e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第68章
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more potential for mischief than others。
不过这些债券有多少缺点，但我们却必须承认许多零息与PIK债券应该不会还不出钱来，事实上我们自己也投资了一些，而且若是债券市场情况再变差一点，我们可能还会买的更多，（当然我们从来就不会考虑去买那些新发行债信又差的垃圾债券），就本质而言，没有一项财务工具是不对的，只是有一些含有相当高程度的可能伤害在里面。
The blue ribbon for mischief…making should go to the zero…coupon issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current basis。 Our advice： Whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT … or whenever someone creates a capital structure that does not allow all interest； both payable and accrued； to be fortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital expenditures … zip up your wallet。 Turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his high…priced entourage accept zero…coupon fees； deferring their take until the zero…coupon bonds have been paid in full。 See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures。
所有的罪过应该归咎于债券发行者没有办法在现在就立即支付利息，我们的建议是当任何投资银行家在开始提到EBDIT之前，或是任何人在对你提议一项可以不必支付任何利息的金融工具时，为了你自己的现金流量着想，赶快把你的荷包看紧，换个角度建议这些推销者是否也能接受等这些零息债券真正偿还本金之后，再缴交手续费，看看这些人的热情还能支撑多久。
Our ments about investment bankers may seem harsh。 But Charlie and I … in our hopelessly old…fashioned way … believe that they should perform a gatekeeping role； guarding investors against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess。 Promoters； after all； have throughout time exercised the same judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have exercised in accepting liquor。 At a minimum； therefore； the banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender who； when necessary； refuses the profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the highway。 In recent years； unfortunately； many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard。 Lately； those who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not encountered heavy traffic。
我们对于这些投资银行家的批判或许是激烈了一点，但查理跟我以我们这种无可救药的保守作风，相信他们确实应该要做好把关的工作，保护投资人免于这些推销者过度的引诱，因为推销者对于佣金的饥渴就像是酗酒者对于酒精的沉溺一样，最低限度，投资银行家也要肩负起吧台调酒师的角色，必要的时候，就算少赚一杯酒钱，也要劝客户少喝一点，不幸的是最近几年来，许多大型的投资银行都认为这样的基本道德规范是一项很严重的限制，因为其它很多大胆的业者，可以更自由的大行其道。
One distressing footnote： The cost of the zero…coupon folly will not be borne solely by the direct participants。 Certain savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds； using cash that came from FSLIC…insured deposits。 Straining to show splendid earnings； these buyers recorded … but did not receive … ultra…high interest ine on these issues。 Many of these associations are now in major trouble。 Had their loans to shaky credits worked； the owners of the associations would have pocketed the profits。 In the many cases in which the loans will fail； the taxpayer will pick up the bill。 To paraphrase Jackie Mason； at these associations it was the managers who should have been wearing the ski masks。
最后还有一个令人不平的附带说明，零息债券的代价并不只由直接参与者自己承担而已，一些储贷机构由于是这些垃圾债券的大买家，利用由联邦政府所保险的人民储蓄存款来投资，为了尽量美化帐面盈余数字，这些单位将这些即使还没有收到的超高利息收入全部认列，许多储贷机构现在却因此面临严重的问题，若是他们那些债信不佳的债务人付出本金，当然状况就可以顺利解决，但问题是通常他们都付不出本金，到最后还是必须由整体纳税义务人来买单，套句Jackie Mason的话，应该是由这些储贷机构的经理人来戴区棍球面罩。
Mistakes of the First Twenty…five Years （A Condensed Version）
头25年所犯的错误（浓缩版）
To quote Robert Benchley； 〃Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity； perseverance； and to turn around three times before lying down。〃 Such are the shortings of experience。 Nevertheless； it's a good idea to review past mistakes before mitting new ones。 So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years。
套用Robert Benchley的名言：「要一只狗教小孩子忠诚、忍耐，并此能够滚三圈再在地上躺好」，这就是经验传承的难处，不过不论如何，再犯下一错误之前，最好能够先反省一下以前的那些错误，所以让我们花点时间回顾一下过去25年的经验。
My first mistake； of course； was in buying control of Berkshire。 Though I knew its business … textile manufacturing … to be unpromising； I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap。 Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years； though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was being aware that the strategy was not ideal。
首先我所犯的第一个错误，当然就是买下Berkshire纺织的控制权，虽然我很清楚纺织这个产业没什么前景，却因为它的价格实在很便宜而受其所引诱，虽然在早期投资这样的股票确实让我获利颇丰，但在1965年投资Berkshire后，我就开始发现这终究不是个理想的投资模式。
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price； there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit； even though the long…term performance of the business may be terrible。 I call this the 〃cigar butt〃 approach to investing。 A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke； but the 〃bargain purchase〃 will make that puff all profit。
如果你以很低的价格买进一家公司的股票，应该很容易有机会以不错的获利出脱了结，虽然长期而言这家公司的经营结果可能很糟糕，我将这种投资方法称之为「烟屁股」投资法，在路边随地可见的香烟头捡起来可能让你吸一口，解一解烟瘾，但对于隐君子来说，也不过是举手之劳而已。
Unless you are a liquidator； that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish。 First； the original 〃bargain〃 price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all。 In a difficult business； no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces … never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen。 Second； any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns。 For example； if you buy a business for 8 million that can be sold or liquidated for 10 million and promptly take either course； you can realize a high return。 But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for 10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost。 Time is the friend of the wonderful business； the enemy of the mediocre。
不过除非你是清算专家，否则买下这类公司实在是属于傻瓜行径，第一长期而言，原来看起来划算的价格到最后可能一点都不值得，在经营艰困的企业中，通常一个问题才刚解决不久，另外一个问题就又接踵而来，厨房里的蟑螂绝对不会只有你看到的那一只而已，第二先前的价差优势很快地就会被企业不佳的绩效所侵蚀，例如你用800万美元买下一家清算价值达1；000万美元的公司，若你能马上把这家公司给处理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，换算下来你的报酬可能会很可观，但是若这家公司要花上你十年的时间才有办法把它给处理掉，而在这之前你只能拿回一点点可怜的股利的话，相信我时间虽然是好公司的朋友，但却是烂公司最大的敌人。
You might think this principle is obvious； but I had to learn it the hard way … in fact； I had to learn it several times over。 Shortly after purchasing Berkshire； I acquired a Baltimore department store； Hochschild Kohn； buying through a pany called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire。 I bought at a substantial discount from book value； the people were first…class； and the deal included some extras … unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion。 How could I miss？ So…o…o … three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid。 After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn； I had memories like those of the husband in the country song； 〃My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot。〃
或许你会认为这道理再简单不过了，不过我却必须经历惨痛的教训才真正的搞懂，在买下Berkshire不久之后，我又买了巴尔的摩百货公司、Hochschild Kohn与一家叫多元零售公司（后来与Berkshire合并），我以相当的折价幅度买下这些公司，经营的人也属一流，整个交易甚至还有额外的利益，包含未实现的房地产增值利益与后进先出法的存货会计原则，我到底还漏掉了什么？ 还好三年之后，算我走狗运，能够以成本价左右的价格脱身，在跟Hochschild Kohn公司结束关系之后，我只有�
