on public credit-第3章
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of government into confusion。
But what expedient can the public now employ; even supposing
trade to continue in the most flourishing condition; in order to
support its foreign wars and enterprizes; and to defend its own
honour and interests; or those of its allies? I do not ask how
the public is to exert such a prodigious power as it has
maintained during our late wars; where we have so much exceeded;
not only our own natural strength; but even that of the greatest
empires。 This extravagance is the abuse complained of; as the
source of all the dangers; to which we are at present exposed。
But since we must still suppose great commerce and opulence to
remain; even after every fund is mortgaged; these riches must be
defended by proportional power; and whence is the public to
derive the revenue which supports it? It must plainly be from a
continual taxation of the annuitants; or; which is the same
thing; from mortgaging anew; on every exigency; a certain part of
their annuities; and thus making them contribute to their own
defence; and to that of the nation。 But the difficulties;
attending this system of policy; will easily appear; whether we
suppose the king to have become absolute master; or to be still
controuled by national councils; in which the annuitants
themselves must necessarily bear the principal sway。
If the prince has become absolute; as may naturally be
expected from this situation of affairs; it is so easy for him to
encrease his exactions upon the annuitants; which amount only to
the retaining money in his own hands; that this species of
property would soon lose all its credit; and the whole income of
every individual in the state must lie entirely at the mercy of
the sovereign: A degree of despotism; which no oriental monarchy
has ever yet attained。 If; on the contrary; the consent of the
annuitants be requisite for every taxation; they will never be
persuaded to contribute sufficiently even to the support of
government; as the diminution of their revenue must in that case
be very sensible; would not be disguised under the appearance of
a branch of excise or customs; and would not be shared by any
other order of the state; who are already supposed to be taxed to
the utmost。 There are instances; in some republics; of a
hundredth penny; and sometimes of the fiftieth; being given to
the support of the state; but this is always an extraordinary
exertion of power; and can never become the foundation of a
constant national defence。 We have always found; where a
government has mortgaged all its revenues; that it necessarily
sinks into a state of languor; inactivity; and impotence。
Such are the inconveniencies; which may reasonably be
foreseen; of this situation; to which GREAT BRITAIN is visibly
tending。 Not to mention; the numberless inconveniencies; which
cannot be foreseen; and which must result from so monstrous a
situation as that of making the public the chief or sole
proprietor of land; besides investing it with every branch of
customs and excise; which the fertile imagination of ministers
and projectors have been able to invent。
I must confess; that there is a strange supineness; from long
custom; creeped into all ranks of men; with regard to public
debts; not unlike what divines so vehemently complain of with
regard to their religious doctrines。 We all own; that the most
sanguine imagination cannot hope; either that this or any future
ministry will be possessed of such rigid and steady frugality; as
to make a considerable progress in the payment of our debts; or
that the situation of foreign affairs will; for any long time;
allow them leisure and tranquillity for such an undertaking。 What
then is to become of us? Were we ever so good Christians; and
ever so resigned to Providence; this; methinks; were a curious
question; even considered as a speculative one; and what it might
not be altogether impossible to form some conjectural solution
of。 The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of
battles; negociations; intrigues; and factions。 There seems to be
a natural progress of things; which may guide our reasoning。 As
it would have required but a moderate share of prudence; when we
first began this practice of mortgaging; to have foretold; from
the nature of men and of ministers; that things would necessarily
be carried to the length we see; so now; that they have at last
happily reached it; it may not be difficult to guess at the
consequences。 It must; indeed; be one of these two events; either
the nation must destroy public credit; or public credit will
destroy the nation。 It is impossible that they can both subsist;
after the manner they have been hitherto managed; in this; as
well as in some other countries。
There was; indeed; a scheme for the payment of our debts;
which was proposed by an excellent citizen; Mr HUTCHINSON; above
thirty years ago; and which was much approved of by some men of
sense; but never was likely to take effect。 He asserted; that
there was a fallacy in imagining that the public owed this debt;
for that really every individual owed a proportional share of it;
and paid; in his taxes; a proportional share of the interest;
beside the expence of levying these taxes。 Had we not better;
then; says he; make a distribution of the debt among ourselves;
and each of us contribute a sum suitable to his property; and by
that means discharge at once all our funds and public mortgages?
He seems not to have considered; that the laborious poor pay a
considerable part of the taxes by their annual consumptions;
though they could not advance; at once; a proportional part of
the sum required。 Not to mention; that property in money and
stock in trade might easily be concealed or disguised; and that
visible property in lands and houses would really at last answer
for the whole: An inequality and oppression; which never would be
submitted to。 But though this project is not likely to take
place; it is not altogether improbable; that; when the nation
becomes heartily sick of their debts; and is cruelly oppressed by
them; some daring projector may arise with visionary schemes for
their discharge。 And as public credit will begin; by that time;
to be a little frail; the least touch will destroy it; as
happened in FRANCE during the regency。 and in this manner it will
die of the doctor。
But it is more probable; that the breach of national faith
will be the necessary effect of wars; defeats; misfortunes; and
public calamities; or even perhaps of victories and conquests。 I
must confess; when I see princes and states fighting and
quarrelling; amidst their debts; funds; and public mortgages; it
always brings to my mind a match of cudgel…playing fought in a
China shop。 How can it be expected; that sovereigns will spare a
species of property; which is pernicious to themselves and to the
public; when they have so little compassion on lives and
properties; that are useful to both? Let the time come (and
surely it will come) when the new funds; created for the
exigencies of the year; are not subscribed to; and raise not the
money projected。 Suppose; either that the cash of the nation is
exhausted; or that our faith; which has hitherto been so ample;
begins to fail us。 Suppose; that; in this distress; the nation is
threatened with an invasion; a rebellion is suspected or broken
out at home; a squadron cannot be equipped for want of pay;
victuals; or repairs; or even a foreign subsidy cannot be
advanced。 What must a prince or minister do in such an emergence?
The right of self…preservation is unalienable in every
individual; much more in every community。 And the folly of our
statesmen must then be greater than the folly of those who first
contracted debt; or; what is more; than that of those who
trusted; or continue to trust this security; if these statesmen
have the means of safety in their hands; and do not employ them。
The funds; created and mortgaged; will; by that time; bring in a
large yearly revenue; sufficient for the defence and security of
the nation: Money is perhaps lying in the exchequer; ready for
the discharge of the quarterly interest: Necessity calls; fear