philosophy of right-第62章
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duties of the citizens； should be defined by law … to be so far excluded from all this that absurdity can foist
itself upon him as the word of God。
§ 259。
The Idea of the state：
（A） has immediate actuality and is the individual state as a self…dependent
organism … the Constitution or Constitutional Law；
（B） passes over into the relation of one state to other states … International
Law；
（C） is the universal Idea as a genus and as an absolute power over individual
states … the mind which gives itself its actuality in the process of
World…History。
Remark： The state in its actuality is essentially an individual state； and beyond that a particular
state。 Individuality is to be distinguished from particularity。 The former is a moment in the very Idea
of the state； while the latter belongs to history。 States as such are independent of one another； and
therefore their relation to one another can only be an external one； so that there must be a third
thing standing above them to bind them together。 Now this third thing is the mind which gives itself
actuality in world…history and is the absolute judge of states。 Several states may form an alliance to
be a sort of court with jurisdiction over others； there may be confederations of states； like the Holy
Alliance for example； but these are always relative only and restricted； like perpetual peace'。 The
one and only absolute judge； which makes itself authoritative against the particular and at all times；
is the absolute mind which manifests itself in the history of the world as the universal and as the
genus there operative。
A。 Constitutional Law
§ 260。
The state is the actuality of concrete freedom。 But concrete freedom consists in
this； that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their
complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right （as they do in
the sphere of the family and civil society） but； for one thing； they also pass over
of their own accord into the interest of the universal； and； for another thing； they
know and will the universal； they even recognise it as their own substantive mind；
they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit。 The result is that the
universal does not prevail or achieve completion except along with particular
interests and through the co…operation of particular knowing and willing； and
individuals likewise do not live as private persons for their own ends alone； but in
the very act of willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal；
and their activity is consciously aimed at none but the universal end。 The principle
of modern states has prodigious strength and depth because it allows the principle
of subjectivity to progress to its culmination in the extreme of self…subsistent
personal particularity； and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive
unity and so maintains this unity in the principle of subjectivity itself。
Addition： The Idea of the state in modern times has a special character in that the state is the
actualisation of freedom not in accordance with subjective whim but in accordance with the
concept of the will； i。e。 in accordance with its universality and divinity。 Immature states are those in
which the Idea of the state is still veiled and where its particular determinations have not yet
attained free self…subsistence。 In the states of classical antiquity； universality was present； but
particularity had not then been released； given free scope； and brought back to universality； i。e。 to
the Universal end of the whole。 The essence of the modern state is that the universal be bound up
with the complete freedom of its particular members and with private well…being； that thus the
interests of family and civil society must concentrate themselves on the state； although the
…universal end cannot be advanced without the personal knowledge and will of its particular
members； whose own rights must be maintained。 Thus the universal must be furthered； but
subjectivity on the other hand must attain its full and living development。 It is only when both these
moments subsist in their strength that the state can be regarded as articulated and genuinely
organised。
§ 261。
In contrast with the spheres of private rights and private welfare （the family and
civil society）； the state is from one point of view an external necessity and their
higher authority； its nature is such that their laws and interests are subordinate to
it and dependent on it。 On the other hand； however； it is the end immanent within
them； and its strength lies in the unity of its own universal end and aim with the
particular interest of individuals； in the fact that individuals have duties to the state
in proportion as they have rights against it （see § 155）。
Remark： In the Remark to § 3 above； reference was made to the fact that it was Montesquieu
above all who； in his famous work L’Esprit des Lois； kept in sight and tried to work out in detail
both the thought of the dependence of laws … in particular； laws concerning the rights of persons …
on the specific character of the state； and also the philosophic notion of always treating the part in
its relation to the whole。
Duty is primarily a relation to something which from my point of view is substantive； absolutely
universal。 A right； on the other hand； is simply the embodiment of this substance and thus is the
particular aspect of it and enshrines my particular freedom。 Hence at abstract levels； right and duty
appear parcelled out on different sides or in different persons。 In the state； as something ethical； as
the inter…penetration of the substantive and the particular； my obligation to what is substantive is at
the same time the embodiment of my particular freedom。 This means that in the state duty and right
are united in one and the same relation。 But further； since none the less the distinct moments
acquire in the state the shape and reality peculiar to each； and since therefore the distinction
between right and duty enters here once again； it follows that while implicitly； i。e。 in form； identical；
they at the same time differ in content。 In the spheres of personal rights and morality； the necessary
bearing of right and duty on one another falls short of actualisation； and hence there is at that point
only an abstract similarity of content between them； i。e。 in those abstract spheres； what is one
man's right ought also to be another's； and what is one man's duty ought also to be another's。 The
absolute identity of right and duty in the state is present in these spheres not as a genuine identity
but only as a similarity of content； because in them this content is determined as quite general and
is simply the fundamental principle of both right and duty； i。e。 the principle that men； as persons；
are free。 Slaves； therefore； have no duties because they have no rights； and vice versa。 （Religious
duties are not here in point。）
In the course of the inward development of the concrete Idea； however； its moments become
distinguished and their specific determinacy becomes at the same time a difference of content。 In
the family； the content of a son's duties to his father differs from the content of his rights against
him； the content of the rights of a member of civil society is not the same as the content of his
duties to his prince and government。
This concept of the union of duty and right is a point of vital importance and in it the inner strength
of states is contained。
Duty on its abstract side goes no farther than the persistent neglect and proscription of a man's
particular interest； on the ground that it is the inessential； even the discreditable； moment in his life。
Duty； taken concretely as Idea； reveals the moment of particularity as itself essential and so
regards its satisfaction as indisputably necessary。 In whatever way an individual may fulfil his duty；
he must at the same time find his account therein and attain his personal interest and satisfaction。
Out of his
