the common law-第1章

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The　Common　Law

by　Oliver　Wendell　Holmes；　Jr。





LECTURE　I。

EARLY　FORMS　OF　LIABILITY。

＇1＇　The　object　of　this　book　is　to　present　a　general　view　of　the　Common　Law。　To　accomplish　the　task；　other　tools　are　needed　besides　logic。　It　is　something　to　show　that　the　consistency　of　a　system　requires　a　particular　result；　but　it　is　not　all。　The　life　of　the　law　has　not　been　logic：　it　has　been　experience。　The　felt　necessities　of　the　time；　the　prevalent　moral　and　political　theories；　intuitions　of　public　policy；　avowed　or　unconscious；　even　the　prejudices　which　judges　share　with　their　fellow…men；　have　had　a　good　deal　more　to　do　than　the　syllogism　in　determining　the　rules　by　which　men　should　be　governed。　The　law　embodies　the　story　of　a　nation's　development　through　many　centuries；　and　it　cannot　be　dealt　with　as　if　it　contained　only　the　axioms　and　corollaries　of　a　book　of　mathematics。　In　order　to　know　what　it　is；　we　must　know　what　it　has　been；　and　what　it　tends　to　become。　We　must　alternately　consult　history　and　existing　theories　of　legislation。　But　the　most　difficult　labor　will　be　to　understand　the　combination　of　the　two　into　new　products　at　every　stage。　The　substance　of　the　law　at　any　given　time　pretty　nearly　＇2＇　corresponds；　so　far　as　it　goes；　with　what　is　then　understood　to　be　convenient；　but　its　form　and　machinery；　and　the　degree　to　which　it　is　able　to　work　out　desired　results；　depend　very　much　upon　its　past。

In　Massachusetts　today；　while；　on　the　one　hand；　there　are　a　great　many　rules　which　are　quite　sufficiently　accounted　for　by　their　manifest　good　sense；　on　the　other；　there　are　some　which　can　only　be　understood　by　reference　to　the　infancy　of　procedure　among　the　German　tribes；　or　to　the　social　condition　of　Rome　under　the　Decemvirs。

I　shall　use　the　history　of　our　law　so　far　as　it　is　necessary　to　explain　a　conception　or　to　interpret　a　rule；　but　no　further。　In　doing　so　there　are　two　errors　equally　to　be　avoided　both　by　writer　and　reader。　One　is　that　of　supposing；　because　an　idea　seems　very　familiar　and　natural　to　us；　that　it　has　always　been　so。　Many　things　which　we　take　for　granted　have　had　to　be　laboriously　fought　out　or　thought　out　in　past　times。　The　other　mistake　is　the　opposite　one　of　asking　too　much　of　history。　We　start　with　man　full　grown。　It　may　be　assumed　that　the　earliest　barbarian　whose　practices　are　to　be　considered；　had　a　good　many　of　the　same　feelings　and　passions　as　ourselves。

The　first　subject　to　be　discussed　is　the　general　theory　of　liability　civil　and　criminal。　The　Common　Law　has　changed　a　good　deal　since　the　beginning　of　our　series　of　reports；　and　the　search　after　a　theory　which　may　now　be　said　to　prevail　is　very　much　a　study　of　tendencies。　I　believe　that　it　will　be　instructive　to　go　back　to　the　early　forms　of　liability；　and　to　start　from　them。

It　is　commonly　known　that　the　early　forms　of　legal　procedure　were　grounded　in　vengeance。　Modern　writers　＇3＇　have　thought　that　the　Roman　law　started　from　the　blood　feud；　and　all　the　authorities　agree　that　the　German　law　begun　in　that　way。　The　feud　led　to　the　composition；　at　first　optional；　then　compulsory；　by　which　the　feud　was　bought　off。　The　gradual　encroachment　of　the　composition　may　be　traced　in　the　Anglo…Saxon　laws；　/1/　and　the　feud　was　pretty　well　broken　up；　though　not　extinguished；　by　the　time　of　William　the　Conqueror。　The　killings　and　house…burnings　of　an　earlier　day　became　the　appeals　of　mayhem　and　arson。　The　appeals　de　pace　et　plagis　and　of　mayhem　became；　or　rather　were　in　substance；　the　action　of　trespass　which　is　still　familiar　to　lawyers。　/2/　But　as　the　compensation　recovered　in　the　appeal　was　the　alternative　of　vengeance；　we　might　expect　to　find　its　scope　limited　to　the　scope　of　vengeance。　Vengeance　imports　a　feeling　of　blame；　and　an　opinion；　however　distorted　by　passion；　that　a　wrong　has　been　done。　It　can　hardly　go　very　far　beyond　the　case　of　a　harm　intentionally　inflicted：　even　a　dog　distinguishes　between　being　stumbled　over　and　being　kicked。

Whether　for　this　cause　or　another；　the　early　English　appeals　for　personal　violence　seem　to　have　been　confined　to　intentional　wrongs。　Glanvill　/3/　mentions　melees；　blows；　and　wounds；all　forms　of　intentional　violence。　In　the　fuller　description　of　such　appeals　given　by　Bracton　/4/　it　is　made　quite　clear　that　they　were　based　on　intentional　assaults。　The　appeal　de　pace　et　plagis　laid　an　intentional　assault；　described　the　nature　of　the　arms　used；　and　the　length　and　depth　of　the　wound。　The　appellor　also　had　＇4＇　to　show　that　he　immediately　raised　the　hue　and　cry。　So　when　Bracton　speaks　of　the　lesser　offences；　which　were　not　sued　by　way　of　appeal；　he　instances　only　intentional　wrongs；　such　as　blows　with　the　fist；　flogging；　wounding；　insults；　and　so　forth。　/1/　The　cause　of　action　in　the　cases　of　trespass　reported　in　the　earlier　Year　Books　and　in　the　Abbreviatio　Plaeitorum　is　always　an　intentional　wrong。　It　was　only　at　a　later　day；　and　after　argument；　that　trespass　was　extended　so　as　to　embrace　harms　which　were　foreseen；　but　which　were　not　the　intended　consequence　of　the　defendant's　act。　/2/　Thence　again　it　extended　to　unforeseen　injuries。　/3/

It　will　be　seen　that　this　order　of　development　is　not　quite　consistent　with　an　opinion　which　has　been　held；　that　it　was　a　characteristic　of　early　law　not　to　penetrate　beyond　the　external　visible　fact；　the　damnum　corpore　corpori　datum。　It　has　been　thought　that　an　inquiry　into　the　internal　condition　of　the　defendant；　his　culpability　or　innocence；　implies　a　refinement　of　juridical　conception　equally　foreign　to　Rome　before　the　Lex　Aquilia；　and　to　England　when　trespass　took　its　shape。　I　do　not　know　any　very　satisfactory　evidence　that　a　man　was　generally　held　liable　either　in　Rome　/4/　or　England　for　the　accidental　consequences　even　of　his　own　act。　But　whatever　may　have　been　the　early　law；　the　foregoing　account　shows　the　starting…point　of　the　system　with　which　we　have　to　deal。　Our　system　of　private　liability　for　the　consequences　of　a　man's　own　acts；　that　is；　for　his　trespasses；　started　from　the　notion　of　actual　intent　and　actual　personal　culpability。

The　original　principles　of　liability　for　harm　inflicted　by　＇5＇　another　person　or　thing　have　been　less　carefully　considered　hitherto　than　those　which　governed　trespass；　and　I　shall　therefore　devote　the　rest　of　this　Lecture　to　discussing　them。　I　shall　try　to　show　that　this　liability　also　had　its　root　in　the　passion　of　revenge；　and　to　point　out　the　changes　by　which　it　reached　its　present　form。　But　I　shall　not　confine　myself　strictly　to　what　is　needful　for　that　purpose；　because　it　is　not　only　most　interesting　to　trace　the　transformation　throughout　its　whole　extent；　but　the　story　will　also　afford　an　instructive　example　of　the　mode　in　which　the　law　has　grown；　without　a　break；　from　barbarism　to　civilization。　Furthermore；　it　will　throw　much　light　upon　some　important　and　peculiar　doctrines　which　cannot　be　returned　to　later。

A　very　common　phenomenon；　and　one　very　familiar　to　the　student　of　history；　is　this。　The　customs；　beliefs；　or　needs　of　a　primitive　time　establish　a　rule　or　a　formula。　In　the　course　of　centuries　the　custom；　belief；　or　necessity　disappears；　but　the　rule　remains。　The　reason　which　gave　rise　to　the　rule　has　been　forgotten；　and　ingenious　minds　set　themselves　to　inquire　how　it　is　to　be　accounted　for。　Some　ground　of　policy　is　thought　of；　which　seems　to　explain　it　and　to　reconcile　it　with　the　present　state　of　things；　and　then　the　rule　adapts　itself　to　the　new　reasons　which　have　been　found　for　it；　and　enters　on　a　new　career。　The　old　form　receives　a　new　content；　and　in　time　even　the　form　modifies　itself　to　fit　the　meaning　which　it　has　received。　The　subject　under　consideration　illustrates　this　course　of　events　very　clearly。

I　will　begin　by　taking　a　medley　of　examples　embodying　as　many　distinct　rules；　each　with　its　plausible　and　seemingly　sufficient　ground　of　policy　to　explain　it。

＇6＇　A　man　has　an　animal　of　known　ferocious　habits；　which　escapes　and　does　his　neighbor　damage。　He　can　prove　that　the　animal　escaped　through　no　negligence　of　his；　but　still　he　is　held　liable。　Why？　It　is；　says　the　analytical　jurist；　because；　although　he　was　not　negligent　at　the　moment　of　escape；　he　was　guilty　of　remote　heedlessness；　or　negligence；　or　fau