e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第81章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
傅囊谐械ｎ叶畹乃鹗В惨蛭猈ells Fargo就是市场上最大的不动产借款银行，一般咸认它最容易受到伤害。
None of these eventualities can be ruled out。 The probability of the first two occurring； however； is low and even a meaningful drop in real estate values is unlikely to cause major problems for well…managed institutions。 Consider some mathematics： Wells Fargo currently earns well over 1 billion pre…tax annually after expensing more than 300 million for loan losses。 If 10％ of all 48 billion of the bank's loans … not just its real estate loans … were hit by problems in 1991； and these produced losses （including foregone interest） averaging 30％ of principal； the pany would roughly break even。
以上所提到的风险都很难加以排除，当然第一点与第二点的可能性相当低，而且即使是房地产大幅的下跌，对于经营绩效良好的银行也不致造成太大的问题，我们可以简单地算一下，Wells Fargo现在一年在提列3亿美元的损失准备之后，税前还可以赚10亿美元以上，今天假若该银行所有的480亿借款中有10％在1991年发生问题，且估计其中有30％的本金将收不回来，必须全部转为损失（包含收不回来的利息），则在这种情况下，这家银行还是可以损益两平。
A year like that … which we consider only a low…level possibility； not a likelihood … would not distress us。 In fact； at Berkshire we would love to acquire businesses or invest in capital projects that produced no return for a year； but that could then be expected to earn 20％ on growing equity。 Nevertheless； fears of a California real estate disaster similar to that experienced in New England caused the price of Wells Fargo stock to fall almost 50％ within a few months during 1990。 Even though we had bought some shares at the prices prevailing before the fall； we weled the decline because it allowed us to pick up many more shares at the new； panic prices。
若是真有一年如此，虽然我们认为这种情况发生的可能性相当低，我们应该还可以忍受，事实上在Berkshire选择购并或是投资一家公司，头一年不赚钱没有关系，只要以后每年能够有20％的股东权益报酬率，尽管如此，加州大地震使得投资人害怕新英格兰地区也会有同样的危险，导致Wells Fargo在1990年几个月间大跌50％以上，虽然在股价下跌前我们已买进一些股份，但股价下跌使我们可以开心地用更低的价格捡到更多的股份。
Investors who expect to be ongoing buyers of investments throughout their lifetimes should adopt a similar attitude toward market fluctuations； instead many illogically bee euphoric when stock prices rise and unhappy when they fall。 They show no such confusion in their reaction to food prices： Knowing they are forever going to be buyers of food； they wele falling prices and deplore price increases。 （It's the seller of food who doesn't like declining prices。） Similarly； at the Buffalo News we would cheer lower prices for newsprint … even though it would mean marking down the value of the large inventory of newsprint we always keep on hand … because we know we are going to be perpetually buying the product。
以长期投资作为终生目标的投资人对于股市波动也应该采取同样的态度，千万不要因为股市涨就欣喜若狂，股市跌就如丧考妣，奇怪的是他们对于食物的价格就一点都不会搞错，很清楚知道自己每天一定会买食物，当食物价格下跌时，他们可高兴的很，（要烦恼的应该是卖食物的人），同样的在水牛城报纸我们期望印刷成本能够降低，虽然这代表我们必须将帐列的新闻印刷存货价值向下调整，因为我们很清楚，我们必须一直买进这些产品。
Identical reasoning guides our thinking about Berkshire's investments。 We will be buying businesses … or small parts of businesses； called stocks … year in； year out as long as I live （and longer； if Berkshire's directors attend the seances I have scheduled）。 Given these intentions； declining prices for businesses benefit us； and rising prices hurt us。
同样的原则也适用在Berkshire的投资之上，只要我还健在（若我死后，Berkshire的董事会愿意透过我所安排的降神会接受我的指示，则期间或许更长久），我们会年复一年买下企业或是企业的一部份…也就是股票，也因此企业的价格下跌对我们会更有利，反之则可能会对我们不利。
The most mon cause of low prices is pessimism … some times pervasive； some times specific to a pany or industry。 We want to do business in such an environment； not because we like pessimism but because we like the prices it produces。 It's optimism that is the enemy of the rational buyer。
股价不振最主要的原因是悲观的情绪，有时是全面性的，有时则仅限于部份产业或是公司，我们很期望能够在这种环境下做生意，不是因为我们天生喜欢悲观，而是如此可以得到便宜的价格买进更多好的公司，乐观是理性投资人最大的敌人。
None of this means； however； that a business or stock is an intelligent purchase simply because it is unpopular； a contrarian approach is just as foolish as a follow…the…crowd strategy。 What's required is thinking rather than polling。 Unfortunately； Bertrand Russell's observation about life in general applies with unusual force in the financial world： 〃Most men would rather die than think。 Many do。〃
当然以上所述并不代表不受欢迎或注意的股票或企业就是好的投资标的，反向操作有可能与群众心理一样的愚蠢，真正重要的是独立思考而不是投票表决，不幸的是Bertrand Russell对于人性的观察同样地也适用于财务投资之上，「大多数的人宁死也不愿意去思考！」。
Our other major portfolio change last year was large additions to our holdings of RJR Nabisco bonds； securities that we first bought in late 1989。 At yearend 1990 we had 440 million invested in these securities； an amount that approximated market value。 （As I write this； however； their market value has risen by more than 150 million。）
我们去年其它主要的投资组合的变动就是增加RJR Nabisco的债券，我们是在1989年开始买进这种有价证券，到了1990年底我们的投资金额约为4。4亿美元，与目前的市价相当（不过在撰写年报的同时，他们的市价已增加了1。5亿美元）。
Just as buying into the banking business is unusual for us； so is the purchase of below…investment…grade bonds。 But opportunities that interest us and that are also large enough to have a worthwhile impact on Berkshire's results are rare。 Therefore； we will look at any category of investment； so long as we understand the business we're buying into and believe that price and value may differ significantly。 （Woody Allen； in another context； pointed out the advantage of open…mindedness： 〃I can't understand why more people aren't bi…sexual because it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night。〃）
就像我们很少买进银行股，同样地我们也很少买进投资等级以下的债券，不过能够引起我们兴趣的投资机会，同时规模大到足以对Berkshire有相当影响力的投资机会实在是不多，因此我们愿意尝试各种不同的投资工具，只要我们对于即将买进的投资标的有相当的了解，同时价格与价值有相当大的差距（伍迪艾伦也另一句台词用来形容开明的好处︰「我实在不了解为什么有那么多人排斥双性恋，人们在星期六夜晚至少可以有多一倍的机会能够约会？」）。
In the past we have bought a few below…investment…grade bonds with success； though these were all old…fashioned 〃fallen angels〃 … bonds that were initially of investment grade but that were downgraded when the issuers fell on bad times。 In the 1984 annual report we described our rationale for buying one fallen angel； the Washington Public Power Supply System。
在过去我们也曾成功地投资了好几次投资等级以下的债券，虽然他们多是传统上所谓的失翼的天使，意思是指原先发行时属于投资等级但后来因为公司出现问题而被降等，在1984年的年报中我们也曾经提到过买进华盛顿公用电力系统债券的原因。
A kind of bastardized fallen angel burst onto the investment scene in the 1980s … 〃junk bonds〃 that were far below investment… grade when issued。 As the decade progressed； new offerings of manufactured junk became ever junkier and ultimately the predictable oute occurred： Junk bonds lived up to their name。 In 1990 … even before the recession dealt its blows … the financial sky became dark with the bodies of failing corporations。
不过到了1980年代大量假冒的失翼的天使充斥着整个投资界，也就是所谓的垃圾债券，这些债券在发行时企业本身的信用评等就不佳，十几年下来垃圾债券越来越垃圾，最后真的变成名符其实的垃圾，到了1990年代在经济衰退引发债权危机之前，整个投资界的天空已布满着这些假冒失翼天使的尸体。
The disciples of debt assured us that this collapse wouldn't happen： Huge debt； we were told； would cause operating managers to focus their efforts as never before； much as a dagger mounted on the steering wheel of a car could be expected to make its driver proceed with intensified care。 We'll acknowledge that such an attention…getter would produce a very alert driver。 But another certain consequence would be a deadly … and unne
