial　would　shock　the　moral　sense　of　any　civilized　community；　or；　to　put　it　another　way；　a　law　which　punished　conduct　which　would　not　be　blameworthy　in　the　average　member　of　the　community　would　be　too　severe　for　that　community　to　bear。　It　is　only　intended　to　point　out　that；　when　we　are　dealing　with　that　part　of　the　law　which　aims　more　directly　than　any　other　at　establishing　standards　of　conduct；　we　should　expect　there　more　than　elsewhere　to　find　that　the　tests　of　liability　are　external；　and　independent　of　the　degree　of　evil　in　the　particular　person's　motives　or　intentions。　The　conclusion　follows　directly　from　the　nature　of　the　standards　to　which　conformity　is　required。　These　are　not　only　external；　as　was　shown　above；　but　they　are　of　general　application。　They　do　not　merely　require　that　every　man　should　get　as　near　as　he　can　to　the　best　conduct　possible　for　him。　They　require　him　at　his　own　peril　to　come　up　to　a　certain　height。　They　take　no　account　of　incapacities；　unless　the　weakness　is　so　marked　as　to　fall　into　well…known　exceptions；　such　as　infancy　or　madness。　＇51＇　They　assume　that　every　man　is　as　able　as　every　other　to　behave　as　they　command。　If　they　fall　on　any　one　class　harder　than　on　another；　it　is　on　the　weakest。　For　it　is　precisely　to　those　who　are　most　likely　to　err　by　temperament；　ignorance；　or　folly；　that　the　threats　of　the　law　are　the　most　dangerous。

The　reconciliation　of　the　doctrine　that　liability　is　founded　on　blameworthiness　with　the　existence　of　liability　where　the　party　is　not　to　blame；　will　be　worked　out　more　fully　in　the　next　Lecture。　It　is　found　in　the　conception　of　the　average　man；　the　man　of　ordinary　intelligence　and　reasonable　prudence。　Liability　is　said　to　arise　out　of　such　conduct　as　would　be　blameworthy　in　him。　But　he　is　an　ideal　being；　represented　by　the　jury　when　they　are　appealed　to；　and　his　conduct　is　an　external　or　objective　standard　when　applied　to　any　given　individual。　That　individual　may　be　morally　without　stain；　because　he　has　less　than　ordinary　intelligence　or　prudence。　But　he　is　required　to　have　those　qualities　at　his　peril。　If　he　has　them；　he　will　not；　as　a　general　rule；　incur　liability　without　blameworthiness。

The　next　step　is　to　take　up　some　crimes　in　detail；　and　to　discover　what　analysis　will　teach　with　regard　to　them。

I　will　begin　with　murder。　Murder　is　defined　by　Sir　James　Stephen；　in　his　Digest　of　Criminal　Law；　/1/　as　unlawful　homicide　with　malice　aforethought。　In　his　earlier　work；　/2/　he　explained　that　malice　meant　wickedness；　and　that　the　law　had　determined　what　states　of　mind　were　wicked　in　the　necessary　degree。　Without　the　same　preliminary　he　continues　in　his　Digest　as　follows　：

＇52＇　〃Malice　aforethought　means　any　one　or　more　of　the　following　states　of　mind　。。。。。　〃（a。）　An　intention　to　cause　the　death　of；　or　grievous　bodily　harm　to；　any　person；　whether　such　person　is　the　person　actually　killed　or　not；　〃（b。）　Knowledge　that　the　act　which　causes　death　will　probably　cause　the　death　of；　or　grievous　bodily　harm　to；　some　person；　whether　such　person　is　the　person　actually　killed　or　not；　although　such　knowledge　is　accompanied　by　indifference　whether　death　or　grievous　bodily　harm　is　caused　or　not；　or　by　a　wish　that　it　may　not　be　caused；　〃（c。）　An　intent　to　commit　any　felony　whatever；　〃（d。）　An　intent　to　oppose　by　force　any　officer　of　justice　on　his　way　to；　in；　or　returning　from　the　execution　of　the　duty　of　arresting；　keeping　in　custody；　or　imprisoning　any　person　whom　he　is　lawfully　entitled　to　arrest；　keep　in　custody；　or　imprison；　or　the　duty　of　keeping　the　peace　or　dispersing　an　unlawful　assembly；　provided　that　the　offender　has　notice　that　the　person　killed　is　such　an　officer　so　employed。〃

Malice；　as　used　in　common　speech；　includes　intent；　and　something　more。　When　an　act　is　said　to　be　done　with　an　intent　to　do　harm；　it　is　meant　that　a　wish　for　the　harm　is　the　motive　of　the　act。　Intent；　however；　is　perfectly　consistent　with　the　harm　being　regretted　as　such；　and　being　wished　only　as　a　means　to　something　else。　But　when　an　act　is　said　to　be　done　maliciously；　it　is　meant；　not　only　that　a　wish　for　the　harmful　effect　is　the　motive；　but　also　that　the　harm　is　wished　for　its　own　sake；　or；　as　Austin　would　say　with　more　accuracy；　for　the　sake　of　the　pleasurable　feeling　which　knowledge　of　the　suffering　caused　by　the　act　would　excite。　Now　it　is　apparent　from　Sir　James　＇53＇　Stephen's　enumeration；　that　of　these　two　elements　of　malice　the　intent　alone　is　material　to　murder。　It　is　just　as　much　murder　to　shoot　a　sentry　for　the　purpose　of　releasing　a　friend；　as　to　shoot　him　because　you　hate　him。　Malice；　in　the　definition　of　murder；　has　not　the　same　meaning　as　in　common　speech；　and；　in　view　of　the　considerations　just　mentioned；　it　has　been　thought　to　mean　criminal　intention。　/1/

But　intent　again　will　be　found　to　resolve　itself　into　two　things；　foresight　that　certain　consequences　will　follow　from　an　act；　and　the　wish　for　those　consequences　working　as　a　motive　which　induces　the　act。　The　question　then　is；　whether　intent；　in　its　turn；　cannot　be　reduced　to　a　lower　term。　Sir　James　Stephen's　statement　shows　that　it　can　be；　and　that　knowledge　that　the　act　will　probably　cause　death；　that　is；　foresight　of　the　consequences　of　the　act；　is　enough　in　murder　as　in　tort。

For　instance；　a　newly　born　child　is　laid　naked　out　of　doors；　where　it　must　perish　as　a　matter　of　course。　This　is　none　the　less　murder；　that　the　guilty　party　would　have　been　very　glad　to　have　a　stranger　find　the　child　and　save　it。　/2/

But　ag