e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第98章
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118；683 263；265（1）（2） 300；000（1） 50；000（1）（2） 285；683 714；000（1） 232；700（1） 203；071
（1）Fair value as determined by Charlie and me （1）公平价值是由查理跟我来判断
（2） Carrying value in our financial statements （2）是指财务报表上的帐面价值
Our 40 million of First Empire State preferred carries a 9％ coupon； is non…callable until 1996 and is convertible at 78。91 per share。 Normally I would think a purchase of this size too small for Berkshire； but I have enormous respect for Bob Wilmers； CEO of First Empire； and like being his partner on any scale。
我们在第一帝国9％收益率的特别股投资了4；000万美元，在1996年前公司无法赎回，每股转换价格订为78。91美元，通常我会认为这样的规模对于Berkshire来说实在是太小了，但由于我们对于该公司总裁Bob Wilmers实在是过于崇敬，所以不管金额大小，还是希望有机会能与他一起合伙共事。
Our American Express preferred is not a normal fixed…ine security。 Rather it is a 〃Perc；〃 which carries a fixed dividend of 8。85％ on our 300 million cost。 Absent one exception mentioned later； our preferred must be converted three years after issuance； into a maximum of 12；244；898 shares。 If necessary； a downward adjustment in the conversion ratio will be made in order to limit to 414 million the total value of the mon we receive。 Though there is thus a ceiling on the value of the mon stock that we will receive upon conversion； there is no floor。 The terms of the preferred； however； include a provision allowing us to extend the conversion date by one year if the mon stock is below 24。50 on the third anniversary of our purchase。
至于美国运通的投资则不是一般的固定收益证券，它算是一种Perc…每年可以为我们3亿美元的投资贡献8。85％的股利收入，除了接下来会提到的一个特点，那就是我们的特别股在发行后的三年可以转换成最多12；244；898股的普通股，若有必要我们可转换的股份可能会向下调整，以确定我们所收到的股份总值不能够超过4。14亿美元，虽然对于可能取得的普通股价值有其上限，但相对地却没有下限，不过这样的特别条款还包含若是三年期限到时公司股价低于24。5美元时，可以有权请求延长转换期限一年。
Overall； our fixed…ine investments have treated us well； both over the long term and recently。 We have realized large capital gains from these holdings； including about 152 million in 1991。 Additionally； our after…tax yields have considerably exceeded those earned by most fixed…ine portfolios。
总的来说，不管最近或是是长期而言，我们在固定收益证券上的投资表现还算不错，靠着这样的投资我们赚取大量的资本利得，在1991年这个数字大约在1。52亿美元左右，此外我们的税后投资报酬率也远高于一般的固定收益证券。
Nevertheless； we have had some surprises； none greater than the need for me to involve myself personally and intensely in the Salomon situation。 As I write this letter； I am also writing a letter for inclusion in Salomon's annual report and I refer you to that report for an update on the pany。 （Write to： Corporate Secretary； Salomon Inc； Seven World Trade Center； New York； NY 10048） Despite the pany's travails； Charlie and I believe our Salomon preferred stock increased slightly in value during 1991。 Lower interest rates and a higher price for Salomon's mon produced this result。
不过在这期间也发生一些小意外，当然没有像所罗门事件那样让我本人都跳进去，当我在撰写这封信时，我也同时写了一封信要放在所罗门的年度报告之内，我顺便提出来算是对于该公司近况的一份报告，（写给纽约第七世贸大楼所罗门公司），虽然公司遭逢不幸，但查理跟我都相信，目前低利率的环境加上所罗门普通股的股价回升，使我们在所罗门的特别股价值已略见增加。
Last year I told you that our USAir investment 〃should work out all right unless the industry is decimated during the next few years。〃 Unfortunately 1991 was a decimating period for the industry； as Midway； Pan Am and America West all entered bankruptcy。 （Stretch the period to 14 months and you can add Continental and TWA。）
去年我曾告诉各位除非航空业的经营环境在未来几年内加速恶化，否则我们在美国航空的投资应该可以有不错的结果，不过很不幸的随着中美、泛美与美西航空相继倒闭，1991年正是航空业加速恶化的一年，（若是把时间延长为14个月，则还要包括大陆航空与TWA两家航空公司）。
The low valuation that we have given USAir in our table reflects the risk that the industry will remain unprofitable for virtually all participants in it； a risk that is far from negligible。 The risk is heightened by the fact that the courts have been encouraging bankrupt carriers to continue operating。 These carriers can temporarily charge fares that are below the industry's costs because the bankrupts don't incur the capital costs faced by their solvent brethren and because they can fund their losses … and thereby stave off shutdown … by selling off assets。 This burn…the…furniture…to…provide…firewood approach to fare…setting by bankrupt carriers contributes to the toppling of previously…marginal carriers； creating a domino effect that is perfectly designed to bring the industry to its knees。
表上我们对于在美国航空投资的评价之所以如此的低，反应出整个产业目前所面临到的获利前景不佳的风险，这个风险又因为法院鼓励已经宣布破产的航空公司继续营运而更加提高，这些同业得以用比一般成本还低的价格，因为它们完全可以不必在乎其它还咽咽一息的同业所需负担的资金成本，因为为了避免营运停摆，它们可以靠着变卖资产来弥补所发生的损失，这种拆家具拿来当材火烧的做法，有可能进一步危及其它营运还算正常的同业，然后引发骨牌效应，使得整个产业一败涂地。
Seth Schofield； who became CEO of USAir in 1991； is making major adjustments in the airline's operations in order to improve its chances of being one of the few industry survivors。 There is no tougher job in corporate America than running an airline： Despite the huge amounts of equity capital that have been injected into it； the industry； in aggregate； has posted a net loss since its birth after Kitty Hawk。 Airline managers need brains； guts； and experience … and Seth possesses all three of these attributes。
Seth Schofield在1991年成为美国航空公司的总裁，正对整个公司的营运做出相当重大的调整，期能增加其成为航空业仅存的几位幸存者之一，在美国没有比经营一家航空公司还要困难的行业，虽然大笔的资金已经投入到这个产业，但是从小鹰号诞生开始，航空业历史累积加总所产生的损失却是相当惊人，航空公司的经理人需要的不只是智能、勇气还要再加上经验，而毫无疑问的，Seth 同时具有以上三项的特质。
Miscellaneous其它事项
About 97。7％ of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1991 shareholder…designated contributions program。 Contributions made through the program were 6。8 million； and 2；630 charities were recipients。
大约有97。7％的有效股权参与1991年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约680万美元捐出的款项分配给2；630家慈善机构。
We suggest that new shareholders read the description of our shareholder…designated contributions program that appears on pages 48…49。 To participate in future programs； you must make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner； not in the nominee name of a broker； bank or depository。 Shares not so registered on August 31； 1992 will be ineligible for the 1992 program。
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计画的详细内容，如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计画，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1992年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1992年的捐赠计画。
In addition to the shareholder…designated contributions that Berkshire distributes； managers of our operating businesses make contributions； including merchandise； averaging about 1。5 million annually。 These contributions support local charities； such as The United Way； and produce roughly mensurate benefits for our businesses。
Berkshire除了透过股东指定捐赠计画对外捐赠之外，我们旗下事业的经理人每年也会透过公司对外捐赠，包含商品在内每年平均金额约在150万美元左右。这些捐赠主要是赞助当地像是联合劝募等慈善团体，所得的效益应该与我们所捐出的相当。
However； neither our operating managers nor officers of the parent pany use Berkshire funds to make contributions to broad national programs or charitable activities of special personal interest to them； except to the extent they do so as shareholders。 If your employees； including your CEO； wish to give to their alma maters or other institutions to which they feel a personal attachment； we believe they should use their own money； not yours。
然而不管是旗下事业或是母公司的经理人在利用Berkshire的资金对外捐赠给全国性组织或特别利益团体时，都是以站在股东利益立场所应该做的，相对地若是你的员工也包含CEO在内，想要与其校友会或其它人建立个人关系的，我们认为他们最好是用自己的钱，�
