philosophy of right-第31章

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which　subjectivity　claims　to　be　absolute。　

Remark：　This　final；　most　abstruse；　form　of　evil；　whereby　evil　is　perverted　into　good　and　good
into　evil；　and　consciousness；　in　being　aware　of　its　power　to　effect　this　perversion；　is　also　made
aware　of　itself　as　absolute；　is　the　high…water　mark　of　subjectivity　at　the　level　of　morality；　it　is　the
form　into　which　evil　has　blossomed　in　our　present　epoch；　a　result　due　to　philosophy；　i。e。　to　a
shallowness　of　thought　which　has　twisted　a　profound　concept　into　this　shape　and　usurped　the
name　of　philosophy；　just　as　it　has　arrogated　to　evil　the　name　of　good。　

In　this　Remark；　I　will　indicate　briefly　the　chief　forms　of　this　subjectivity　which　have　become
current。　

（a）　In　hypocrisy　the　following　moments　are　contained：　

　　　　　＇a＇　knowledge　of　the　true　universal；　whether　knowledge　in　the　form　merely　of　a　feeling　for
　　　　　right　and　duty；　or　of　a　deeper　cognition　and　apprehension　of　them；　
　　　　　＇b＇　volition　of　the　particular　which　conflicts　with　this　universal；　
　　　　　＇c＇　conscious　comparison　of　both　moments　＇a＇　and　＇b＇；　so　that　the　conscious　subject　is
　　　　　aware　in　willing　that　his　particular　volition　is　evil　in　character。　

These　points　are　descriptive　of　acting　with　a　bad　conscience；　hypocrisy　proper　involves　something
more。　

At　one　time　great　importance　was　attached　to　the　question　whether　an　action　was　evil　only　in　so
far　as　it　was　done　with　a　bad　conscience；　i。e。　with　explicit　knowledge　of　the　three　moments　just
specified。　The　inference　from　an　affirmative　answer　is　admirably　drawn　by　Pascal：　Ils　seront　tous
damnés　ces　demi…pécheurs；　qui　ont　quelque　amour　pour　la　vertu。　Mais　pour　ces
franc…pécheurs；　pécheurs　endurcis；　pécheurs　sans　mélange；　pleins　et　achevés；　1'enfer　ne
les　tient　pas；　ils　ont　trompé　le　diable　à　force　de　s'y　abandonner。　

Footnote：　Lettres　provinciales；　iv。　In　the　same　context；　Pascal　also　quotes　Christ's　intercession　on　the
Cross　for　his　enemies：　'Father；　forgive　them；　for　they　know　not　what　they　do'　…　a　superfluous　prayer　if　the　fact
that　they　did　not　know　what　they　did　made　their　action　innocent　and　so　took　away　the　need　of　forgiveness。
Pascal　quotes　there　too　Aristotle's　distinction　between　the　man　who　acts　ouk　eidos　and　the　one　who　acts
agnoon；　in　the　former　type　of　ignorance；　his　action　is　not　freely　willed　（here　the　ignorance　depends　on　external
circumstances；　see　above；　§　117）　and　his　action　is　not　imputable　to　him。　But　of　the　latter　Aristotle　says：　'Every
wicked　man　is　ignorant　of　what　he　ought　to　do　and　what　he　ought　to　refrain　from　doing；　and　it　is　this　kind　of
failure　which　makes　men　unjust　and　in　general　bad。。。。　An　ignorant　choice'　between　good　and　evil　'is　the　cause
not　of　the　action's　being　involuntary'　（of　being　non…imputable）　'but　only　of　its　being　wicked'。　Aristotle
evidently　had　a　deeper　insight　into　the　connection　between　knowing　and　willing　than　has　become　common　in　a
superficial　philosophy　which　teaches　that　the　opposite　of　knowledge；　the　heart　and　enthusiasm；　are　the　true
principles　of　ethical　action。　

The　subjective　right　of　self…consciousness　to　know　whether　an　action　is　truly　good　or　evil　in
character　must　not　be　thought　of　as　so　colliding　with　the　absolute　right　of　the　objectivity　of　this
character　that　the　two　rights　are　represented　as　separable；　indifferent　to　one　another；　and　related
only　accidentally。　It　was　such　a　conception　of　their　relation　that　lay　in　particular　at　the　root　of　the
old　questions　about　efficacious　grace。　On　its　formal　side；　evil　is　most　peculiarly　the　individual's
own；　since　（a）　it　is　precisely　his　subjectivity　establishing　itself　purely　and　simply　for　itself；　and　for
that　reason　it　is　purely　and　simply　the　individual's　own　responsibility　（see　§　139　and　the　Remark
thereto）；　（b）　on　his　objective　side　man　accords　with　his　concept　inasmuch　as　he　is　mind；　in　a　word
a　rational　entity；　and　has　in　his　own　nature　as　such　the　character　of　self…knowing　universality。
Therefore　it　means　failing　to　treat　him　with　the　respect　due　to　his　concept　if　his　good　side　is
divorced　from　him；　so　that　the　character　of　his　evil　action　as　evil　is　divorced　from　him　too　and　is
not　imputed　to　him　as　evil。　How　determinate　is　the　consciousness　of　these　moments　in　distinction
from　one　another；　or　to　what　extent　it　has　developed　or　failed　to　develop　in　clarity　so　as　to
become　a　recognition　of　them；　and　to　what　degree　an　evil　action　has　been　done　with　a　conscience
more　or　less　downright　evil　…　all　these　questions　are　the　more　trivial　aspect　of　the　matter；　the
aspect　mainly　concerned　with　the　empirical。　

（b）　Evil　and　doing　evil　with　a　bad　conscience；　however；　is　not　quite　hypocrisy。　Into　hypocrisy
there　enters　in　addition　the　formal　character　of　falsity；　first　the　falsity　of　holding　up　evil　as　good　in
the　eyes　of　others；　of　setting　oneself　up　to　all　appearance　as　good；　conscientious；　pious；　and　so　on
…　conduct　which　in　these　circumstances　is　only　a　trick　to　deceive　others。　Secondly；　however；　the
had　man　may　find　in　his　good　conduct　on　other　occasions；　or　in　his　piety；　or；　in　a　word；　in　good
reasons；　a　justification　in　his　own　eyes　for　the　evil　he　does；　because　he　can　use　these　reasons　to
pervert　its　apparent　character　from　evil　into　good。　His　ability　to　do　this　depends　on　the　subjectivity
which；　as　abstract　negativity；　knows　that　all　determinations　are　subordinate　to　itself　and　issue　from
its　own　will。　

（c）　In　this　perversion　of　evil　into　good　we　may　prima　facie　include　the　form　of　subjectivism　known
as　Probabilism。　Its　guiding　principle　is　that　an　action　is　permissible；　and　may　be　done　with　an　easy
conscience；　provided　that　the　agent　can　hunt　out　any　single　good　reason　for　it；　be　it　only　the
authority　of　a　single　theologian；　and　even　if　other　theologians　are　known　by　the　agent　to　dissent
ever　so　widely　from　that　authority。　Even　in　this　idea　there　is　still　present　the　correct　apprehension
that　authority　and　a　reason　based　on　authority　gives　probability　only；　although　this　is　supposed　to
be　enough　to　produce　an　easy　conscience；　it　is　granted　in　Probabilism　that　a　good　reason　is
inevitably　of　such　a　character　that　there　may　exist　along　with　it　different　reasons　at　least　as　good。
Even　here　we　must　recognise　a　vestige　of　objectivity　in　the　admission　that　it　is　a　reason　which
should　be　the　determining　factor。　But　since　the　discrimination　between　good　and　evil　is　made　to
depend　on　all　those　good　reasons；　including　theological　authorities　too；　despite　the　fact　that　they
are　so　numerous　and　contradictory；　the　implication　is　that　it　is　not　this　objectivity　of　the　thing；　but
subjectivity；　which　has　the　last　word。　This　means　that　caprice　and　self…will　are　made　the　arbiters　of
good　and　evil；　and　the　result　is　that　ethics　as　well　as　religious　feeling　is　undermined。　But　the　fact
that　it　is　private　subjectivity　to　which　the　decision　falls　is　one　which　Probabilism　does　not　openly
avow　as　its　principle；　on　the　contrary；　as　has　already　been　stated；　it　gives　out　that　it　is　some　reason
or　other　which　is　decisive；　and　Probabilism　is　to　that　extent　still　a　form　of　hypocrisy。　

（d）　In　the　stages　of　subjectivism；　the　next　in　ascending　order　is　the　view　that　the　goodness　of　the
will　consists　in　its　willing　the　good；　this　willing　of　the　abstract　good　is　supposed　to　suffice；　in　fact
to　be　the　sole　requisite；　to　make　its　action　good。　As　the　willing　of　something　determinate；　action
has　a　content；　but　good　in　the　abstract　determines　nothing；　and　hence　it　devolves　on　particular
subjectivity　to　give　this　content　its　character　and　constituents。　just　as　in　Probabilism　anyone　who　is
not　himself　a　learned　Révérend　Père　may　have　the　subsumption　of　a　determinate　content　under
the　universal　predicate　'good'　effected　for　him　by　the　sole　authority　of　one　such　theologian；　so　here
every　subject；　without　any　further　qualification；　is　invested　with　this　honour　of　giving　a　content　to
good　in　the　abstract；　or　in　other　words　subsuming　a　content　under　a　universal。　This　content　is　only
one　of　the　many　elements　in　an　action　as　a　concrete　whole；　and　the　others　may　perhaps　entail　its
description　as　'criminal'　and　'bad'。　That　determinate　content　which　1；　as　subject；　give　to　the　good；
however；　is　the　good　known